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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND 
JOHN C. GREENLEAF, JR. . . . . . . . . . Plaintiff-i,n-Error 
vs. 
G. E. RICHARDS Def endant-i,n-Error 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR AND 
SUPERSEDEAS 
To the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia: 
Your Petitioner, John C. Greenleaf, Jr., respectfully rep-
resents that he is aggrieved by a final judgment of the Cir-
cuit Court of Greene County pronounced on the 25th day 
of May, 1940, in which G. E. Richards~ recovered a judg-
ment against your petitioner in the sum of Four Hundred 
Fi£ ty ( $450.00) Dollars with interest thereon from said 
date, together with costs. 
A duly authenticated copy of so much of the record as 
deemed necessary, is attached hereto as a part of this 
petition. 
The parties will be referred to in the positions which 
they occupied in the Trial Court. 
2* *COURT PROCEEDINGS 
This was an action for damages to plaintiff's automobile 
and alleged injuries to plaintiff arising out of a collision 
between two automobiles, the automobiles being driven by 
plaintiff Richar.ds proceeding in an easterly dicection along 
Z Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Route 33, a secondary road, with a stop sign thereon erected 
pursuant to directions of the Highway Commission, whereas 
defendant's automobile was approaching the intersection 
from the plaintiff's right in a northerly direction over U. 
S. 29. The proceeding was instituted by a motion found at 
page 1 et seq. of the record, the plaintiff claiming $500.00 
for personal injuries and $500.00 for damages to his car. 
The defendant filed a cross-claim for damages to his 
automobile in the amount of $300.00. Issue was joined on 
the pleadings as made on the 24th day of May, 1940, the 
jury was impaneled to try the case with the result that a 
verdict was found in favor of the plaintiff on May 25th, 
1940 for $450.00. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evi-
dence, defendant moved to strike the same, and again at 
the conclusion of all of the evidence, defendant again moved 
to strike. 
The defendant objected to various instruction offered by 
the plaintiff and excepted to their being given by the court, 
objected to the refusal of instructions offered for him, to 
the amendments of others offered for him, to the action 
of the court in refusing to receive other instructions for him 
which were necessary for the proper conduct of his 
3* case and to the action of *the court in refusing to 
give an instruction which the court had amended so 
,:i.s to embrace what the court said was a proper instruction 
to be given and excepted to the actions of the court with 
reference to these instructions. 
After the jury had found its verdict, defendant moved 
the Court to set the verdict aside and asked the Court to 
take these motions under advisement, but this motion was 
overruled as were the motions to strike and judgment was 
entered for the plaintiff forwith in the sum of $450.00 to 
which judgment a Writ of Error is now sought. 
4* *STATEMENT OF FACTS 
· In this case, the Jury found for the Plaintiff. Conse-
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quently, disputed questions of fact must be taken as estab-
Hshed in accordance with the verdict; subject to the exception 
that the Court is not bound to believe that which is inher-
ently impossible, or contrary to established physical facts; 
nor can the Plaintiff ask the Court to disbelieve his own 
testimony, or make for him any better case than he has made 
for himself by his own evidence, M ass1:e v. Firnistone, 134 
Virginia, 450, 462. We shall try to state the facts fairly 
from this standpoint. 
On December 20th, 1939, the Plaintiff, Richards, had 
travelled from Rehobeth Church in Lanchester County to 
Harrisonburg for the purpose of taking four young ladies 
from the Harrisonburg Normal School for the holidays. 
Mrs. Carter, mother of one of the young ladies, accompanied 
him. Consequently, on the return trip there were six per-
sons in the car-three on each seat. 
On the same day, the Defendant, Greenleaf, accompanied 
by his friend, Quintard Taylor, both students at the Uni-
versity of Virginia, left the University about 2 P. M., 
driving North on Federal State Highway 29, to spend the 
holidays at their homes in ~ew Yorks State. 
The Richards' car was. a five passenger, 1938 Chevrolet 
Sedan. Defendant Greenleaf's car was a 1936 Plymouth 
Coupe. 
S* * At Ruckersville, 16 miles North of the University 
of Virginia, Highway No. 29, running straight for 
miles and miles, and approximately North and South, is 
crossed by Highway No. 33, running East and West. High-
way No. 29 is one of the most heavily travelled highways in 
the State; carrying at all times a heavy and practically 
unbroken stream of North and South bound traffic. High-
way No. 33, running East and West, is not so heavily travel-
ed, and by appropriate stop signs, placed by the Department 
of State Highways, is made a subordinate or secondary high-
way as compared with Highway No. 29. 
It was testified, and not contradicted, that this is one 
of the most dangerous intersections in the state. Plaintiff 
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Richards testified that he knew this; that he had made this 
same trip for the purpose of taking these young ladies to 
and from Harrisonburg, some ten times or more; and that 
he was thoroughly familar with this intersection and its 
dangerous character (Ms. R. p. 17). 
Since the date of this accident, the Highway Department 
has undertaken to make it less dangerous by constructing 
a large circle directly in the centre of the intersection and 
flanking it with small triangles on all four sides, with approp-
rfate signs "Keep to the right", etc., and by moving the 
stop signs on No. 33 close up to the actual intersection. 
None of this was there at the time of the accident, but. on 
the other hand, the intersection was wide open, with approach-
ing cars visible for a long distance in every direction from 
the intersection. Highway No. 33 crosses this intersection 
practically on the level and almost at a right angle. To th~ 
South, on Highway No. 29, there is a slight "dip", 
6* so that cars approaching from the South *drop out 
of sight for a brief moment of time at a point about 
500 feet to the South of the intersection, but came into sight 
again, and continue in plain view, as they approach the 
intersection, from a point between 450 and 500 feet South · 
of the intersection. The Court has certified this to be a 
fact, so we take it to be conclusively established. ( See Ms. 
R. p. 190). 
(Note: On the plat, the engineer placed an arrow, some 
three inches long, pointing Southward d9wn U. S. No. 
29, with the notation beside it, "Visibility 1000 feet or more"; 
but an actual test, made by the Sheriff driving an ordinary 
five-passenger sedan, on the ocasion of the "view", showed 
that while Northbound cars on U. S. No. 29 came into plain 
view at a point about 500 feet South of the intersection, and 
remained in view until after passing the intersection, there 
was a dip about 600 feet South of the intersection in which 
~orthbound cars on U. S. No. 29 dropped out of sight; in 
other words, Northbound cars approaching the intersection 
over U. S. No. 29 came into sight at some point South of 
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the '15 m. p. h.' speed limit sign which, as shown by the plat •. 
set 419 feet South of the intersection.) . 
The various signs on U. S. No. 29, indicating an inter-
section ahead, stood at the time of the accident exactly as 
shown on the plat. The "stop" sign on Highway No. 33, 
stood then 80 feet West of the centre of the intersection, 
just as shown on the plat; but since then, upon ocasion of 
the construction of the circle and triangle mentioned, it 
has been moved right up to the intersection. This stop sign 
on No. 33, then and now, is of the large octagon shape, 
. black and yellow type. 
The collision occurred about 2 :30 P. M., December 20th, 
1939. The macadam on U. S. No. 29 was 20 feet 
7* in width; on Highway No. 33, it *was sixteen feet in 
width. The actual impact occu.rred on the intersection 
as defined by the lateral lines of the paved portions extended, 
but to the East <i>f the centre line of Highway No. 29. It 
had rained earlier in the day, but was not then raining. 
It was testified, and may be taken as established by the ver-
dict, that defendant Greenleaf's car left on the pavement, 
skid or impression marks for a:·• distance of fifty-three feet 
up to the poirit of impact, the lines made by said skid marks 
being practically straight, except turning to the right at or 
about the point of the impact. · 
From this and other evidence, the Plaintiff claimed the 
Defendant entered the intersection at an excessive speed. 
Plaintiff made various statements as to the speed at which he 
entered the intersection, placing his speed at five· to· eight 
miles per hour and that he slowed down ( one statement) 
to about three miles per hour upon entering the intersection .. 
By the evidence of his own mechanic, however, (Wit-
ness Zack Ashburn, Ms. R. p. 132) the radiator of Plain-
tiff Richards' car was driven back into the fan on the right 
hand side, which would seem to establish that the Plain-
tiff's car ran into the Defendant's car, and not vice versa. 
Be this as it may, it is fully established by the uncontra-
dicted evidence, that after the impact, and after the cars 
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had swung around and slapped together, the Defendant 
Greenleaf's car went East on Highway No. 33 a distance 
of thirty-six feet from the point of the impact; while Plain-
tiff Richards' car, evidently completely out of control, swung 
off to his left and went eight-one feet to the cement 
8* base of the gas pumps of a service *station in the 
Northeast corner of the intersection; one of the 
witnesses testifying that he thought, or feared, it was coming 
into the service station (Ms. R. p. 127). 
The Plaintiff and his witness, Mrs. Carter, first testified 
that as they approached the intersection from the West, 
Richards stopped at, or just a little past, the stop sign on 
Highway No. 33, which, as previously stated, stood, then, 
eighty-one feet West of the centre of the intersection. On 
page 17 (Ms. R. p. 62) he says, "I stopped at the stop 
sign where I could see". 
Otherwise, without attempting to fix the exact point at 
which Richards stopped, both he and Mrs. Carter testified 
that they stopped where they could see, plainly see, any car 
approaching the intersection from either direction-looked 
both ways-could see both ways-etc., etc., (Ms. R. pp. 
5, 6, et seq., page 62-17)-could see cars coming both ways. 
Plaintiff Richards further testifies (Ms. R. P. 18) that 
after stopping, he never looked to the right or left any 
more, neither before nor after entering the intersection, 
but looked straight ahead down Highway No. 33 in the 
direction he was travelling, and that he never saw the de-
fendant Greenleaf's car until after the impact. 
And mark you, this, notwithstanding Greenleaf's car was 
in plain view to anyone entering the intersection from High-
way No. 33 for a distance of niore than four hundred and 
fifty feet as it approached the intersection from the 
South. 
19* *Plaintiff Richards sued for the sum of $1,000.00., 
claiming $500.00 for personal injury to one of his 
.fingers, and $500.00 for damage to his ,car. The Jury denied 
him any recovery for injury io his .fin:ger, but gav.e .him 
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$450.00 for damage to his car. Defendant Greenleaf cross-
claimed for $300.00 for damage to his car. Defendant 
moved to set the verdict aside and this motion being over-
ruled, he now seeks a writ of error from this Court. 
10* *THE PHYSICAL FACTS 
The stop sign on Route No. 33 is 70 feet back from the 
\.Vestern intersection of U. S. No. 29 with Route No. 33. 
At the stop sign the absolute maximum visibility is 377 
feet; at the intersection the visibility is more than 450 
feet to the South, from which direction Greenleaf was ap-
proaching. The acident took place near the center line of 
Route No. 33 on the Northeast side of U. S. No. 29 so that 
Richards' car traveled more than 80 feet from the stop 
sign to the scene of the collision. While the absolute max-
imum visibility from the stop sign is 377 feet, it will be 
observed on the plat that there are some trees which would 
obscure the vision of a party stopping on Route No. 33. 
After reaching the intersection there is nothing to obscure the 
vision of one on Route No. 33, looking South along U. S. 
No. 29 for a distance of practically 500 feet where there is 
a slight dip. 
Richards admitted. to the Traffic Officer Parker on the 
day of the accident he had stopped at the stop sign, and 
also admitted that he had testified to that fact in Court at 
the hearing of Commonwealth vs. Richards, and in addition, 
made that statement in Court on the day of the trial of this 
case. 
In a long line of decisions commencing with Firmstone 
YS. Massie, 134 Va. 450, it is said on page 462: 
"No litigant can successfully ask a court or jury to believe 
that he has not told the truth. His statements of fact 
and the necessary inferences therefrom are binding upon 
him. He cannot be heard to ask that his case be made 
.stronger than he makes it, where, as here, it depends upon 
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facts within his own knowledge and as to which he has · 
testified." 
11 * *Richards never saw the Greenleaf car until after 
the impact. There were two passengers to his right 
on the front seat. Neither of them saw the car ( Greenleaf's) 
when they could and should have seen it, though one, Miss 
Olivia Carter, saw it just before it hit. 
All witnesses agree that Richards was going slowly. He 
says he was just shifting into second at the time of the 
accident, but even if he were only going seven m. p. h., as 
he says, Greenleaf, who had been decelerating his speed and 
who applied his brakes hard well back of the intersection,. 
could not have been out of Richards' range. of vision when 
Richards entered the intersection. 
The Richards' car struck the Greenleaf car, they pro-
ceeded parallel for a short distance, but, despite the fact 
that he was struck by the Richards' car and carried with it, 
the Greenleaf car stopped long before the Richards' car had 
stopped. The impact could not have added speed to Richards' 
car unless, in the excitement of running into a car which 
he had not seen, Richards stepped on his accelerator. 
If the Greenleaf car struck the Richards' car on the side 
it could not have mashed back the radiator into the fan. 
It is evident that, at the time of impact, Greenleaf' s car 
was almost, if not completely stopped, otherwise he would not 
have been carried parallel with the Richards' car for a 
short distance East along No. 33 but would have carried the 
Richards' car to the North along U. S. No. 29. 
12* *ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
The Court erred in the following particulars : 
FIRST: Refusing to enter a judgment in favor of the 
defendant notwithstanding the verdict of the Jury because 
the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence. 
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Plaintiff's own evidence and all of the evidence shows con-
clusively that if plaintiff's negligence was not the sole cause 
of the accident, then plaintiff was guilty of negligence which 
contributed efficiently to the accident and was guilty of 
concurrent negligence. 
SECOND: In entering judgment against the defendant 
on the verdict of the Jury. 
THIRD: The Court erred in refusing to strike the evi-
dence of the plaintiff as not being sufficient to go to the 
Jury at the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence. 
FOURTH: The Court erred in not sustaining the de-
fendant's motion at the conclusion of all of the evidence to 
strike out the evidence of the plaintiff. 
FIFTH : The Court erred in the giving of instructions. 
SIXTH: The Court erred in refusing to give instructions 
asked for by the defendant. 
SEVENTH: The Court erred in refusing to receive 
further instructions tendered by the defendant as he had 
not instructed the Jury fully upon the case. 
13* *ARGUMENT 
The first, second, third and fourth assignments will be 
argued together. We think this may best be done by set-
ting out the negligence of the defendant, if any, and the 
negligence of the plaintiff. We believe it clear as a matter 
of law that the defendant was guilty of no negligence and 
equally clear that as a matter of law plaintiff Richards was 
guilty of negligence contributing to the accident, and that 
to say the least, he was guilty of concurrent negligence. 
This will be set out on the next page. 
The fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh assignments of error 
deal with the instructions. In regard to these instructions, 
there are many and grievious error, not only in the giving 
of the instructions asked for by the defendant, and the 
refusal to give instructions asked for by the defendant. The 
.record _is in such shape .as to prevent our setting out these 
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errors with as much particularity as we would wish. We 
do not waive these errors and instructions which are plainly 
apparent from the transcript, but we believe the facts are 
sufficient to entitle the defendant to a judgment in his favor 
insofar as plaintiff's claim is concerned. 
14* *I 
NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT? 
It is respectfully submitted that the defendant was under 
duty to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances and 
that if he exercised such care, he is guilty of no negligence 
whatsoever. We believe it apparent he exercised ordinary 
care. 
It is not contradicted that defendant had left Charlottes-
Yille, sixteen miles away, around two P. M. and that the 
accident occurred around two-thirty P. M. The Court will 
take judicial notice that the distance from Charlottesville 
to Ruckersville is sixteen miles. Evidently the defendant 
had been driving at a careful rate of speed. He estimated 
that he had been driving fifty m. p. h. in the open country. 
Defendant was entirely familar with the road, knew of the 
stop signs on Route No. 33, knew that there were two signs 
on Route No. 29 in the vicinity of the accident, namely, 
"Cross Roads" and "Speed Limit-15 m. p. h." and he 
took this to mean, as we believe everyone takes it to mean 
and as we believe the true meaning to be, namely, that he 
should enter the intersection at 15 m. p. h. 
Had our requested instruction to this effect been granted, 
the result of the trial might have been far different. 
As defendant Greenleaf approached the intersection, it 
is not controverted that he applied his brakes lightly to reduce 
his speed to this amount, nor is it controverted that he 
applied them hard just before he entered the intersection and 
the physical facts, we believe, show that he had reduced 
his speed to this amount as he entered the intersec:tion. · 
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Defendant Greenleaf had observed plaintiff Rich-
15* ards' car *in the vicinity of the stop sign on Route 
No. 33, as it approached U. S. No. 29 in an Easterly 
direction. It was traveling slowly and the fact that it was 
traveling slowly led defendant Greenleaf to believe that 
plaintiff Richards would stop and yield defendant Green-
leaf the right of way to which he was entitled. 
While the Richards' car was in his view from the time it 
reached the approximate location of the stop sign until 
the collision, it never stopped while it was within the range 
of his vision. There was nothing to warn him until less . 
than two seconds before the acident that plaintiff would not 
stop his car before entering the intersection. Defendant 
Greenleaf was not required to anticipate and guard against 
the want of ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff. He 
had the right of way along a much traveled highway. He 
was, of course, bound t6 use proper care under the circum-
stances to avoid collision with an approaching vehicle but 
in determining whether reasonable care was exercised, it 
must be remembered that a driver having a right of way 
may take into consideration, as a factor upon which, with 
others, to base his conduct, the duty of other drivers to 
obey the law and the probablity that they will do so. (See 
Roth et al v. Hurd 13 A. (2d) 891 (1940). (Penna.) 
"Wherein was" ( Greenleaf) "negligent? It is natural 
to assume that one on a main highway" (As defendant 
Greenleaf) "approaching a crossing, would take it for granted 
that another on a secondary road likewise approaching it" 
(but who was approaching it slowly for a distance of about 
70 feet, was traveling slowly with the intention of 
16* stopping before entering the *intersection and) "giving 
the arterial traffic the right of way" a fortiori when 
plaintiff Richards' approaching car was on the left of 
defendant's Greenleaf's car. "One who is required to stop 
has not the right of way. That right, assuming that it 
had theretofore existed, is then suspended and remains sus-
pended until he can proceed with safety." (Words in 
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quotations are from Otey v. Blessing 170 Va. 542, 548 
and are apt here.) 
The rule governing this case was that Richards should 
not attempt to enter the arterial highway without exercising 
common prudence for the safety of himself and others; that 
common prudence required him to keep his eyes open, see 
what was there to be seen, not to do so until he could do 
so with reasonable safety, and then only after giving a signal 
plainly visible to the driver of approaching vehicles of his 
intention to start, at a proper time and place, and not to 
negligently mislead others as to his intention by approaching 
the intersection arterial highway slowly when he had stopped 
nearly 70 feet from its intersection at a place where he 
could not be readily seen; and unless the law requires Green-
leaf to anticipate Richards' negligence; then Greenleaf was 
guilty of no negligence. The flow of traffic along arterial 
highways would be seriously impeded, their very purpose· 
would be defeated, if such extraordinary care were re-
quired. 
ii* *II 
PRIMARY NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF 
The negligence of the · plaintiff is so glaring that it is 
in reality a case which argues itself. It seems necessary 
. to call attention only to the following among the other facts 
in the case: 
( 1) That plaintiff was guilty of negligence proximately 
and solely causing the accident in the following particulars: 
(a) In failing to stop his automobile to accord with the 
requirements of the road sign erected upon Route No. 33 
hy authority of the Highway Commission; (1932 P. 648, 
1934 p. 398; 1936 Va. Code Sec. 2154 (100); 
(b) In driving his said automobile immediately prior to 
the time of the accident recklessly and in a manner so as to 
endanger life, limb and property of others lawfully using 
the highway; ( 1938 S. V. Supp. 2154 ( 108) 
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( c) In failing to bring his vehicle to a stop inmiediately 
before entering a highway fro 111, a side road when there was 
traffic approaching upon such highwa1y within 500 feet from 
such highway point of entrance; (Ital. ours) (1938 V. C. 
Supp. 2154 ( 109) ( If he actually did stop he also violated · 
Sec. 2154 ( 122) V. C. 1932 . p. 654; 1934 p. 400, in that 
before starting again he failed "first to see that such move-
ment ( could) be made in safety" for surely to stop approx-
imately 70 feet back of an intersection where his vision was 
100 feet less than it would have been had he stopped at the 
intersection, and then to travel slowly forward in first gear 
at a speed of 7 or 8 m. p. h. for a distance of more than 70 feet 
and not to look again does not meet with the requirements 
of the statute.) 
18* * ( d) In driving his vehicle upon a State High-
way so as to unnecessarily block, hinder and retard 
the orderly and safe use of the highway; 1938 V. C. Supp. 
2154 (109) 
( e) In violating the provision of the right-of-way laws 
when two vehicles approach or enter an intersection at 
approximately the same time; 1932 p. 654, 1936 V. C., 
sec. 2154 (123) 
( f) If not heeding the danger which he should have seen 
and would have seen had he looked with seeing eyes at any 
time after passing the stop sign. 
While it is respectfully submitted that these acts of neg-
ligence were the sole cause of the accident, assuming for the 
purpose of argument that they were not the sole causes 
of the accident, they undoubtedly efficiently contributed to 
the same and should bar any recovery by the plaintiff herein. 
Again admitting for the sake of argument that defendant 
was guilty of any negligence, although we do not believe that 
he was, plaintiff was also guilty of negligence which con-
curred until the very moment of collision and should bar any 
recovery by him as a matter of law. 
(A) "There can be no doubt about" (Richards') "neg-
ligence. The stop sign standing at the crossing and the 
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mandate of the statute code, section 2154 ( 132) give to the 
.high road the right of way. Yet" though the approaching 
Greenleaf car was but a short distance away and had been 
1n view, had plaintiff Richards looked, ever since Richards 
l1ad gone a short distance f i:-om the stop sign, if not before, 
and although Richards had been traveling slowly and 
19* could have stopped his car within a few *feet, and 
had !ooked with seeing eyes could have seen to his 
:right a distance of 500 feet from the intersection ( a greater 
distance .:han defendant Greenleaf's car r.c·~1Id po.c;;:;ibly have 
been, as Richards entered the intersection) Richards drove 
steadily ahead in Greenleaf's path and although the physical 
fact that Richards' car struck the Greenleaf car is shown 
.by the testinwny of Richards' repairman. Zack Ashcurn. 
( .Ms. R. p. 134) that "the radiator had been knocked back 
into the fan:' ... "on the right hand side'': Richard~; nev<!r 
~aw the GreenJt>af car until after the impac: (Ms. R. p. 
1~). 
·;It was almost a suicidal movement, to stot)" (if plain-
tiff Richards did stop) "and not to look is inexcusable and 
inexplainabie". (Words in· quotations are from Otey v. 
Blessing, 170 Va. 542, 548 and are apt here.) 
Perhaps even more apt is the final paragraph in the 
above case on page 552 as adopted (Words in quotations 
from the text): "The trouble in this case is that Mr." 
(Richards) "went upon" (U. S. No. 29) "without looking 
and while" (some of his witnesses said) "that" (Greenleaf) 
"was running at a" ( speed greater than 1 S m. p. m.) "yet 
by his own testimony it is plain that he did not see" ( Green-
leaf) "until" (after) "the moment of the accident" even 
though the physical facts show that the right hand front 
of his car ran into the Greenleaf car. 
If defendant Greenleaf's car were really speeding, which 
we assert is contrary to the physical facts and to the weight 
of the credible evidence, then plaintiff Richards' negligence 
is all the greater. 
20* *Most apt is the followi~g .adapted from Yellow 
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Cab Co. vs. Gulley, 169 Va. 617-618 (Words in quotatio~~ 
from the text) : . 
"The law requires the driver of a car to keep a proper 
lookout, in order that he may avail himself of what the 
lookout discloses to prevent injury to himself as well as to 
others. Keeping a lookout is without avail unless one uti-
lizes the information thereby secured. One who keeps a 
lookout, and fails to take advantage of what it discloses, 
is as guilty of negligence as one who fails to keep a lookout. 
The result is the same. He who doesn't take heed of a 
danger signal, plaintly seen with the eyes, might just as 
well shut his eyes to the signal. It is as true today as it 
was in the days of prophet, Isiah, that the fate of one who 
seeth but observeth not, is preordained. The rule that one 
should exercise ordinary and reasonable care to a void danger 
is as old as the law of self-preservation. None are so blind 
as those who will not see." 
"The car of the plaintiff was in a place of safety when the 
owner" ( could have and should have) "had knowledge of 
the danger immediately" ( to his right) "and instantly coming 
closer. Heedless of every sense of precaution, in the face 
of a known danger," (he) "proceeded closer to it, and if" 
(he) "did not actively and actually thrust" (himself) "into 
the danger", (he) "did, in fact, invite it. Even if" (Rich~ 
ards) "had the right of way", (and he did not have it, he) 
''was not absolved from exercising due care and ordinary 
drcumspection to avoid injury to" (himself) "and others.'~ 
Nichoison v. Garland 156 Va. 745, 158 S. E. 901; Johnson 
. . v. Harrison, 161 Va. 804, 172 S. E. 259. 
21 * * ( B) The plaintiff testifies and the evidence cor:-
roborates the fact that immediately prior to the ac.:"' 
~ident he was driving slowly. In Nicholson v. Garland, 
supra, Mr. Justice Browning delivered the opinion ~f th~ ., . 
~ourt said: ,1_:{.- · • .. · · 
"It is not to be denied that the driver of a car may Qe 
guilty of negligence, though he is proceeding at a slow rate 
~ -, ·- ' ""., ... "· -
·16 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
of speed. His caution in the matter of speed :will not absolve 
him from the duty of keeping a proper and effective look-
out for oncoming vehicles wh~n he is about to enter an 
intersection. In the performance of this duty we think the 
defendant failed and he was, therefore, guilty of negligence. 
That the contributory negligence of the plaintiff and the 
primary negligence of the defendant occurred to cause the 
accident is apparent. 
"In the case of Bohlkin v. Ports1nouth, 146 Va. 340, 348, 
131 S. E. 790, 792, 44 A. L. R. 810, it was said: 'It should 
be remembered that the duty of the trial judge to set aside a 
verdict of the jury where the same is not justified by the 
law and the evidence is just as imperative as is the duty to 
sustain the verdict where a contrary condition exists.' 
"The strength of the plaintiff's was that he had the 
right of way, and that is true, under the provisions of the 
sratute, unless he was trav~ling at an unlawful speed, or 
another vehicle was already within the intersection." 
In the instant case, the very slowness with which plain-
tiff was traveling was not only negligence in blocking "a 
very dangerous intersection" and "a very heavily traveled 
highway" but, also, he led the defendant to believe that he 
would yield him the right of way to which he was entitled. 
In this case, the plaintiff did not have the right of way 
and, if he were in the intersection first, he must have entered 
it at approximately the same time as did the defendant. 
(C) According to the physical facts, the Greenleaf car 
must have been within 500 feet from the intersection 
22* when plain-*tiff Richards entered theron. 
( D) ( E) · ( F) That the duty set out in these 
paragraphs owed by plaintiff Richards to defendant Green-
leaf needs no argument. It is aparent that their violation, 
if not the sole proximate cause of the accident, did efficiently 
contribute thereto. 
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It seems conclusive, as a matter of law, that the plain-
tiff failed to look seasonably,· if at all. If he glanced and 
missed seeing the defendant Greenleaf' s car and then after-
ward, without observing what any prudent man could have 
observed, pulled into U. S. No. 29 in the path of the Green-
leaf car, then but a short distance away, it was obviously 
gross negligence. Furthermore, he was guilty of obvious 
uegligence, after starting, in continuing across the road 
without looking again. 
Blashfield' s Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, 
Volume 2, Chapter 27, pages 128 to 263, discusses fully 
the right of way of motorists at intersections and crossing 
of streets or highways. Page 228 reads: 
"A driver who attempts to cross an intersection looking 
directly ahead, without looking up the intersecting streets for 
approaching vehicles, and collides with a vehicle approach-
ing on such a street, must be deemed guilty of negligence 
per se, if had he looked before attempting to cross, he 
would have seen the colliding car coming a short distance 
away." 
Page 222: "The erratic conduct of the operator of a 
motor vehicle at an intersection may be so misleading as 
to constitute negligence. 
23* *"A motorist who slows down after entering a 
street intersection for the purpose of allowing another 
vehicle approaching on an intersecting street to pass in 
front, the driver of the latter vehicle, changing his course 
for that purpose, will be guilty of negligence if he again 
starts his machine and drives in front of the other vehicle. 
Page 223 : "Where both drivers approach an intersection 
at approximately the same time slow down, the one having 
the right of way is justified in believing that the other 
driver intends to recog.ni?e such right. of way and to in-
crease speed to pass the crossing." · 
The .Plaintiff .had _no right of way even had he stop_pe.d at 
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the intersection. Not only was Greenleaf approaching an 
his tight, but he was practically at the intersection when 
Richards came into the same. 
Some confusion occurs in the evidence because many of 
. the witnesses thought that the intersections were the begin-
. ·ing of the "Y's" but under section No. 2154 ( 49) (Z-1) 
Y; C. intersection is defined as "The area embraced within 
the prolongation of the lateral curb lines, or if none, then 
(he lateral boundary lines of two or more highways, which 
join one another at an angle, whether or not one such 
highway crosses the other." This was a country inter-
section and there were no curb lines·. 
It is respect£ ully submitted that Richards' right to _pro-
ceed, after first stopping, if he did stop, was suspended until 
the Greenleaf car had passed. He had no opportunity:; in 
the exercise of ordinary care, to enter the arterial high-
way with reasonable safety to himself and others 
24* until he had done this and nothing *could justify 
his pulling blindly into the arterial road and striking 
G·reenleaf' s car. . ~ -~ 
"An automobile driver desiFing to cross (through) high-
way must stop, make reasonable observations, and proceed 
t~.rith reasonable dispatch, (Ital. ours) having in mind super-
ior rights of drivers on 'through' highway and that they drive 
rapidly." Adams v. Canfield, 248 N. W., 800; 263 Mich., 
606. ( Quoted from note Blashfield, Vol. 2, bottom page 
217. The last five words are not applicable here, according 
to our viewpoint.) 
If Greenleaf did approach the highway rapidly, how-
ever, Richards should have anticipated it. If all cars travel-
ing on U. S~ No. 29 came slowly, would Richards "be 
afraid" of this intersection? He had been over it at least 
ten times; he "kne'V the intersection thoroughly" ; he "knew 
it was a dangerous intersection", ipse dixit, yet he entered 
upon the arterial highway after stopping about 70 feet back, 
withput looking further, without signalling and without 
prtid&ice~. 
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Under any aspect of the evidence, Richards was guilty 
as a matter of law, of negligence contributing to the acci-
dent, if not of gross negligence. 
25* *CONCLUSION 
Wherefor, Your Petitioner prays that a writ of error 
may be granted to the judgment aforesaid, and a supers~deas 
thereto awarded; that the judgment may be reversed, the· 
• • I 
verdict of the Jury set aside, and the final judgment entered 
for your Petitioner. _ 
Your Petitioner avers that .on the 25th day of September;. 
1940, a copy of this"·petition'\vas mailed to R. 0. Norris, 
Esq., of Lively, Virginia, one of the attorneys of record 
f 1 . "ff . ( or the ,p amtt . · · · · . 
Your .Petitioner requests .. that he may be premitted: to 
1 
supplement this written pe~ition\ by an·, oral ~tatement L of 
the reasons for review~ng ,· the judgment :corhplained bf. 
And your Petitioner wilr ·~ver .: pray, etc. 
JOHN C. GREENLEAF, JR.: 
. ) l 
By WM. ESKRIDGE DUKE atid 
HOMER RICHEY, Counsel. 
Per W. E. DUKE 
~TM. ESKRIDGE DUKE of 
Duke & Duke 
No. 1 Court Sq. Bldg. 
Charlottesville, Va. 
HOMER RICHEY 
Fifth St., N. E. 
Charlottesville, Va. 
ST ATE OF VIRGINIA 
COUNTY OF ALBEMARLE, to-wit: 
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I, William E. Duke, attorney at law, practicing in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that in my 
opinion there is error in the judgment complained of in the 
foregoing petition, for which the same should be reviewed 
by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
WILLIAM E. DUKE 
Received Sept. 25, 1940. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
November 29, 1940. Writ of error and supersedeas 
awarded by the court. Bond $800. 
M. B. W. 
RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Please before the Judge of the Circuit Court of the County 
of Greene, at the courthouse thereof, on Friday, May 24th, 
1940. 
Be It Remembered that heretofore, to-wit, in the Clerk's 
Office of said court on the 1st day of May, 1940, came 
G. E. Richards and filed his notice of motion against John 
C. Greenleaf, Jr., which notice is in these words: 
NOTICE OF MOTION 
• 
To John C. Greenleaf, Jr.: 
You are hereby notified that on the 20th day of May, 1940, 
at eleven o'clock A. M., or as soon thereafter as it may be 
heard, I wi11 move the Circuit Court of Greene County at 
the Court House at Standardsville in said county in the 
State of Virginia for a judgment against you for the sum of 
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one thousand dollars ($1000.00), five hundred dollars ($500.-
00) of which said sum is due and owing by you to me for the 
damages, wrongs and injuries hereinafter set forth, to-
wit: 
That heretofore, to-wit, on the 20th day of December, 
1939, I was possessed of a Chevrolet Automobile 
page 2 ~which was then bting lawfully driven by me in 
an easterly direction over and along that certain 
state highway, leading from Harrisonburg to Barbours-
ville in said county, near its intersection with that certain 
other state highway, leading from Charlottesville to Wash-
ington, D. C. ; and you were then and there driving a cer-
tain Plymouth Coupe 'Automobile, owned by you, in a 
northerly direction along that said state highway, leading 
from Charlottesville to vVashington, D. C., and near its 
intersection with the aforesaid state highway leading from 
Harrisonburg to Barboursville, which said state highways 
cross at Ruckersville in said County of Greene; and there-
upon it became and was your duty in attempting to cross 
said highway, leading from Harrisonburg to Barbours-
ville, to use reasonable care in the management and operation 
of your said automobile, to drive your vehicle at a speed 
and in a manner so as not to endanger, or be likely to 
endanger Iif e, limb or property of any person, to drive at 
a reasonable speed under the circumstances and traffic con-
ditions existing at the time, in order to avoid a collision 
with pedestrians and vehicles traveling on said state high-
way, leading from Harrisonburg to Barboursville, and, if 
necessary in order to a void a collision, to bring your auto-
mobile to a full stop before entering the area of intersection 
of said two highways. 
Notwithstanding your said duty and notwithstanding the 
fact that you had been warned of an approaching intersection 
by two signs erected by the State Highway Department on 
the side of the highway on which you were 
page 3 ~traveling, you failed to use such care, and so 
carelessly and negligently drove and managed 
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your said automobile in attempting to cross said state high-
way, leading from Harrisonburg to Barboursville, that it 
ran into and struck my said automobile, which was then 
being driven by me in a lawful and proper manner on said 
state highway leading from Harrisonburg to Barboursville, 
with great force and violence, which was thereby crushed, 
broken and injured, by reasol} of which and as the proxi-
mate result whereof I have been damaged to the extent of 
five hundred dollars aforesaid; and although you are fully 
aware of the said damage and injury caused and done by 
you to me by reason of said careless negligent and wrongful 
acts and doings, and.although I have heretofore made demand 
upon you for payment therefor, yet you have wholly failed 
and refused to pay the same. 
And five hundred dollars ($500.00) representing the resi-
due of the aipount for which judgment is asked under this 
notice of motion is due and owing by you to me for the 
damages, wrqngs and injuries hereinafter set forth, to-wi~: 
That heretofore, to-wit, on the 20th day of December, 
1939, I was possessed of a Chevrolet Automobile which was 
then being lawfully driven by me in an easterly direction 
over and alo~g that certain state highway, leading from 
Harrisonburg to Barboursville in said county, near its inter-
section with t~at certain other state highway, leading from 
Charlottesville·,to Washington, D. C.; and you were then 
and there driving a certain Plymouth Coupe Auto~ 
page 4 ~mobile, owned by you, in a northerly direction a-
long that said state highway, leading from Char-: 
lottesville to W:ashington, p. C., and near its intersection 
with the aforesaid state highway leading from Harrisonburg 
to Barboursville, which said state highways cross at Ruckers-: 
ville in said County of Greene; and thereupon it became and 
was your duty ..in attempting to cross said highways; leading 
from Harrisonburg to Barboursville, to use reasonable care 
Jn the managern~nt and operation of your said automobile, 
·10 drive your vehicle at a speed and in a manner so as not 
to endanger, or lj~ l~ely tp -endanger ·life, limb- or property 
~ • t • • • - ., - •• - - • 
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of any person, to drive at a reasonable speed under the cir-
cumstances and traffic conditions existing at the time, in 
order to avoid a collision with pedestrians and vehicles travel-
ing on said state highway, leading from Harrisonburg to 
Barboursville, and, if necessary in order to avoid a col-
lision, to bring your automobile to a full stop before enter-
ing the area of intersection of said two highways. 
Notwithstanding your said duty and notwithstanding the 
fact that you had been warned of an approaching intersection 
by two signs erected by the State Highway Department on 
the side of the highway on which you were traveling, you 
failed tQ use such care, and so carelessly and negligently 
drove and managed your said automobile in attempting to 
cross said state highway, leading from Harrisonburg to 
Barboursville, that it ran into and struck my said auto-
mobile, which was then being driven by me in a lawful and 
proper manner on said state highway leading from Har-
risonburg to Barboursville, with great force and violence 
and threw me into and against said automobile 
page 5 rwith great force and violence thereby injuring my 
left hand and causing me great bodily suffering 
and pain, together with loss of the use of my said le£ t 
hand, by reason of which and as the proximate result 
whereof I have been damaged to the extent of five hundred 
dollars aforesaid; and although you are fully aware of the 
said damage and injury caused and done by you to me by 
reason of said careless negligent and wrongful acts and do-
ings, and although I have heretofore made demand upon you 
for payment therefor, yet you have wholly failed and refused 
to pay the same. 
Wherefore judgment for the aforesaid sum of one thous-
and dollars ($1000.00) will be asked at the hands of said 
court at the time and place herein above set out. 
Given under my hand this 24th day of April, 1940. 
Respectfully, 
(SGD) G. E. RICHARDS 
By Counsel 
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(sgd) R. 0. NORRIS, JR. 
{sgd) JOHN S. CHAPMAN, P. Q." 
page 6 ~ And at another day, to-wit, at a Circuit Court 
continued and held for said County at the Court-
house thereof on Friday, May 24, 1940, the defendant filed 
the following plea of not guilty, to-wit : 
PLEA OF NOT GUILTY 
And the said John C.· Greenleaf, Jr., by his attorneys, 
comes and says that he is not guilty of the suppqsed tres-
passes above laid to his charge, or any or either of them 
in manner and form as the said plaintiff hath above com-
plained against him and of this he puts himself upon the 
country. 
(sgd) R. N. EARLY 
(sgd) WM. E. DUKE 
(sgd). HOMER RICHEY 
for Defendant" 
And at the same time, the defendant filed his grounds 
of defense to plaintiff's notice of motion, as follows : 
GROUNDS OF DEFENSE 
For grounds of defense the defendant says: 
1. That he was not guilty of negligence as alleged in 
plaintiff's notice of motion, and was guilty of 
page 7 ~no negligence which proximately caused or effic. 
iently contributed to the accident referred to in 
-the notice of motion ; · 
2. That at the time of the accident, defendant Greenleaf 
was operating his automobile in a northerly direction on 
U. S. No. 29 in a careful and prudent manner and with due 
regard to the rights of others using said highway; that de-
fendant, in obedience to the sign upon U. S. No. 29 reduced 
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his speed as he approached the cross road and entered up-
on the same at a speed of 15 miles an hour as required by 
law; that prior to the accident, defendant Greenleaf observed 
plaintiff Richards coming out from behind a sign and a 
stop sign which were situated about 80 feet to the west 
of the center line of the intersection of Highway No. 33 
with U. S. No. 29; that defendant Greenleaf knew that 
there was a stop sign upon Route 33 and had naturally 
supposed that plaintiff Richards would stop his car before 
entering the intersection of Route 33 over which he was 
travelling in an easterly direction and U. S. 29; not only 
on account of this stop sign but because plaintiff Richards 
was required by law to stop before entering said intersection 
irrespective of said sign, and further expected the right 
of way to be given him because the Richards car was ap-
proaching from his left, yet the plaintiff failed to stop his 
said car and failed to yield the right of way to said defen-
dant. 
3. That when defendant saw plaintiff did not intend to 
stop and yield him the right of way to which he was en-
titled, he did all that he could to avoid a collision, 
page 8 ~applying his brakes still more sharply and cutting 
to his right, and that the accident was proximately 
caused by the negligent manner in which said plaintiff 
Richards operated his said automobile; 
4. That even if the defendant Greenleaf were guilty of . 
negligence, which is hereby expressly denied, ·plaintiff Rich-
ards would not be entitled to recovery in this action because 
said plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which 
proximately caused or efficiently contributed to the injury of 
\vhich he complains, said acts of. negligence being among 
others the following: 
(a) That the plaintiff Richards failed to stop the auto-
mobile he was driving at the intersection of Route No. 33 
with U. S. 29 when he reached the same while driving as 
aforesaid along Route No. 33 ; 
( b) That plaintiff Richards neglige~y and carelessly 
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fail~d to keep a proper lookout as he approached the inter-
section aforesaid for cars approaching from the right as 
was defendant's car which in the exercise of reasonable 
care and in keeping a proper lookout, he should have seen 
and to which he should have yielded the right of way; 
( c) That plaintiff Richards negligently and carelessly , 
failed to keep a proper lookout when entering upon U. S. 
29, as had he done so, he could have avoided said collision 
by stopping his said car and yielding 
0
to the defendant the 
right of way to which defendant was entitled; instead, 
plaintiff negligently attempted to get across U. S. 29 in 
front of defendant when the position of the cars was such 
as to render this impossible, and that this negli-
page 9 ~gence on the part of plaintiff directly and prox-
mately contributed and actually and primarily 
caused the damages of which he has complained; as did the 
following: 
( d) Failure to exercise ordinary care to avoid the col-
lision; 
( e) Driving his car with two passengers on the front seat 
so that his vision to the right was obscured, negligent dis-
regard for the safety of others, failure to anticipate the 
presence of others lawfully using the highway, failure to 
stop after observing the Greenleaf car; 
( f) Failure to stop his car after the Greenleaf car could 
~ave been observed by keeping a proper lookout; failure to 
exercise ordinary care and prudence in the circumstances. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN C. GREENLEAF, JR. 
By (sgd) R. N. EARLY 
(sgd) WM. E. DUKE 
(sgd) HOMER RICHEY 
.H.N.EARLY 
HOMER RICHEY 
W. E. DUKE, p. d." 
Counsel for Defendant 
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page 1,0 ~ And at another day, to-wit, on the 25th of 
May, 1940, the following order was entered: 
FINAL ORDER 
"This day came the parties in person and with counsel, 
same jury as of yesterday, and the Court and Jury viewed 
the scene of action; and the Court after giving instructions 
in this cause and hearing the argument of counsel on both 
sides, the Court sent the Jury to their room to consider 
of their verdict. And the jury after remaining out for 
a while returned into Court and agreed upon the following 
verdict: "We, the jury, find for the plaintiffs $450.00 
Four Hundred and Fifty Dollars damages to car." 
J. A. DUNN, Foreman. 
Whereupon counsel for the defendant moved the Court to 
set aside said verdict and award him a new trial upon the· 
ground that the same was contrary to the law and the evi--
clence and without evidence to support the same, and errors· 
apparent of record; and the Court, after considering the 
same, doth overrule the said motion, to which action of 
the Court the defendant excepts and assigns his reasons 
therefor. 
Therefore, it is considered and ordered by the Court 
that the said plaintiffs do recover against the said defen-· 
dant, John C. Greenleaf, Jr., the sum of $450.00, 
page 11 ~the damages assessed by the jury as aforesaid, 
with interest theron to be computed at the rate of 
six per centum per annum from the 25th day of May, 1940, 
until paid, and their costs by them in this behalf expended. 
And the counsel for the defendant having signified his 
intention to present a petition to the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of Virginia for a writ of error and the said def en-· 
dant by counsel having moved the Court for a suspension of 
the execution of said judgment for a period of sixty days 
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to enable him to present his petition to the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia, the Court doth adjudge and order 
that the execution of said judgment be and the same hereby 
is suspended for a period of 60 days from the 25th day of 
May, 1940, upon condition that the said defendant or some 
one for him shall execute within a period of 30 days a 
bond in the penalty · of $250.00 before the Clerk of this 
Court with surety to be approved by said Clerk, said bond 
to be conditioned as the law directs. 
page 13 ~ CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION 
NO. 1 
The following is hereby . certified by the Court as all of 
the evidence introduced on the trial of this case, both for 
the plaiqtiff and the defendant as hereinafter denoted : 
VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENE 
COUNTY 
' G. E. RICHARDS, etc., ............. ~ . . . . . . . Plaintiff 
v. 
JOHN C. GREENLEAF, JR., ............. Defendant 
EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE HONORABLE 
LEMUEL F. SMITH, JUDGE 
May 24th and May 25th, 1940 
APPEARANCES 
R. 0. Norris, Jr. and John S. Chapman for the plaintiff 
Vv. E. Duke, Homer Richey and R. N. Early for the defen-
dant. 
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G. E. Richards 
Mr. G. E. Richards, the Plaintiff, being first duly sworn, 
testified in his own behalf as follows : 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF BY. MR. NORRIS: 
Q. Mr. Richards, where do you live? 
A. I live at Rehobeth Church, Virginia. 
Q. What County? 
A. Northumberland County, adjoining Lanchester. 
Q. Mr. Richards, how long have you been driving a car? 
A. About twenty-three years. 
page 14 ~ Q. On this occasion that this collision occurred, 
where had you been? 
A. I had gone up to I:Iarrisonburg to bring four young 
ladies back for the Christmas holidays, back from school. 
They all lived down there where I live, one lived in the 
house where I am a boarder and others were neighbors, 
I knew their parents. 
Q. You had been to Harrisonburg to the State Normal 
College to get these four young ladies? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had you ever made that trip before? 
A. I have. 
Q. Did you take any one with you? 
A. I took Mrs. Grace Carter, the Mother of one of the 
g1rls. 
Q. Did you have her with you on your return trip? 
A. Yes, she was with us. 
Q. Will you tell the Court and the Gentlemen of the 
Jury just w~o it was in your car on this retu~n trip? 
A. Mrs. Carter, as I said and her daughter, Miss Olivia 
Carter. 
The Court: I would suggest that you place them in the 
car. 
A. Mrs. Carter and her daughter, Olivia, were in the 
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front seat, Miss Alice Ingram, Miss Margaret Montgomery, 
and Miss Beth Hardy were on the rear seat. Four 
page 15 rgirls Mrs. Carter and myself. 
Q. About what time-I belive you have stated 
you were on your way from Harrisonburg home? 
A. That is right. 
Q. When the collision occurred? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Will you state approximately what time it was and the 
date? 
A. It was the 20th of December, I think about twenty 
minutes to three o'clock? 
Q. You mean last December? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now Mr. Richards, in your own language-first I 
am going to show you this map, you have never had an 
opportunity to see it, so I am going to ask you to look at 
this map 
( At this point this witness inspects the map ref erred to 
by counsel) . 
Q. Now, let's turn it over, so we can see the road the 
way it is there. Right here apparently this is the inter-
section. 
A. Yes, that is 33, this is the road I was on. 
Q. You were on 33, this is the intersection here, and 
this is 29? 
A. Yes, this right. 
Q. Coming from Charlottesville? 
page 16 r. A. Yes, North. 
Q. And 33 is from Harrisonburg to Standards-
ville? 
A. That is right. 
Q. And this intersection occurs at Ruckersville? 
John C. Greenleaf, Jr. v. G. E. Richards 31 
G. E. Richards 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where is the old location,·'of the Stop sign on 33? 
A. Is this east here? 
By the Court: Let me suggest this that you all agree that 
"the opening statements regarding the re-location of the 
stop signs and the change at the intersection is an accurate 
statement on that subject. 
Mr. Norris : So far as I know. 
The Court : I want the record to show that the scene 
there today is not the scene there in December. 
Mr. Duke : And it should be further stipulated that 
Senator Chapman and I had the surveyor go there and 
agreed that he should draw the road, not as it exists 
today, but prior to the changes made by the State High-
way Department, and for that purpose he was furnished 
plans of the State Highway, and consulted some members 
of the State Highway Department on the ground, and it 
is stipulated that that survey is an accurate plat of the 
property as it existed at the time of the accident. 
The Court: Is that correct, gentlemen for the Plain-
tiff? 
page 17 r Mr. Chapman: I think so. 
Q. You have examined this map, and later 
on I am going to ask you some questions regarding it, but 
. first I want you to state to the Jury exactly what happened 
when you approached the intersetcion of 29 and 33, you 
coming east on 33 ? 
A. I stopped. I came to a dead stop. 
Q. Did you see the stop sign? 
A. Yes, I saw the stop sign. 
Q. And you stopped? . 
A. I have been over that road for the last three years tak-
ing these girls to and from Harrisonburg, and I have seen 
the travel at that intersection. and have been afraid of it, 
and very careful not to cross that intersection without 
32 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
G. E. Richards 
stopping, I came to a dead stop, as to my position in relation 
to the sign I don't know, all I know is that I stopped out 
far enough where I could see both ways, and I looked both 
ways. Mrs. Carter was on the front seat with me, and 
nothing ever escapes her in the car, and she looked both 
ways. 
Q. Do you mean both ways on the north and south route, 
which I believe is 33? 
A. 29, yes. 
The Court: It is agreed by counsel that 33 runs east 
and west and, will be so described; and that 29 
page 18 ~runs north and south and will be so described. 
Q. Go ahead sir? 
A. When I stopped, I stopped out far enough in the 
intersection to see both ways, I don't know how far it 
was out, but when I saw the road was clear, I started up 
and didn't stop any more. I didn't think the law required 
me to, I had stopped once, and saw nothing, and I pulled 
on ahead into the intersection, I imagine I was about in 
the center of the intersection, when I was struck, I couldn't 
say positively, I may have been a little over on the right side 
going east, and about in the middle of 29, I would say. 
Q. Mr. Richards, if you know, how far approximately 
was this car that struck you, from you, when you first 
saw it? 
A. I never did see it. 
Q. You didn't see the car? 
A. No. 
Q. Which way were you looking at the time? 
A. I was looking straight ahead on the road I was going, 
there were some other cars there, I don't believe I met 
one, but there were some other .cars pulling out from. the 
Filling Station on the right of . 33. 
Q. You were watching them? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And when you stopped your car, you stopped 
page 19 ~out far enough to see up and down the pther road? 
A. Yes. -~ 
Q. And you saw nothing? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You then pulled into the inteftsection? 
A. Yes. 
~Q. On you right side of the road-
Mr. Richey: I suggest that counsel should not lead 
the witness. 
The Court : That is all right unless counsel intimates 
an answer, it is perfectly all right so long as you don't 
answer it for him. 
Q. What part of your car, Mr. Richards was struck by 
the Greenleaf car? 
A. I don't know what part struck first, the whole right 
side was crushed, the radiator was torn lose, and the right 
side was bent and mashed up, front fender and rear fen-
der, of course, were both smashed. The whole right side of 
the car was crushed. 
Q. After the impact what did your car do? 
A. It turned it looked like to me . to the left, to the north 
and cut across the road, of course, the car was rocking 
back and forth, and before I could get control of it, it 
had gone almose to the filling station on this other corner 
here, almost to the tanks. 
The Court: Describe that as th~ north east cor-
ner. 
page 20 ~ Q. To a certain extent, then the impact turned 
you back? · 
A. No, it turned me facing north east, almost directly at 
that filling station. 
Did you stop your car, or allow it to run until it stopped 
itself? 
A I stopped it. It was going at a pretty .agood speed then. 
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Q. Was it going at a more rapid speed after the impact 
before it stopped, than it was before the impact? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. Will you state at which rate of speed you were travel-
ling at the time of the impact? 
A. I would say not over 7 or 8 miles an hour, I had come 
to a full stop, and just started up, I had not shifted gea_rs, 
I think I was in the act of shifting when it happened, but I 
know I hadn't shifted into second. 
Q. What became of the Greenleaf car? 
A. It stopped just a little bit north and east, I would 
. say of the exact center of the intersection and sat there 
for sometime, until the Traffic Officer came up, and Mr. 
Greenleaf asked him finally if he could move it, it was block-
ing traffic. 
Q. Mr. Richards, give your approximate _opinion, or your 
opinion from the best of your knowledge and belief, the ap-
proximate speed of the Greenleaf -car, when you first observed 
it. 
Mr. Richey: He said he hadn't seen it. 
The Court : I understood him to testify that he 
i;age 21 ~didn't see the Greenleaf car. 
Q. You didn't see the Greenleaf car until after 
the impact? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. How did you get home you and your party? 
A. We had a taxi-cab from Standardsville here, come 
out and take us all home there in the taxi-cab. 
Q. You had to leave your car at Ruckersville? 
A. I left the car at Ruckersville at a garage. A garage-
man took it into his garage for storage, until I could send 
up and get it. 
Q. Have you had occasion to examine 29, route 29, im-
mediately south of this intersection, since the time of the acci-
dent? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And before these improvement were made? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. Were there stop signs on Route 29, or slow-down signs, 
or what signs did you find there? 
A. There ·was a yellow sign with black cross marks 
which indicated you are approaching a crossing or inter-
section, then I would say 25 or 30 feet, I don't know just 
how far, there is another sign, which said speed limit 15 
miles per hour. 
Q. Mr. Richards have you had occasion to have the damage 
to your car, because of that collision definitely · esti-
mated? 
page 22 r A. Yes, I had a statement from the T. D. Mc-
Ginis Motor Company, the man to whom I turned 
my car into, he towed it down and made the repairs on it. 
Q. I hand you statement, is that the statement furnished 
you by the T. D. McGinis Inc., of Kilmarnock, Va? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How much are those damages on that statement? 
A. $414.30. 
Q. $414.30, that includes the towing, and the taxi-cab 
doesn't it? 
A. That includes the towing, but not the taxi-cab charge. 
Q. But it does include the cost of towing the wreck down 
to Kilmarnock, Virginia? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Mr. Richards, did you suffer any physical hurt· in 
the collision? 
A. Yes, I had my head bumped and the skin broken, my 
hip was hurt some and my left hand was hurt. Of course, 
the head injury and the hip injury were temporary. My 
head bumped against something in the top of the car, and 
broke the skin, and my hip was sore, I suppose I was jammed 
over against the side of the car, and my hand was hurt. 
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Q. What part of your hand was hurt? 
A. Third finger on my left hand. 
Q. What happened to that, if you know? 
.:~ ..... 
-:.~.t:}~~ 
A. I don't know, I have had it examined by a 
page 23 ~doctor at Kilmarnock, two or three days after the 
accident, it was b~dly swollen, he said, and I 
suppose he thought it was just temporary, and would go 
down, but it has not. I cannot close it up, and cannot grip 
anything. 
Q. Do you suffer any pain from that? 
A. There is not any pain unless I strike it. There is 
no constant pain. 
Q. You simply cannot bring it together? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ask Dr. Foster of this Town to examine it 
this morning? 
A. He looked at it this morning and he said-
Mr. Richey: Don't testify to what he said. 
Q. He looked at it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You say that finger, that you still cannot use that 
finger? 
A. No I can close the other fingers, but I cannot close 
that one, and cannot grip anything. 
Q. Mr. Richards, who was the owner and the driver 
of the car that you had this collision with? 
A. Of the car that struck me? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Mr. Greenleaf. 
Q. Is that Mr. Greenleaf sitting over there? (Indicating 
the Defendant, John C. Greenleaf, Jr.). 
page 24 ~ A. That is right. 
Q. You ha~'t met Mr. Greenleaf prior to 
the collision, had you? 
A. No, that is the first time I had seen him. 
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Q. Did you have any traffic officer to make any examin-
ation of the ground, very shortly after the impact? 
A. Traffic Officer Parker was over at Madison and we 
phoned him to come down and he came down and made 
an examination of everything. 
Q. Do you know what County this accident took place 
in? 
Mr. Duke: We will stipulate it is in Greene County. 
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. RICHEY: 
Q. Mr. Richards, I believe you stated there were six 
persons in your car. 
A. That is right. 
Q. Yourself, the lady you brought with you, her daughter 
and three others? 
A. That is right. 
Q. What time did you leave Northumberland, that morn-
ing? 
A. I don't know. I don't remember. 
Q. It was in the morning I guess. 
A. We left early around 7 o'clock. 
Q. After breakfast or before? 
A. After breakfast. 
Q. Do you know the distance from there to Harrison-
burg? 
A. According to my speedometer it is 185 miles. 
Q. What time did you get to Harrisonburg? 
page 25 ~ A. I don't know that, between 11 and 12, I 
don't know. 
Q. In the morning? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What time did you leave Harrisonburg for the re-
turn trip? 
A. About one o'clock or a little after one. 
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Q. You were going all the way home that afternoon? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I suppose you own the car you were driving? 
A. I did. . 
Q. What did they pay you for the trip? 
A. I don't receive any pay at all. 
Q. How did it happen that you had made so many trips, 
if you are not receiving anything for it? 
A. Because I live at Mrs. Carter's house, I am a boarder 
at Mrs. Carter's. Mrs. Carter has a daughter at school 
and I take her as a favor to Mrs. Carter, the other girls 
all live in the immediate neighborhood within a mile or two, 
I know them, and I know their parents, and it doesn't cost 
any more to take four that it does one, I don't take them all 
on every trip. 
Q. How many trips have you made since 1933 over this 
same route? 
A. The first trip I made was in 1936, that is when Olivia 
started school. I don't know, I should say about ten. 
Q. You have probably been over that road ten times since 
1936, then? · 
page 26 r A. Yes. 
Q .. You knew this intersection thoroughly? 
A. Very well. · 
Q. And knew it was a dangerous intersection? 
A. I did. 
Q. You had seen the traffic conditions there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When the traffic officer got there, do you recall what 
you told him of the speed you were making across that inter-
section? 
A. No, I recall I told him that I stopped, whatever I 
told him about the speed was a guess. 
Q. You estimated your speed at 5 miles an hour going 
into the intersection, and at the moment of impact at 3 
miles an hour. 
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A. I don't think I did. I don't think· I ever said that 
I was going 3 miles an hour at the moment of impact. 
Q. You heard him testify to that on the hearing once 
had in this case, did you not? 
A. I don't think I did, I don't recall it. 
Q. On the former hearing of this case, you were asked 
this question: "Mr. Richards, you say that you don't know 
where you stopped your car, that it might have been at or 
beyond the stop sign?" To which you replied, "I couldn't 
state." Then you were asked, "It could have been this 
side of the stop sign?" and you answered, "No, I think 
it was at the stop sign, it may have been 
page 27 rthree or four feet past it. Did you testify to 
that on the former hearing? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. You don't deny it do you? 
A. I don't deny it, and I don't admit it either, I don't 
know, all that I know is that I testified then, and I testify 
now that I stopped where I could see. 
Mr. Norris: See what. 
A. The road in both directions. 
Q. You didn't look after you made the one look, where-
ever you stopped, you looked straight down the road you 
were travelling from that point? 
A. I looked just as I started up and I didn't look any 
more. 
Q. North or south.? 
A. No. 
Q. And you never saw this car at all until it struck you? 
A. No. That is right. 
Q. Assuming that you did slow down before the impact, 
if you didn't see the car, why did you slow down? 
A. I didn't slow down. 
Q. It appears from this evidence that you told the officer 
you wer·e moving 5 miles an hour as you. entered the inter-
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section, and at that time you slowed down to three miles an 
hour at the moment of impact, why did you slow down, 
if you didn't see the Greenleaf car? 
A. I didn't slow down.· I might have said I was going 
three miles an hour, but I didn't say I was slowing 
page 28 ~to three miles an hour. I had no occasion to slow 
down, the natural thing for me to do was speed 
up after I got started and get out of the intersection as 
quickly as I could. 
Q. You didn't state to him you were moving S miles an 
hours, and at the time of the impact only three miles an 
hour, you don't think you said that? 
A. I don't think I did. 
Q. l believe you testified a moment ago, you thought you 
were going from 7 to 8 miles an hour? 
A. That is all a guess. 
Q. If you were making only that speed, how do you ex-
plain the fact that from the point of impact over to where 
you stopped your car over at the north east corner of 
the intersection is 81 feet. You testified you couldn't get 
your car under control. If you were going only · 7 or 8 
miles an hour, why did you pick up speed? 
A. After the impact that is what gave me the speed. 
Q. Do you mean the impact knocked you 81 feet? 
A. It didn't knock me 81 feet, but it gave me the speed 
that took me 81 feet or whatever it was. 
Q. Did l ask you about the baggage, did you have a 
baggage compartment in the rear? 
A. Yes, I had a trunk. 
Q. Where was it? 
A. On the rear. 
page 29 ~ Q. How much baggage did you have m the 
car with those six people? 
A. They had nothing except their coats. 
Q. No other suit cases, or other equipment? 
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A. No, the suit cases were in the rear. 
Q. There were two ladies in the front seat, both on your 
right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. ':fhe direction this Greenleaf car was coming from? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Richards, now this stop sign, which y~m testified 
in · the former hearing you stopped at or within three or 
four feet of, is some 80 feet from the center line of 29, 
when you got to this point, which is the western portion 
of the travelled portion of 29, why didn't you stop before 
your front wheels got in there, and look again? 
A. I didn't know it was required, I thought anybody driv-
ing into the intersection.on 29, should keep a look-out too, I 
didn't think it altogether rested · on one to observe the 
cars, but on both, I stopped where I could see, and I assumed 
that a driver coming from either way on the other road 
vmuld observe the traffic rule, which said 15 miles an hour. 
I assumed that when a sign says 15 miles an hour it means 
15 miles an hour right at ·that sign. I stopped at the stop 
sign, where I could see. 
Q. When you got to this point, you can see 
page 30 r 1000 feet south from this red cross here, can you 
not? 
A. Yes, you can, but there is a dip in that road where 
the 1000 feet don't mean anything. 
Q. This plat shows the contrary, this plat shows you 
could see, except for a small part of the road right in 
here, the entire car, and at that point the top of the car is 
visible. If you could see that far up that road, why didn't 
you stop? · 
Mr. Norris: I object to Mr. Richey testifying. 
The Court: Your objection is sustained. Gentlemen 
of the Jury," lawyers ask questions, and not answer them, 
their statements are to be wholly clisn;garded ~y you unless 
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in the instance when I ask them if they can agree and 
they do agree. 
Mr. Richey: I didn't intend to make any statement of 
my own. 
Q. This filling station-the point of impact was about 
near the center of 33, near the east side of the travelled 
portion of 29, somewhere near my pencil point, is that 
correct? 
A. As near as I could judge about the center of the inter-
section on the right hand side of 33, I know I was on the 
right hand side of the road, I don't know where he was. 
Q. You then went 81 feet over near two tanks here? 
A. I went over near those tanks, I don't know the distance. 
Q. I see in my notes and in the evidence that 
page 31 ~you made the statement to Officer Parker that you 
stopped at the stop sign. Do you recall that now, 
whether you told him that? 
A. I don't recall just exactly what I told him. 
Q. You wouldn't say yea or pay to that question? 
A. No. There was a lot of excitement there at the time, 
and I couldn't say postively just what I did tell him. 
Q. Now you knew, of course, from the ten trips or there-
abouts you made across that intersection that 29 is a very 
heavily travelled highway? 
A. I did. 
Q. You knew that cars passing north and south on 29 
had the right of way over cars coming on 33 east or west? 
A.·Yes. 
Q. In addition to that the stop sign told you to stop? 
A. (No reply). 
Q. Mr. Richards, what make of car were you driving? 
A. Chevrolet. 
Q. What year made? 
A. 1938. 
Q. Did you buy it new? 
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A. Yes. 
43 
Q. Do you know what milage it had on it at that time? 
A. 23,000. 
Q. Did you make any attempt to use your brakes_? 
page 32 ~ A. Yes, I finally stopped the car by using brakes. 
Q. They were working all right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you make any complaint of that hand injury at 
the time of the accident? 
A. No, at the time I didn't notice it, I knew my hand 
was hurt and my hip was hurt, that worried me more than 
anything else. 
Q. Do you remember Dr. Foster coming out there to 
examine one of the young ladies? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you see him on that occasion? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he examine you? 
A. No. 
Q. When did you first make any complaint of this hand 
injury? 
A. After I had gotten home, three of four days later,. 
when the swelling didn't go down. 
Q. How many times have you seen a doctor about it? 
A. Twice. 
Q. How loµg since the last time? 
A. The last time, probably 3 months. 
Q. There were no bones broken, were there? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. The Dr. didn't tell you there were, did he? 
A. No, he didn't make an x ray. 
page 33 ~ A. He didn't think it sufficiently serious to 
make an x ray of it did he? 
A. No, he thought the swelling would go down, I did 
too. 
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Q. Let's see the hand. 
(At this point the witness holds out his hand for counsel 
to examine). 
Q. Now the other hand by it? 
("At this point the witnes~ extends both hands for coun-
sel to examine). . 
Q. This is the. finger that is hurt? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you been wearing that ring some years? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Goes on and off all right? 
A. It does now. 
Q. Have any difficulty if getting it off before? 
A. No. 
Q. And you say you cannot close this hand. 
A. I can close the hand all right, I cannot close this 
finger. 
Q. How well could you dose it before? As well as this? 
(Indicating) . 
A. Yes. . 
Q. Did you notice a half a dozen times since you have 
been on the witness stand that you have closed that hand 
just like this? 
A. No, I haven't. 
page 34 ~ Mr. Richey: I call the Jury's attention to it. 
Since he has been on the stand he has closed that 
hand at least a half a dozen times. 
Q. To whom was this taxi charged? Who paid for that? 
A. Mrs. Carter. 
Q. You didn't pay for that? 
A. No. 
Q. Yoµ didn't pay the taxi charge? 
A. I didn't pay it, I didn't have it. 
Q. It was not charged to you then, was not your debt? 
A. No. 
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Q. Mrs. Carter paid that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You don't expect to receive anything on that do you? 
You don't expect to repay her do you? 
A. I don't know, I haven't yet. 
Q. And you are not going to? 
A. I don't know, there has nothing been said about it. 
She paid it. 
Q. You don't mean to tell us that you were here for 
their accomodation, and that they were expecting you to pay 
for that? 
A. Just · the contrary, she said she would pay it, that 
I had had· enough loss. 
Q. She did pay it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who paid for the gas and oil on this trip? 
page 35 ~ A. I did. 
Q. You reside in the same house? 
A. With Mrs. Carter yes. 
Q. And it was just an accomodation on your part to 
take the young ladies home? 
A. Her daughter, yes. I think this was the first time 
I had ever taken all of them together. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. NORRIS: 
Q. I just want you to show the Jury about that finger? 
The Court: I think that he has been examined enough on 
that point. The statement of counsel that he had closed 
it is not evidence at all, the Jury can look at that for them-
selves. 
The witness stood aside. 
Mr. H. R. Parker, another witness for the Plaintiff, 
being first duly Jworn, testified as follows : 
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EXAMINATION IN CHIEF BY MR. CHAPMAN 
Q. I believe your name is H. R. Parker? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is your occupation? 
A. State Trooper. 
Q. How long have you been on the force? 
A. Since July 18, 1937. 
Q. Did you make an examination of the intersection 
between 33 and 29 at Ruckersville, on the 20th day of 
December, 1939, where a collision had taken place between 
two cars? 
page 36 ~ A. Yes, sir, on the 20th of December, 1939, 
which was on a Wednesday, the accident took place 
at approximately 2 :35 P. M. 
Q. At what time? 
A. Approximate 2 :35 P. M. I arrived at the scene of 
the accident at 3 : 15 P. M. 
Q. Do you know where the spot at which the collision 
took place? 
A. You can only approximate that spot from the physical 
facts that I found at the scene of the accident. 
Q. What papers are you examining now? 
A. This is the diagram that was made from the evidence 
I found on the scene at the time. 
Q. You made that? 
A. Yes, I did myself. 
Q. When did you make it? 
A. On the day of the trial in the Trial Justice Court. 
Q. Go ahead? 
A. As soon as I was able to determine the actual point 
of impact from the physical facts, I determined that it 
took place in the center or on the white line of route 33, 
and toward the right hand side going north of 29, to the 
right hand side of the white line. 
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Q. About the center of 33? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And on the east edge of 29? 
A. I wouldn't say on the edge, but it was to the 
page 37 rright of the white line. 
Q. To the right of the center line? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you examine the cars, were they both there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where did you find the Richards car? 
A. The Richards car went approximately 27 yards from 
the estimated point of impact in the direction in Mr. Charlie 
Jennings Filling Station, and stopped 6 feet from the south 
pump, gas pump, which is under the porch to his filling 
station. 
Q. Six feet from what? 
A. Six· feet from the south pump, the pump on the south 
end. . · 
Q. And where was the Greenleaf car? 
A. The Greenleaf car went 36 feet from the estimated 
point of impact down Route 33, went east on Route 33, per-
haps not exactly east, it possibly went about north east, 
a north east direction, for a distance of 36 feet. 
Q. On 33? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What part of the car received the impact? 
A. Maybe I could show it, by the small cars here. We 
will say this is the Greenleaf car coming on route 33, going 
east, this is the Greenleaf car ? 
Mr. Norris: You mean the Richard's car, don't 
you? 
page 38 r A. No, sir, going north on 29. As near as 
I was able to determine from the physical facts-
The Court : Mr. Parker, can you get those so as to 
indicate north and south. 
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A. This is north on 29, this is the Richards car going 
east on 33, as near as I was able to determine that was 
approximately the manner in which the two cars came to-
gether. The Greenleaf car wheels, at this point, showed a 
skid mark ot impression mark, and was bearing to the right, 
and from the physical facts, I think that is the way they hit, 
like this, they came together like this. (Indicating). The 
Richards car then continued on over to the Filling Station 
and the Greenleaf car stopped about like that. 
The Court : They went like this, means the two are 
parallel with their sides against each other, with the Richards· 
car slightly more in the road. 
Q. Did you see any skid marks there of the Greenleaf 
car? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you measure those skid marks? 
A. The Greenleaf car left. a skid mark or an impression 
mark, on a four wheel brake ,car, just prior to getting a 
.,kid mark you will get an impression mark, which looks 
very similar to a skid mark, I couldn't state whether all 
that was a skid mark, part of. it was not, I think part of 
. that! was impression mark, for a distance of 53 feet. 
page 39 ~ Q. You say part of that was impression mark? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You mean of that track? 
A. Mr. Chapman that is the mark you will get before 
your wheels go into a skid, the tire mark left on the hard 
surface. 
By the Court: Is that the mark that is made on the 
surface of the road prior to the wheels being locked? 
A. Yes. 
By Mr. Norris: Do you mean it is made during the 
act of applying your brakes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The thing you call an impression mark is made while 
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the brakes were being set, and before the tires stopped 
revolving, is that correct? 
A. We find your best braking point, the most effective 
brake, is the braking you get before your car goes into· a 
skid, your brakes are not as effective in a skid as before. 
You will get a similar mark in the highway from both. 
Q. From your experience can you tell how long was the 
skid mark? 
A. Yes, sir, I cannot say as to the skid mark, I say the 
skid mark and the impression mark was a distance of 53 
feet from the point it stopped to the approximate point of 
impact. 
Q. Can you tell the Court and Jury from the 
page 40 rlength of that mark the speed that car was travel-
ling? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Can you approximate it? 
A. Taking into consideration the skid mark and the physi-
cal facts as I found them together, I cannot. You cannot 
tell how hard those cars hit, and all that would have to 
be figured in, which is entirely impossible for me to do. 
Q. Don't the department furnish you witli a table telling 
you about the average distance it will take to stop a car at 
a given speed? 
A. We have a table that has been worked out by engineers 
throughout the country. 
By the Court: Assuming the car did not hit ·anything 
at all, which, of course, is contrary to the -fact, assume 
from the impression mark and skid mark, can you give 
us in a general way, assum1ng it did not hit anything at 
all, how fast the car was going, leaving the collision out o:f 
consideration altogether? 
A. (Referring to table), leaving the collision out al-
together from the form we work on,, I would say the car 
was running 30 miles an hour. 
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Mr. Norris: As a matter of fact, it had to be running 
faster that that considering the collision, would it not? 
Mr. Richey: I think that is distinctly leading and putting 
the words in the witness' mouth. 
page 41 ~ The Court: That is true normally. Mr. Par-
ker, if you are acurate about your 30 miles an hour 
without the crash, of course, it \vould be greater taking the 
collision into consideration, would it not? 
A. Yes, sir, in my opinion it would. 
Q. Mr. Parker how long have you been engaged in your 
business for the County of Greene, including Ruckersville? 
A. I came to Madison and Greene County in October, 1938. 
Q. Are you perfectly familar with the road at that inter-
section in Ruckersville of 29 and 33? 
A. Yes, sir, I think so. 
Q. Do you know whether the crossing sign there, and the 
speed limit of 15 miles an hour are now where they have 
Leen ever since you have been engaged here on 29? 
A. With the exception of the cross roads sign, I think 
the signs are exactly as they were when I came here. 
Q. What do you mean by Cross Roads sign? 
A. Cross Roads sign, showing a cross mark in black, 
which has been placed there since I was put on here, however, 
I won't say when that was put there. 
Q. You say the 15 miles an hour sign and cross roads 
sign are just where they have always been? 
A. What do you mean? 
Q. The sign with the cross marks on it? 
A. Yes, sir, that cross sign was put there since I have 
been here, but it was th~re at the time of the acci-
dent. 
page 42 ~ Q. Can you tell the distance the 15 mile sign 
is from the intersection? 
A. To the center of the intersection. Mr. Chapman I 
have not measured it, if I gave you a distance it would 
be only an estimation. 
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The Court: Don't you show that on the plat, which is 
agreed to be accurate. 
Mr. Richey : That is all on the plat. 
The Court: That is all right then. 
Mr. Norris: How far is it shown to be there? 
Mr. Duke : Shown to be SOS feet from the intersection, 
that is the cross roads sign. 
Mr. Norris: Then it iS' agreed that the plat shows the 
cross roads sign is SOS feet from the intersection, that is 
the cross roads sign on route 29. vVhat is the distance Mr. 
Duke from the Speed Limit 1 S miles an hour sign to the-
center of the intersection? 
Mr. Duke: The speed limit sign to the center of the 
intersection is 419 feet, as shown on the plat. 
Mr. Norris: Here is another sign what does this sign: 
say? 
Mr. Duke: It shows you are approaching U. S. 33. 
Mr. Norris : How far is that sign from the intersection?· 
The Court : That is on the left hand side of the road~. 
the other two are on the right hand side, is that right? 
Mr. Duke: No all on the left, 338 feet to the intersec-
tion. 
page 43 ~ Mr. Norris : What is this one. 
Mr. Duke: That says Ruuckersville, that ts 
207 feet from the intersection. 
Q. All those signs on U. S. 29? 
A. Yes. 
The Court : That is your recollection of those signs 
there? 
A. Yes, sir, on the right hand side going north. 
Q. You have a map, I believe you made sometime ago 
of the crossing at Ruckersville, and the roads, contiguous 
to it? · 
The Court: That is what you have testified to, you 
used your memorandum for reference. 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Did you make a tracing of the skid marks? 
A. I only took a measurement of the skid marks, that 
little map was only drawn the day of the hearing in the 
Trial Justice Court for the benefit of the Trial Justice, to 
show the position of the marks and cars. That was not made 
at the scene, the measurement of the skid marks and positions 
of the cars were taken at the scene. 
Q. That measurement was 53 feet? 
A. From the approximate point of impact or the stopping 
point of the New York car, to the end of the skid mark 
where the brakes were first applied, was a 
page 44 ~distance of 53 feet, then the New York car went 
more north eastward for a distance of 36 feet. 
Mr. Norris : Twelve yards? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did it continue on 29? 
The Court: He has gone over that, he said it went 
east, then he b·ecame more accurate and said it went slightly 
north east. 
Q. Can you tell us anything about that dip, does a car 
coming from the direction of Charlottesville-Suppose you 
were standing at the intersection, does a car get out of your 
sight in the dip? 
A. In my opinion, I have not tested it myself, if I were 
standing at the intersection or anywhere east of the stop 
sign on 33, I could see the car in the dip, but I could not 
see the bottom of the dip. 
Q. You think you could? 
A. I think I could see the top of the car, but not the bot-
tom of the dip. 
Q. A car going 25 miles an hour would be there how long? 
A. I cannot answer that question. 
Q. How far is that dip from the intersection? 
The Court: Don't you show that on the plat? 
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Mr. Duke: That plat shows-
The Court: Just answer my question. 
Mr. Duke : The plat is stipulated to be correct. 
page 45 r The Court: What I want to know from the mid 
line of 29 and 33, to the lowest point in the dip 
toward Charlottesville, how far is it? 
Mr. Richey: This plat is drawn 20 feet to the inch it 
would be 520 feet to the low point, these figures here are 
elevations. 
The Court: So roughly speaking it is 500 feet from the 
intersection to the lowest point of the dip? 
Mr. Richey: The lowest point I have got here. 
Mr. Norris : Is that from the center of the intersection? 
Mr. Richey: ·Yes. 
By the Court: Do you recall if those road markers are 
at the lowest point iµ the dip or north of it? 
A. The way I remember it they are north of the lowest 
point of the dip. 
The Court : What is the difference in the elevation 
of the intersection and the lowest point in the dip? 
Mr. Richey: · The altitude I don't see given, but is is 
in the neighbarhood of 500 feet, and this down here i"s 492 
feet, it would be nearly 7 feet, that is from the surface 
of the ground, that does not take a car standing or a man 
sitting in the car into consideration at all. 
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. DUKE: 
Q. Mr. Parker would you indicate on this map approxi-
mately where the cars came together, ybu notice 29 coming out 
here, and you notice that is the center line of 
page 46 r29, and this is the center line of 33 going east. 
Now would you put on there roughly the approxi-
mate point of impact. 
Mr. Richey: I think it would expedite matters, if you 
turn the map around the way it sets. 
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A. This is in the direction of Charlottesville, and this 
is the direction of Standardsville. This is the center line 
shown here? 
Q. That is correct. 
Mr. Richey : This line indicates it is 22 feet in width. 
A. This is 33 in the direction of Gordonsville. As near 
as I am able to state the accident occured right on the center 
line of 33 and to the right of the center line of 29. 
The Court: Which is designated by black spot on large 
plat, and punctured by a pin hole. 
Q. As I understand what you mean by impression marks 
is that if you are driving your car and apply your brakes, 
that slows down the turning your wheel, but don't make 
any mark, but as you apply them a little harder, there won't 
be a head in mark, but sort of like you might say a· change in 
shading? 
A. Yott will have a coat of rubber that has come from the 
tires, from an impression mark, when your wheels skid you 
will have a solid coat of rubber, on the hard surface. 
Q. In other words the skid mark indicates the 
page 47 ~brakes are firmly applied? 
A. Yes, sir. Some cars you can apply your 
brakes to the limit without getting a skid mark, others you 
cannot. 
Q. It shows your brakes are in good condition? 
A. Yes, as a matter of fact, it depends entirely on the 
type of car, on how effective a brake you get. 
Q. It would be impossible to estimate the speed of a car 
from seeing the application of brakes along the road, would 
it? 
;\. It is only estimated. You have to take into consider-
ation the surface of the road, whether there is any grease 
on the surface of the road, the condition of the tires, how 
much traction you have left. We have found from ex-
perience with these cars in trying them ourselves that that 
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summary will work out within a few miles of the actual 
speed. 
Q. Some experts differ on that, however, do they not? 
A. Probably do. 
Q. You have to know the weight of the car, the occupants, 
etc., and you have .to show whether the road was perfectly 
dry, by the way it had been raining that morning, I believe, 
had it not? 
A. Yes, sir, it had. 
Q. Is it not a fact that Mr. Richards estimated his 
speed at 5 miles an hour as he entered the intersection, and 
three at the moment of impact, Mr. Parker? 
page 48 r A. The question I asked Mr. Richards was to 
estimate his speed before the accident, before he 
actually saw the danger, his answer was five miles an hour, 
I then asked him to estimate his speed at the moment 6£ im-
pact, and his answer was three miles an hour; 
Q. Did Mr. Richards tell you he had stopped at the stop 
sign, or what statement did he make? 
A. Mr. Richards made the statement that· he had stopped. 
Q. Did he say where he had stopped? 
A. I cannot say that. 
Q. You have heard him testify, have you not? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You haven't heard him testify under oath? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Refreshing your recollection, don't you recall that· 
when you. testified before the Trial Justice that you stated, 
there is one question I will answer, Mr. Richards also made 
a statement that day, ( meaning the day of the acident), that 
he-in the presence of Mr. Greenleaf, stopped at the stop 
sign, and pulled off at a slow rate of speed, but before he got 
a cross the Greenleaf car came up and struck him. Do you 
remember making that statement? 
A. You have got to take into consideration that this took 
c.,. 
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place December 20, 1939. We investigate on an average 
of two accident a week, and I cannot answer that 
page 49 rwhether I did or not. 
Q. If the Stenographer who took this down 
says that you made that statement, your recollection would 
he more clear then, and would be more aP.t to be correct then, 
than it would today, would it not? 
A. I would be safe in telling this Court that the evidence 
the stenographer took at the · Trial Justice Court would 
probably be more accurate that the evidence I could give 
today. 
Q. Do you consider that a dangerous intersection or not? 
A. I consider the intersection at Ruckersville, prior to 
the changes made there, as one of the most dangerous inter-
sections in the State. 
Witness stood aside. 
Mr. E. Q. Miller, another witness for the Plaintiff, being 
first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF BY MR. NORRIS 
Q. Where do you live, Mr. Miller? 
A. On 33 near Ruckersville. 
The Court: The plat which has been referred to in the 
opening statements by counsel, and which has been referred 
to by several witnesses is marked Exhibit No. 1, with the 
stipulations of counsel, and is a part of the record in this case. 
Q. Were you at Ruckersville on the afternoon of December 
20th, last when a collision occurred between a car 
page 50 roperated and owned by Mr. Richards and one 
operated by Mr. John C. Greenleaf? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see the collision? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What is your occupation? 
A. I do some trucking and do some farming. 
Q. Do you operate a truck and operate a farm? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where were you just immediately prior to this col-
lision? 
A. I was coming out of the Gulf Service Station. 
Q. The Gulf Service Station is on which corner of this 
intersection, north-east, north-west, south-east, or south-
west? 
A. Here is the Gulf Service Station. (Indicating on 
Map). 
Q. This is the road from Charlottesville, and this is the 
road from Harrisonburg? 
A. Yes, sir, the Gulf Station is here. ( Indicating north-
east corner). 
Q. Mr. Miller will you tell the Court and Jury just exactly 
what you saw? 
A. I stepped out the service station door, and I heard 
brakes cry on a car-
Q. You heard brakes cry·? 
A. Yes, sir, and I looked up and noticed a car coming 
from toward Charlottesville on 29-
page 51 r Q. At what rate of speed was it coming, appar-
ently? · 
A. I would say 40 or 45 miles an hour. 
Q. This was the time you heard the brakes cry? 
A. "Y'es. · 
Q. How far was it from the intersection at that time? 
A. I would say around 45 or 50 feet, maybe a little 
further, about that grass plot there. 
Q. Go ahead and tell us what happened then? 
A. I didn't see the other car until it got practically across 
the road, and then I noticed the other car coming. 
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Q. At what rate of speed was the other car coming? 
A. Coming kind of slow, around five miles an hour, or 
maybe a little more. 
Q. There was a collision, was there not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. At what point did the car coming from Charlottes-
ville strike the car coming from the west-Harrisonburg? 
A. You mean in the road? 
Q. I mean on each car? 
A. Right behind-the car coming from Charlottesville 
hit the Chevrolet coming from Standardsville right behind 
the front wheel, here, it hit in this position. (Indicating). 
Q. What happened to the two cars? 
A. When they hit, they clung together a moment,. and then 
the Chevrolet car came on across toward the Service 
Station. · 
page 52 ~ Q. Towards you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What became of the other car? 
A. The other car stopped. 
Q. Whereabouts in the road did this collision occur? 
A. About the center of 33, but it was way over the cen-· 
ter of 29. 
Q. About the center of 33, but which side of the center of 
29? 
A. On the east side. 
Q. That is the right side coming from Charlottesville? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did the brakes continue to cry Mr. Miller until the 
impact? 
A. Well I wouldn't like to say, they did or didn't. It 
looked like to me he was kind of mashing on them and 
letting up and mashing down on them again, that is the 
way it looked to me, when I first saw the car when they 
hollered. 
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Q. How was his car travelling? 
A. It was coming zig zag, it looked like to me. 
Q. That is the car from Charlottesville? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It appeared to you that he would bring his brakes on 
and then let up, is that correct? 
A~ That is the way it seemed to me. 
page 53 ~ Q. Did you see the Gentleman driving the car 
from Charlottesville, a£ ter the impact? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that the Gentleman sitting over there? ( Indicating 
the Defendant, John C. Greenleaf, Jr.). 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see the Gentleman driving the other car? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that this Gentleman? (Indicati11g the Plaintiff, 
G. E. Richards). 
A. Yes. . . 
Q. Are you acquainted with the various signs south of 
the intersection on Route 29 coming from Charlottesville? 
A. I think I am. 
Q. Are there several there? 
A. Yes, sir. There is a slow down sign there. 
The Court: I understood, you have agreed on that, I 
don't think it is necessary to go into that. 
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. DUKE: 
Q. Mr. Miller you have driven cars for a number of years, 
have you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. As a matter of fact, isn't it considered good practice 
in putting your brakes on, to mash dowri on them and 
let it back, isn't it considered that that get~ good 
results? 
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Q. It is a general practice, you are well ac-
quainted with that, are you not? 
A. (No reply). 
Q. Would you please point out on this map whereabouts 
the Greenleaf car was when you first saw it? 
A. I would say the car was somewhere in there. (In-
dicating on Map). 
Q. How close to the Seminole Trail sign, which is here? 
A. It was not back that far, I would say here. 
Mr. Norris: Make a mark there. 
The point is marked with an X, indicating the point where 
the witness first saw the Greenleaf car. 
By the Court: How many feet from the center of 33 
v.rould that be? 
Mr. Duke: We can scale it. 96 feet . 
The Court : Is that your recollection between 90 and 
l 00 feet from the center of the two roads, where the mid 
lines of the two roads cross? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. About what speed, did you think the Plymouth was 
making at the time you first saw it? 
A. _Around 40 or 45 miles an hour. 
Q. What speed was it making at the time it came into 
the intersection? 
A. At the time they hit? 
page 55 r Q. No, at the time it entered the intersection? 
A. He was slowing down all the time it looked 
like to me, as much as he could. 
Q. Didn't you state at a former hearing that he was 
probably making ·15 miles an hour at that time? . 
A. I believe I stated that at about the time of the col-
lision. 
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By the Court: What do you mean by intersection? 
A. I reckon he means where it started into 33, the wide 
circle. 
Q. I mean the prolongation of these lines here? 
Mr. Norris: I think what Mr. Duke contends is that 
the 15 mile limit only applies in the intersection, we don't 
agree with that. 
The Court: I understood what Mr. Duke contended and 
that you didn't agree with him. 
A. What I understand you to mean by where he came 
into the intersection is. where they cross. 
The Court: And you think that he was going approxi-
mately 15 miles an hour at the time they hit? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you put another cross Mr. Miller at the point 
at which you think the car had slowed down to 15 miles 
an hour? 
A. I would say 15 miles an hour at the time the collision 
occurred. 
Q. You were standing at the time, I believe you 
page 56 ~were just coming out of the Jenning' s Filling 
Station door? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did you do, if anything, after you saw what 
was happening? 
A. I stepped back inside the door. 
Q. You thought the Chevrolet car was going to run m 
after you, didn't you? 
A. That was the way it was coming. 
Q. It was coming at a pretty good clip, too, wasn't it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the Plymouth car stopped almost immediately? 
A .. Yes, sir. 
Q. At the moment of impact the two cars clung together 
like that? 
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A. The back ends did, yes, sir. 
Q. In which direction did you look, as you first walked 
out the filling station? 
A. I was facing the intersection as I stepped out the door. 
Q. Looking down 29? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Didn't you think it possible with a car coming right 
·at you to over estimate its speed? 
A. I could have, but I don't think I did. 
Witness stood aside. 
page 57 r Mr. Leroy Seale, another witness for the Plain-
tiff, being first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF BY MR. NORRIS: 
Q. Mr. Seale, your name is Leroy Seale? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where do you live? 
A. Shelby. 
Q. Where were you on the 20th of December last, in 
the afternoon, I believe? 
A. I just don't remember that date? 
, Q. That is the date Mr. Richards car and Mr. Greenleaf' s 
car had a crash at Ruckersville? 
A. I was working in the Service Station. 
Q. At Ruckersville? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you see the cars before the crash? 
A. No, sir, just the second they hit. 
Q. You were inside the Service Station? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was the occasion of your coming out? 
A. Well brakes and there was a crash. 
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. Q. What caused you to come out of the service station, 
though? 
A. Well like anybody else I wanted to see. 
Q. Did you hear anything? 
A. Noise. 
Q. What noise did you hear? 
A. I heard the cars crash. 
page 58 r Q. Did you hear the screech of any brakes? 
A. Well not exactly a screech, you know how 
cars go on hard surface. 
Q. Di4 you hear that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. From what direction did you hear that? 
A. South, I guess. 
Q. And you took it to be from the south? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you came out of the Filling Station? ' 
A. I was just inside the door. 
Q. And when you walked out the cars crashed? 
A. They crashed before I came out. 
Q. How did the cars crash, if you know, Mr. Seale? 
A. Well they met kind of on an angle, the front, it 
looked like swerved around and probably the backs touched, 
and it lookeq, as if the Chevrolet, I think it was the Chevrolet, 
speeded up, it was hit kind of on an angle, you could have 
shoved it up. 
Q. It speeded up after the impact, the Chevrolet did, 
is that correct? 
A. That is the way it looked to me. 
Q. Did you notice any brake marks on the highway there? 
A. I couldn't say I did, I didn't pay that much attention 
to it. 
Q. But you did hear the screech of brakes? 
A. Yes, sir, I heard a little screeching. 
page 59 r Q. Which way was the Chevrolet coming from, 
apparently? 
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A. It was coming fro~ towards Standardsville. 
Q. Going east? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was the make of the other car? 
A. Plymouth, as well as I can remember, coupe. 
Q. Which way was it coming from? 
A. It was going north, coming from the south. 
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. RICHEY: 
Q. Mr. Seale, I believe you stated that the impact or 
crash occurred before you got out to see anything_? 
A. I was standing right close to the door, the door was 
open, and they crashed before I came out. 
Q. The first you saw was when the crash occurred and 
you looked out? 
A. No the brakes were crying and I looked. 
Q. The first you saw was the crash? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So you don't know what the speed of the cars was? 
A. No. 
Q. But you do know the Chevrolet ran off into the direction 
c,f your filling station? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And it was coming pretty fast, wasn't it? 
Mr. Norris: I understood you to say it se·emed to speed 
up after the crash, is that correct? 
page 60 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That was merely a surmise, you didn't know 
what speed it was making before the crash, did you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. So you don't know whether it went faster or not? 
A. It looked like to me it speeded up, before the brakes 
turned lose. 
Q. It was getting faster and faster all the time? 
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A. That is the way it looked like to me, I might have 
been a little excited at the time. 
Q. A man who thought a car was coming straight at 
him as fast as that car, was likely to get a little excited, wasn't 
he? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were not in a position to observe things too ac-
curately were you? 
A. No, sir. 
Witness stood aside. 
Mrs. Grace P. Carter, another witness for the Plaintiff, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF BY MR. NORRIS: 
Q. Mrs. Carter where do you live? 
A. Rehobeth Church, Northumberland County, Virginia. 
Q. Mrs. Carter have. you a daughter attending school 
at the Normal College at Harrsonburg? 
A. I have. 
page 61 ~ Q. And what is her name? 
· A. Olivia Carter. 
Q. Mrs. Carter did you go up with Mr. Richards in his 
car on the 20th day of December last for the purpose of 
bringing your daughter and some other girls in the neighbor-
. hood back for the .Christmas Holidays? 
A. I did. 
Q. How long has your daughter been going to the normal 
college? 
A. This is her fourth year, she is a senior. 
Q. Do you know about what time it was when you left 
home that morning, approximately? 
A. Well, you know I went over to Fredericksburg from 
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\Vashington and met some people at Washington, I got up 
at S o'clock that morning. 
Q. You are talking about the trial, I mean on the 20th 
of December? 
A. We left home very early in the morning, I beg ·your 
pardon, I don't know just what hour. 
Q. Do you know about how far it is from your home 
to Harrisonburg, approximately? 
A. I think it is 185 miles. 
Q. Do you know about what time you arrived at Har-
risonburg? 
A. Between 12 and 1 o'lock, I don't know exactly. 
Q. Could you give us any idea, or your best opinion 
of the time it was when you left Harrisonburg 
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A. We remained there long enough to pick up 
the girls, I imagine it was between one and half past, I 
don't know that that made any impression on me. 
Q. Who were the young ladies, Mr. Richards was bringing 
home? 
A. Margaret Montgomery, from Kilmarnock, Beth Hard-
ing, from Paul's Neck, near my home, Alice Ingram from 
Neck, in Northumberland County. They were the three 
girls beside my daughter. · 
Q. How were they seated in the car? 
A. Margeret Montgomery was on the right in the back 
seat of the car; Alice Ingram was in the center, and Beth 
Harding on the opposite side; in front I was on the out-
side, my daughter Olivia in the center, and Mr. Richards 
was operating the car. 
Q. You left Harrisonburg, and when Mr. Richards 
t'eached a point just shortly west of Ruckersville, I would 
like for you to tell the Court and Jury just what occurred? 
A. It occurred so quickly that I hardly know; when we 
reached a point before we approached that intersection 
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Mr. Richards stopped his car, came to an abrupt stop, I 
looked both ways, because I always look both ways. 
Q. Could you at that time see up and down the road from 
Charlottesville, north and south? 
A. I could. 
page 63 r Q. Did you· look yourself? 
A. I looked both ways. 
Q. Did you see anything in sight at that time? 
A. I didn't. 
Q. Then what did Mr. Richards do after you had stopped 
the car and looked both ways? 
A. He started it up. 
Q. He started up, then what was the next thing that 
happened? 
A. Naturally just starting the car we were going very 
slowly, and the next thing that I remember I was being 
thrown all abut the car, in front, and then we finally stopped. 
Q. Do you recall where it was, the car you were in,. 
did stop? 
A. It stopped-I couldn't tell you about the angle it 
stopped, but it stopped right close to the Filling Station, 
I remember I thought how are we going to escape striking 
.an that cement, that was the thought passing through my 
mind. 
Q. Did the car have time to gain any considerable speed 
after it started before it was struck by the other car ? 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. You cannot tell us about the speeds? 
A. No, not about that. 
Q. Could you indicate to the Jury approximately how far 
you had come after starting up before you were struck by 
the other car? 
page 64 r · A. I am afraid I would not know about the 
distance, it was a shock to me. 
Q. Did you see the Greenleaf car before it struck the 
car you were in? 
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A. I heard it when it struck, naturally· and the impact, 
but I did not see it. 
Q. You didn't see it until after the collision? • 
A. Yes. 
CROSS EXAMINATION "BY MR. EARLY: 
Q. I believe you said Mrs. Carter that Mr. Richards 
stopped his car just before he came into this intersection? 
A. No, I don't think I designated just where he stopped, 
I said at a distance, in a position I could see both ways. 
Q. How far do you say he stopped this side of the inter-
section? 
A. I didn't say, and I could say, but it was a point I 
could look both ways. 
Q. How far do you think you could see down 29? 
A. As I understand there is a declivity there, and if 
that car had been in that place, I suppose it was hid. 
Q. Mr. Richards started his car up again after he stopped? 
A. Yes. 
"Q. And went into the intersection, did you look down 
the road after the car started up? . 
page 65 ~ A. When he started I looked again, until I 
thought everything was safe. 
Q. I believe you said you were afraid of being thrown 
into some concrete, what did you mean by that? 
A. Did I say I was afraid of being thrown into it, I 
though he asked me if the car stopped and where the car 
stopped, and where he had stopped, those posts or columns 
loomed up before my face, that is what I meant by the 
concrete. 
Q. When this car was crossing the road, about what 
position was your car in when it was struck by the car 
coming from Charlottesville? 
A. I said I couldn't testify as to that. 
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Q. You don't know whether you had crossed the center 
of the road or not. 
Mr. Norris : Which road do you mean? 
Q. 29? 
A. I don't know, that I understand that question. 
Q. There are two roads in that intersection? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What I mean by that 29, runs north and south, were 
you struck on Route 29 on the west side or the east side 
of 29, you were travelling on 33 ? 
A. Well if the other car was on the right side of the 
road, he couldn't have struck us on the west side, could 
he? 
page 66 ~ Q. I want to know that? 
A. I don't know, it happened so quickly, I 
don't know I cannot tell you just where the car was when 
it happened. 
Q. About what speed, was Mr. Rfohards travelling when 
this car hit him? 
A. I don't know what speed, but after you stop a car 
you cannot speed up at once, you have to go slowly at 
first. I don't know what the speed was. 
Q. You don't have any idea what the speed was? 
A. No, I don't have any definite idea, but he had stopped, 
he had come to a full stop and started up. 
Q. Did the car keep on at the same speed after it was 
struck? 
A. I couldn't tell what the speed of the car was after 
it was struck, I was thrown forward and was almost in an 
unconscious condition. It threw me forward in the wind-
shield, all those gadgets and for the time I don't know 
what it was all about, and I don't know what speed it was 
going at. 
Q. These girls were from Harrisonburg, and were going 
home for the Christmas Holidays? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. You were all jolly and were not paying much atten-
fion to what was happening, were you? 
A. I don't know that we were jolly, we were rather quiet, 
the girls were rather tired they had just gotten through 
with some arduous examinations and they were 
page 67 rrelaxing on the back seat; the three of us 
on the front seat were very quiet, we had come 
some distance. 
Q. Do you remember whether or not you saw a stop sign 
on route 33 just previous to entering this intersection? 
A. I am quite sure I saw a stop sign. 
Q. Do you remember what relation Mr. Richards stopped, 
with reference to that stop sign? 
A. He stopped in a position where he could see both 
ways, the highway from Charlottesville to Washington was 
absolutely clear. 
Q. Do you know whether it was before you got to the 
stop sign or. after you got to the stop sign, that Mr. Richards 
stopped? 
A. No, but it was in a position where I could see. 
Q. You testified when they had the hearing before the 
Trial Justice, did you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you testify at that time that you stopped just 
at the stop· sign? 
A. I don't recall that, I just don't recall whether I did 
or not. 
Q. Does Mr. Richards live with you, or board with you? 
A. Mr. Richards lives in my home, he boards with me. 
Q. What is Mr. Richards' business? 
A. Mr. Richards came from Washington there, he was em-
ployed by the Government for 25 years, and he came down 
to the country and engaged in the poultry business 
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Q. What is his business now? 
A. Is that a question for me to answer? 
The Court: If you know: 
·A; I really dqn't ·_know what to say. · 
Q. Is he a gentleman of leisure? 
A. Probably you ·would say gentleme;tn of leisure. I 
will te·sti~y to the gentleman, but I don't know. alt0getl,ler 
of leisure or no~, he· i§ i:iot idle. 
Q. ))id you compensate -Mr. Richards for the trip:4e ~ade 
to Harrisonburg? · 
. A_. · No, I didn't. · 
Witness stood aside. 
Dr .. M~ D. Foster, another witness· for the. Pla~ntiff, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : · · · 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF BY MR. CHAPMAN 
. . . 
Q. Dr. Foster have you examined Mr. Richards hand 
his left hand? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ··When did· you make the examination? 
A.· This. morning. 
Q. I wish you would tell the Court and J~ry wh~t is 
wrong, if anything, with that hand? 
~.. There is an enlargement, a · definite enlargement of 
the second joint fr.o~n the end of the finger next to the 
ring finger on the- left hand; there is some l~mita-
page 69 ~tion of function, that is, he is not quite able to 
close the finger all the way. I supose that much. 
(Indicating). He gave a history · of having considerable 
discomfort when u_sing the pand, such as raki1;_1g, or -Ijfting 
heavy weights, that tends to cause pain, or does cause·pajn. 
Q. Do you think the trouble to that hand is likely to be 
permanent? 
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A. I am inclined to think so, of course, that is something 
we cannot" say definitely about. 
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. RICHEY 
Q. Dr. Foster, outside of that slight swelling, or en- · 
largement, did you see any other indication· of this injury? 
A. There is an enlargement of the joint. 
Q. There is no telling :what on earth caused that? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Outside ·of that everything you have testified to are 
what are known as subjective symptoms, that is no-one 
k11ows about them, except Mr. Richards? 
A. I would not put it that way. You can see the swelling. 
Q. Outside of that, however, everything you have testi-
fied to are subjective symptoms? 
A. You cannot see whether there is any pain or not. 
Q. And no-one knows that but Mr. Richards, himself? 
A. I expect that is about right. 
Witness stood aside. 
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the witness stand, testified in his own behalf 
as follows: 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF BY MR. NORRIS: 
Q. Mr. Richards, what is your occupation at this time? 
A. Well I would say at this time, I haven't any, I am 
a retired Civil Service employee. 
Q. Under pension of a retired Civil Service Employee of 
the United States Government? 
A. Yes. 
Witness stood aside. 
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Miss Margaret Montgomery, another witnes.s for the 
Plaintiff, being first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF BY MR. NORRIS: 
Q. You are Miss Margaret Montgomery? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where do you live, Miss Montgomery? 
A. Kilmarnock, Va. . 
Q. Miss Margaret, were you attending school at the nor-
mal college at Harrisonburg, on December 20th last, and 
have you been attending school there during the entire 
session, this session? 
A. Yes,· sir. 
Q. Did you return home for your Christmas Holidays, 
in a car owned and driven by Mr. Richards on 
page 71 ~ December 20th, last? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you state who was in the car besides yourself? 
A. Mr. Richards was driving, and Mrs. Carter was in 
the car, and Olivia Carter, Alice Ingram, Beth Harding and 
myself. 
Q. Where were you seated in the car? 
A. Mr. Richards was driving, and I believe Mrs. Carter 
was in the center in front and Olivia was on her right. 
I was seated on the right in the back, Alice Ingram was 
between me and Beth Harding seated on the left in the back. 
Q. All of you girls live down there· in the same neighbor-
hood, do you not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were on the . right hand side of the back seat 
of the car? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you acquainted with where the roads cross, where 
29., which _I will say is the road going generalJy north and 
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south from Charlottesville towards Washington, and 33 was 
the road you were on. Are you acquainted with Ruckers-
ville where those roads cross? 
A. I have been through there several times. 
Q. Been through there several times before this time? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 72 r Q. Do you know whether or not Mr. Richards 
stopped his car at or before his entrance into the 
intersection of those roads? 
A. He stopped before . he entered the intersection. 
Q. He stopped before he entered the intersection? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. At that time you were seated in the rear of the car 
do you know whether or not the car was stopped in a posi-
tion where one could see up and down the highway number 
29, that is from Charlottesville on? 
A. Yes, sir, because I was in the back seat and I could 
see. 
Q. Up and down that road? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you see any car coming in either direction? 
A. No. 
Q. What did Mr. Richards do after he stopped, what 
was the next thing that took place? 
A. You mean after he looked-he started across. 
Q. He started again? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you see the car driven by Mr. Greenleaf 
before it struck the car you were in? 
A. Yes, sir, I did. 
Q. How far would you say approximately it was from 
the car you were in, when you first saw it? 
A. He was I would say 60 or 65 yards from our 
car. 
page 73 r Q. 60 or 65 yards from your car? 
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A. Yes. j• •. : 
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Q. At that time you had started up to cross the inter-
section, is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was the next thing that happened with ref er-
ence to this car coming from the direction of Charlottes-
ville? 
A. I heard the screech of brakes. 
Q. You heard the screech of brakes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was the car you saw coming from Charlottesville, 
coming fast or slow? 
A. Yes, sir, seemed to be coming pretty fast, I could 
not say how fast. 
Q. You would define it as pretty fast? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. After that you heard the screech of brakes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then what was the next thing that happened? 
A. The next thing that I remember was the crash. 
Q. Then they crashed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where did that car, as far as you could tell, which 
side of your car did it strike? 
A. It struck the right side. 
Q. The very side you were seated on? 
A. Yes. 
page 74 ~ Q. Up towards the front or what part of the 
car did it strike? 
A. Towards the front I think. 
Q. Were you hurt yourself? 
A. Not serously, just a sprained shoulder. 
Q. You did have a sprained shoulder? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know where the car you were in finally went 
to and·· stopp~d? 
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A. Right by the service station on the left . hand side . 
·of the road, across the intersection. 
Q. Where did the car driven by Mr. Greenleaf stop? 
A. I think practically in the middle of the road. 
Q. Was the car you were 'in going fast or slow at the 
t~me it was struck, Mr. Richards' car? 
A. Well, we had just started, slow. 
Q. And you say it was going slowly? 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Richey: I don't believe she said that. 
Q. You said that the Greenleaf car stopped about the 
-center of the road, which road do you mean the center of, 
-0r do you mean the center of the intersection? 
A. I mean the intersection, I couldn't be definite about 
that. 
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. RICHEY: 
Q. You were on the rear seat, Miss Montgomery? 
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Q. I suppose you were not paying as much at-
tention to how the Chevrolet car, in which you were riding 
· was being driven, were you? 
A. Well-
Q. Mr. Richards was driving and you paid no attention 
to what he was doing? 
A. Not particularly. 
Q. You happened to see a car coming from your right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You could see a long way in that direction, could 
you not? 
A. Not so far. 
Q. Didn't you say Mr. Richards stopped where you could 
see north and south, both directions? 
A. Yes, sir, when we stopped. 
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Q. You were struck in the intersection? 
A. Yes. 
Q. There is a better view from there than where you 
stopped, is there not? 
A. I don't think I could see any further than I could 
when we stopped. 
Q. Where did you .stop, at the stop sign? 
A. I couldn't say definitely where we stopped, but I 
know we could see both up and down the road. 
Q. You testified in the Trial Justice Court did you not? 
A. Yes. · 
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didn't you make these answers: "Q. Now I 
want you to tell the Court just what happened, beginning 
at the time you approached the intersection? A. You mean 
when we came to 29? Q. Yes. A. Well we stopped at the 
stop sign and Mr. Richards had just· started up, I guess 
we were just about going out in the middle of the road, and 
I guess I just happened to look down the road and saw 
this car coming." This was back in February, that you 
testified in the Trial Justice Court? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was your memory better then than it is now? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you make that statement? 
A. I mean we stopped, I don't know whether it was at 
the stop sign or not. 
Q. Did you or not stop at the stop sign? 
A. I know we stopped, where we could see up and down 
the road. 
Q. Did you make that statement at that time or not? 
A. I don't remember. 
Witness stood aside. 
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Miss Alice Ingram, another witness for the Plaintiff 
being first duly sworn, testifies as follows : 
page 77 r EXAMINATION IN CHIEF BY 
MR. CHAPMAN: 
Q. This is Miss Alice Ingram? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Miss Ingram were you in the Richards car when 
it was wrecked at Ruckersville? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You had been attending normal school at Harrison-
burg that session? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was the date that wreck happened, do you re-
member? 
A. I think it was December· 20th. 
Q. 1939? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I wish you would tell the Court and Jury now exactly 
all the facts that surrounded the movements of that car 
from the neighborhood of the intersection until it was struck? 
A. We were coming from Harrisonburg going through 
Ruckersville, and we stopped, there was a stop sign and we 
stopped before we made the crossing and when we were 
about in the middle of the crossing this car came from the 
direction of Charlottesville and hit us towards the front 
oi the car, then the back came around and hit the back of 
our car. 
Q. Was this car coming from Charlottesville, coming 
fast, moderately or slow? 
A. I would say it would have :o be coming 
page 78 rfast from what it did. 
Q. Do you remember when you first saw that 
car? 
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A. Miss Montgomery was sitting on the right hand side, 
and she threw her arm up like this, and I saw the car, and 
it was just a very short distance between that time and the 
time it struck us, I just turned my head and it struck us. 
Q. Did you say the car was stopped by Mr. Richards, 
was it near the stop sign? 
A. I don't know where the stop sign was, but I know we 
stopped before we got to the road. 
Q. Do you remember whether you stopped near the edge 
of the road? 
A. It was near enough to the edge of the road where 
he could see up and down. 
Q. About how long did Mr. Richards remain there? 
A. I couldn't say. 
Q. Wasn't very long was it? 
A. He stopped to a stand still, but I couldn't say how 
long it was. 
Q. Do you remember where your car was when you were 
struck? 
A. You mean the position of our car? 
Q. Yes, had you passed over most of 29? 
A. No, I would say about the middle of the intersection. 
Q. You don't know which direction your car went after 
it was struck do you? 
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Q. Were you knocked unconscious? 
A. No, I was not. 
Q. You were in the intersection of that road when you 
were struck, your car? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you remember anything about the speed when your 
car was struck, whether it was going slowly or not? 
A. Couldn't have been going very fast, we started from 
.a dead stand still. 
,Q. About what time of day did this collision happen"? 
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A. It must have been after 3 o'clock. 
Q. You were coming from Harrisonburg? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Did you hear the screech of the brakes of the car 
coming from Charlottesville? 
A. I don't remember any noises, except when the cars 
hit and feeling the impact. 
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. RICHEY: 
Q. How long have you been attending Madison College? 
A. This is ·my fourth year. 
Q. You were going home for the Christmas Holidays? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. I guess you were all right jolly, pretty glad to get home, 
were you not? 
A. We were glad to get home, but we were not so jolly, 
· we had just finished strenuous examinations. 
page 80 ~ Q. What baggage did you have in the car? 
A.. I had one suit case. 
Q. Was that in the trunk? 
A. Yes, sir, in the trunk. 
Q. What baggage did any of you have in the car? 
A. We had no baggage in the car, it was all in the trunk. 
Q. All of you have·baggage in the trunk? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What first attracted your attention to something about 
f,J happen? 
A. Just before the accident you mean? 
A. Yes. 
A. I think the first thing that brought my attenti9n to 
anything was Miss Montgomery throwing her arm over her 
face. 
Q. And the same instant you were struck? 
A. By the time I turned my head, I saw something w~s 
going to happen. 
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Q. The Greenleaf car was right at you then? 
A. Practically upon us. 
Q. You don't know what speed it was making before it 
got there, do you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. All you know is that something attracted your atten-
tion, and then something happened? 
A. I knew we were going to be hit. 
Q. How far was it from you at that time? 
page 81 ~ A. Just a few feet, the distance from here to 
that stove. 
(Indicating a distance of 25 feet). 
Q. You had not seen it before that 25 feet? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You don't even know where the stop sign was, do you? 
A. No. 
Q. Except from hearsay you don't even know there is one 
there, do you. 
A. No. 
Q. And you say you could see up and down highway 29, 
both directions from where you stopped? 
A. I didn't look, I know we stopped. 
Q. You didn't know whether you could see up and down 
29 or not? 
A. No. 
Q. I guess you paid no attention to Mr. Richards driving 
the car, you left that to him, did you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You were not looking to right or left? 
A. I don't remember where I was looking. 
Q. How long did your Christmas Holidays last? 
A. I believe we went back on the 2d of January. 
Q. This was on the 20th of December, and yon went back 
to school the 2d of J anuai:y.? 
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Q. All went back at the same time? 
A. Yes, but I went back in another party. 




Q. You were not in bed during the time you were home? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you attend any dances or parties while you were 
at home? 
The Court: Gentlemen of the Jury, there is another 
litigation, which makes it wholly improper to go into these 
matters in this case. Disregard all that. The only ques-
tion is whether she lost consciousness so as to determine 
whether she is a competent witness, as to what her case 
is we are not at all interested at this time. 
The witness stood aside. 
Miss Olivia Carter, another witness for the Plaintiff, 
being duly sworn, testified as follows : 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF BY MR. CHAPMAN: 
Q. This is Miss Olivia Carter? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Miss Olivia were you in Mr. Richards' car with sev-
eral other guests going home from the Normal School at 
Harrisonburg on the 20th of December? 
A .. Yes. 
Q. -Do you remember reaching on that trip a little town 
about six miles east of here, called Ruckersville? 
page 83 r A. Yes. 
Q. I believe you were one of the occupants 
who entirely escaped any injury, is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Therefore you are bringing no action against anybody? 
A. No. 
Q. Mr. Richards was operating that car, was he not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he stop the car before entering the intersection of 
29 or 33? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You were travelling on 33, were you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That road that intersects 33 at Ruckersville is 29, 
now at what point did Mr. Richards stop his car? 
A. He stopped it soon enough so we could see a car coming 
along 29, I don't know just where. 
Q. Where were you seated in the car? 
A. In the front seat. 
Q. On the right or left side? 
A. Between Mr. Richards and my Mother. 
Q. Three on the front seat. Do you remember looking 
down the road or up the road, you know the direction of 
Charlottesville, which is South? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you remember looking up that road? 
A. Yes, sir, I looked both ways. 
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A. I didn't see any. 
Q. Did Mr. Richards start to go into the intersection? '· 
A. After he stopped. 
Q. He started across the intersection? 
A. Yes, sir, he started. 
Q. At the time he started could a car have been seen 
coming from the direction of Charlottesville? 
A. I did not see any. 
Q. Did you look pretty carefully? 
A. Yes. 
Q.··Can you tell the Court where was that car the first 
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time you saw, that came from Charlottesville and struck 
your car? 
A. Just a few feet of our car, when I saw: it, just before 
it hit. 
Q. You hear any screeching of the brakes? 
A. I don't remember anything but the crash. 
Q. It was in a few feet of your car when you saw it, I 
suppose it was just a twinkle of time between that and the 
crash? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Which way did your car go after it was struck? 
A. Towatd the Filling station. 
Q. Did the car speed up after it was struck? 
A. It was struck, I don't remember much about what 
happened then. 
page 85 ~ Q. You don't know what became of Mr. Green-
leaf's car, either, do you? 
A. I couldn't see that, I saw that after I got out. 
Q. Did you see the stop sign at Ruckersville on 33? 
A. Yes, the one just before we started across, yes I saw 
that. 
Q. Can you give us any idea how far Mr. Richards stopped 
from that stop sign? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Was it nearer 29 that the stop sign? 
Mr. Richey: I object. 
The Court: Yes, she says she doesn't know. 
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. RICHEY: 
Q. As a matter of fact you don't know much about it, 
do you? 
A. I know we stopped. 
Q. But you don't know where you stopped? 
A. We stopped at a point where we could see a car 
coming in either direction. 
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Q. You don't know whether that was 10 feet, SO feet or 
7 5 feet from the intersection? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you say you looked up and down the highway? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you didn't see anything? 
A. No. 
Q. You were not expecting anything were you? 
page 86 ~ Mr. Richards was driving then and you were not 
paying much attention were you? 
A. I would have seen the car, if there had been one there. 
Q. There was one there, that is the trouble? 
A. It was not in my range of vision. 
By the Court: You say you didn't see the other car 
until it was within a few feet of you? 
A. Yes, sir, as far as from here to the chair. ( Indicating 
a distance of six or seven feet). . 
Q. There is a plat here drawn by a competent engineer 
showing that from that intersection you can see 1000 feet, 
and more down that road to the right, nothing to obstruct -
the view, if you had looked carefully you would have been 
bound to have seen that car, would you not? 
" A. I don't know what I would have done, I didn't see it. 
Q. You didn't see it? 
A. No. 
Q. Don't you think that was because you didn't look care-
fully? 
A. I did look. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. CHAPMAN: 
Q. Have you good eye sight, Miss Carter? 
A. I am near sighted. 
Q. You think your sight would have been good enough 
to see a car if there had been one in sight of you? 
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A. I think so. 
page 87 r By the Court : YOU are the fourth one to tes-
tify who was riding in the car, which one of you 
wear glasses, if any of the witnesses, who have already testi-
fied wear glasses? 
A. My Mother does, but not all the time. 
By the Court: I am speaking of when they travel, I 
am not asking about when they read? 
A. None of them do. 
By the Court: How about the Plaintiff, the Driver, 
does he wear glasses? 
A. Yes, sir. 
By the Court: None of the others do? 
A. That is right. 
Witness stood aside. 
Mr. Norris: If your Honor please we have concluded 
our evidence in chief with one exception, that is the exception 
of the mechanic who made up this statement, that has gone in 
as evidence of the damages done the car. We called up Kil-
marnock and found. that he left there early this morning. 
I have not been able to locate him, yet, I am sure he will 
be here. 
The Court: Have you asked the other side if they would 
agree if he was here that he would testify that was his 
estimate. 
Mr. Richey: We have a witness summoner here, we 
· will agree to that if they will agree that this 
page 88 rwitness, Mr. Max Oliver, will testify to the same 
thing he testified to in the Trial Justice Court, 
of which we have a transcript. 
Mr. Norris : I will agree that he will testify to the same 
thing as I have in my notes. I don't know what you have. 
The Court: Come in my chambers, a moment gentlemen. 
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and if the evidence is striken we, of course, don't want this 
witness, or if the evidence is not striken and he comes in we 
would like to put him on the stand, but if he does not we 
would like to use this evidence. 
Mr. Norris: I will agree that we will accept that evidence 
if you gentlemen will admit our statement. 
Mr. Richey: vVe will admit that he would testify that 
was correct. 
With this agreement the Plaintiff rests. 
Mr. Richey: We feel that the evidence of the Plaintiff 
himself, and he cannot ask any more than what he has testi-
fied to himself, he testified that he came up to the place and 
that he stopped, and that he stopped where he could see and 
he looked up and down that road, and didn't see anything, 
and that he started across. This is a superior highway here, 
as compared to 33, this has no stop sign, 33 has a 
page 89 ~stop sign 80 or 81 feet from the intersection, ac-
cording to the engineer, and according to the eleva-
tion from this cross mark right here, that was put here, when 
he got his front wheels here he could see a distance of over 
1.000 feet south, when he got his front wheels into here he 
got into danger, and according to his own evidence he went 
right in front of an oncoming car, which he didn't see, 
which he should have seen and could have seen if he looked. 
As I said this morning, assuming the elevation to be 500 
feet, the acutal di:ff erence in elevation is shown by these fig-
ures as you progress up and down the road, and the lowest 
point is here at the stop sign is 499.3, feet and the lowest 
point here is 492 feet. 
The Court: Mr. Richey in this case I am going to have 
to over-rule the motion, just make the motion and let me act. 
Our Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the Court 
should not sustain a motion to strike, unless the Court is 
absolutely certain, I would say almost beyond a reasonable 
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doubt that should it let the matter go to the Jury, and the 
Jury found a verdict, that it would have to set the verdict 
aside, unless that is the situation the Court should let the 
matter go to the Jury and then act on a motion to set aside 
. a verdict, that then the appellate Court could re-
page 90 ~view the whole case. They have virtually said 
that you should not sustain a motion to strike un-
less you have concluded that no matter what verdict the 
Jury returned you were going to set it aside, that in that 
event you ought to sustain the motion to strike. In all 
other cases you should reserve your action until there wa~ 
a v:erdict, so as to speed up the case. Let the record show 
the motion to strike, the motion is over-ruled and the defen-
dant's exception on the grounds he has stated and ony other 
grounds you wish to state now. 
· Mr. Richey: And on the ground that the Plaintiff's 
·evidence shows contributory negligence that efficiently con-
tributed to his own injury. 
At this point the Court a·nd Counsel return to the Court-
room. 
The Court: Gent,emen of the Jury the estimate of cost 
of repair, which was put in the record this morning, or re-
ferred to this morning, counsel have agreed that if the man 
who made tha~ up referring to the bill were in Court he 
would testify that that is his statement of what it would 
cost to repair the car, and you can consider that as his 
statement, the same as if he were a witness here. All right 
the Plaintiff concludes, the Defendant will proceed .. 
Mrs. Ruth Van Fossen, the first witness called by the 
Defendant, being first duly sworn, testfiied as follows: 
page 91 ~ EXAMINATION IN CHIEF BY 
MR. RICHEY: 
• 
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Q. Give the reporter your name? 
A. Ruth Van Fossen. 
Q. Mrs. Van Fossen, you are employed as a Stenographer 
in the office of Mr. Duke in Charlottesville? 
A. I am. 
Q. Did you take the evidence in short hand when this 
case was before the Trial Justice Court in February, 1940? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How soon after it was taken did you reduce it to 
writing? 
A. The next morning, .I started on it. 
Q. Is this one of the copies of the transcript you mad~ 
up? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I will ask you whether on that occasion, Mr. Parker 
the Traffic Officer made this statement: "This is one 
other question I will answer. Mr. Richards also made this 
statement that day, that he, in the presence of Mr. Green-
leaf, he stopped at the stop sign and pulled off, at a slow rate 
of speed, but before he got across he was hit." Is that 
a correct transcript of Mr. Parker's evidence? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now do you remember in that same trial, Mr. Richards, 
the Plaintiff, here testied ? 
page 92 r A. Yes. 
Q. And he was asked the question by Mr. 
Duke: "Mr. Richards you say you don't know just where 
you stopped, that it might have been at or beyond the stop 
sign. A. I could not state. Q. It could have been this 
side of. the stop sign? A. No, I think it was at the stop sign, 
it may have been three or four feet past it." Is that what 
he testified to on that ocasion? 
A. Yes, sir, I think that was what he said. 
The Court : In view of the manner she is being examined, 
I think you should deliver a copy of this record to· the other 
side. 
Q 
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At this moment a copy of the transcript is delivered to 
counsel for Plaintiff. 
Q. In the evidence of Mrs. Grace P. Carter, she was 
asked this question by somebody it does not appear who: 
0 Q. I want you to tell us if you know what was done, what 
happened to your car as you approached the intersection. 
A. There is very tittle, except that he stopped at the stop 
sign, just after we passed the stop sign, Mr. Richards came 
to a full and complete stop." Is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mrs. VanFossen, another witness Miss Margaret Mont-
gomery testified, on p. 35 ? 
page 93 r A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Miss Montgomery was asked this question 
by Mr. Norris, "Now I want you to tell the Court just what 
happened, beginning at the time you began to approach the 
intersection? A. Do you mean when we came to 29? Q. 
Yes. A. Well we stopped at the stop sign, and Mr. Richards 
had just started up, I guess we were just about going out 
in the middle of the road, and I guess I just happened to look 
down the road and saw this car coming." Is that a correct 
transcript? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Chapman: I wish you would turn to page 23 of 
the evidence of Mr. Richards. 
Q. "We came to a stop sign and I stopped, came to a dead 
stop, I don't know where it was as to the position of the stop 
sign, but I think I came to a full stop opposite the stop sign, 
but any way I was out where I could see the road both 
ways. I looked both ways, north and south, and saw nothing, 
and of course started on across." Did he say that? 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Richey: I had intended to put that in, and I will 
vvrite her name by it, like I did the others. 
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The Court : Gentlement, let me suggest this. You all 
hadn't seen this transcript until just now? 
Mr. Chapman: No, sir. 
page 94 r The Court : I would suggest one of you gentle-
men examine it, and let us proceed and then we 
can put this witness back on the stand later. 
Mr. Richey: We have no objection. I don't think they 
have a right to go through this record and find things ex-
cept for the purpose of contradiction. 
The witness stood aside. 
Mr. Quinntard Taylor, Jr., another witness for the Defen-
dant being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF BY MR. DUKE: 
Q. What is your age Mr. Taylor? 
A. 20. 
Q. And your residence? 
A. Garden City, Long Island, New York. 
Q. Are you a student at the University of Virginia? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On the 20th day of December last you and Mr. Green-
leaf starte4 home in Mr. Greenleaf' s car, is that carrect? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What time did you leave Charlottesville? 
A. Around 2 o'clock, I would say. 
Q. As you approached the intersection of route 33, and 
route 29, at Ruckersville, please tell us what happened, where 
you were looking as you first approached that intersection? 
A. I was not looking at the road, I must have been look-
ing out the window or somewhere else. 
page 95 r Q. About what speed were you making? 
A. On the main road, I would say going about 
50. 
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Q. W4at happened as you went down the dip and started 
up the hill? 
A. W ~ started to slow down for the intersection. 
Q. Had the brakes been applied before your ~ttention 
was called to anything, which made you think you should 
look? 
A. I suppose the brakes had been put on, we were slowing 
down, w~ knew the intersection was there. 
Q. About where were the brakes first applied? 
A. Tpat is hard for me to say. 
Q. Where did you first notice the. slowing down? 
A. I didn't notice the slowing down until we started to 
stop, I couldn't say where we started to slow down. 
Q. How was the speed reduced? 
A. I don't see what you mean? 
A. I mean what happened when the brakes were first ap-
plied, were they applied lightly or hard, how did you start to 
slow down? 
A. I suppose the brakes were applied very lightly. 
Q. About how far back from the intersection? 
The Court: Wait a minute Mr. Duke, he says he does 
not know. 
A. We were gradually coming to the intersection and grad-
ually slowing down, I don't know where it was. 
page 96 ~ Q. You say they were applied lightly at first, 
what happened next? 
A. All of a sudden my attention was called to the sudden 
application of the brakes and the wheels gripping the road, 
J looked around to see what was in front of me. 
Q. What did you see? 
A. I saw this other car coming across the road from the 
left, going very slow. 
Q. Could you show us on this map approximately the 
position of the car, when you first saw them? 
A. I imagine about here, maybe even closer, the car was 
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directly in front of us, when I saw it, his car was out here, 
a little to the left, right about center, and our car ·was very 
close to it, almost directly in front of us. 
Q. About what speed were you making when you entered 
that intersection? 
I 
A. I would say about 15. 
Q. About what speed do you think you were making at 
the· time of the collision? 
A. I would say we were slightly slower, slowing down, 
I 
I would say almost 15. 
Q. What did the Richards' car, which was coming out 
from your right out of 33-
A. On my left. . 
Q. Did it make any change in direction? 
page 97 ~ A. It didn't seem to. 
Q. Did Mr. Greenleaf change the direction 
oi his car? 
A. Yes, sir, made a sharp swerve to the right to avoid 
the other car turning east on 33. 
Q. About where did the Richards' car strike the Green-
leaf car with reference to the front? · 
A. They struck sort of corner to corner. Our left front 
fender, and their right struck first. 
Q. What happened next? 
A. The cars sort of dragged together, smashing together. 
Q. How far east of the scene of the collision did the 
Greenleaf car go? 
A. Not very large distance, I couldn't say, I would say 
10 yards, I don't know how far it went. 
Q. Could you tell us how far the Richards' car ran? 
The Court : Is there any use going into that, I don't 
think there is any controversy on that? 
Mr. Duke : All right disregard it. 
r . 
. :CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. NORRIS: 
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Q. Mr. Taylor you and Mr. Greenleaf, Mr. John C. 
Greenleaf, Jr., are friends, are you not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You are from the same part of New York State? 
A. Yes, sir, very near. 
Q. You were friends before you came to the University? 
A. Yes. 
page 98 r Q. Where were you bound? 
A. We were going home for Christmas vaca-
tion. 
Q. What time had you left the University? 
A. About 2 o'clock. 
Q. Were you expecting to get home that night? 
A. Late that night. 
Q. Where is your home? 
A. Out on Long Island. 
Q. You left the University at 2 :30 and expecting to get 
to your home out on Long Island, New York that night? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You were travelling in somewhat of a hurry, weren't 
you? 
A. I wouldn't say so. 
Q. You had to make pretty good time? 
A. We were not expecting to get home until after mid 
night. 
Q. Do you live close to your friend? 
A. Yes, I live so he can drop me off on his way home. 
Q. Did he have to go out of his way to do it? 
A. No. 
Q. As you were coming to Ruckersville, I believe you 
testified you went down a hill? 
A. Yes, sir, there is a grade there. 
Q. Did you observe the cross roads sign there? 
A. I cannot say that I did, I knew there was .a cross 
roads there. 
\ 
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before? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I dare say both of you had made the trip togther be-
fore. 
A. Yes, perhaps once. 
Q. You knew there was a cross roads ahead? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you knew there was a sign? 
A. I didn't know there was a sign. 
Q. I understood you to say there was? 
A. I knew there was cross roads there. 
Q. There was another sign about 25 feet closer to Ruck-
ersville, a speed limit 15 miles an hour sign, did you notice 
that? 
A. I cannot say that I did, I was not paying any atten-
tion to what we ·were doing at all. 
Q. There was another sign still further on beyond that 
which I believe says Virginia-U. S. 33, indicating you 
were coming to 33, did you observe that? 
A. No. 
Q. Now there is still another sign beyond that indicating 
you were coming into Ruckersville, did you observe that? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. The truth of the business 1s you were not paying 
very much attention, were you? 
A. Yes, sir, that is true. 
page lOOr Q. You were thinking about going home? 
A. I don't know what I was thinking about, but 
T was not paying any attention. 
Q. You were going home for Christmas? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The first time or thing that called your attention to the 
road was you felt the brakes suddenly applied on the car 
you were in, is that correct? 
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A. That is correct. 
Q. Then you looked up and saw the Richards car dead 
ahead of you? 
A. Almost. 
Q. ·With its right side toward you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So that before you entered the intersection you saw 
the Richards car in the intersection? 
A. Explain what you mean by entering the intersection, 
we were in the circle part. 
Q. I am not speaking of the circle, I am talking about 
what we would term this part here, made by extending the 
-lateral lines of the road like this ? · 
A. I noticed him after we were in that part. 
Q. You hadn't gotten to it, had you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And the Richards car was in that part, and it was 
dead ahead of you, when you first saw it? 
1>age 101 ~ A. I said almost, a little to the left. 
Q. How far . to the left? 
A. Let me show you, just about where that cross is. 
Q. I want you to tell me Mr. Taylor, I want you to answer 
my last question, which was, you have told the Jury that 
when you first saw the Richards car it was almost dead 
ahead of you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now you say it was not quite,· how many feet was 
it from being dead ahead of you? 
A. I would say 10 feet. 
Q. At that time the brakes had been applied on your car? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. It was quite evident that Mr. Greenleaf saw the car 
ahead before· you did, didn't he? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The brakes is what called your attention to it? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. They were applied sharply? 
A. Yes. 
Q. At what rate of speed would you say yeu were going 
imediately prior to the application of the brakes? 
A. I would say around 1 S miles per hour. 
Q. Your brake marks, or impression marks shows the 
hrakes were being applied 51 feet from here, but you say 
you were going 15 miles an hour immediately before the 
brakes were applied? 
page 102 ~ A. That was when I was not paying any atten-
tion, I would say he was going 15 miles an hour. 
Q. When? 
A. When my attention was called to it? . 
Q. How fast were you going when you looked· ahead and° 
saw this car dead ahead of you? 
A. 15. 
Q. The brakes hadn't done any good, although you felt 
them applied sharply? 
A. No, sir, I looked right around. 
Q. How far was the car you were in from the Richards car, 
' if the Richards- car had been 10 feet further, or immediately 
in front of you? 
A. I should say 20 feet away from him. 
Q. You say you say the Richards car in the intersection? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Or was it in the act of coming into the intersection? . 
A. Yes, sir, it was in the actual intersection. 
Q. And it was · going slowly? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Can you tell us what rate of speed it was going? 
A. About as fast as we were going, about 15 miles an hour . 
. Q. Where did your car, or what part of your car struck 
·what part of the Richards car?. 
A. Our left fender struck their right .front fender. 
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A. When the two cars struck they were pulling 
page 103 ~together side ways, ours pulled along a little ways 
and stopped and theirs went in the driveway of 
the gas station, that is where they stopped, ours in the middle 
of the road and theirs in the gas station. 
Q. At what rate of speed would you say you were going 
when you passed the 15 mile an hour sign? 
A. I didn't see the 15 mile sign. 
Q. Did you see any of the signs at all? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Mr. Taylor do you recall testifying m the Justice 
Court? 
A. Yes. 
A. I . am going to ask you to-or I am going to read to 
you from this evidence and ask you whether or not you 
made that statement in the Trial Justice Court, question by 
Mr. Duke, "When you approached a caution sign on the 
road, I believe there are two signs, do you recall what they 
are as you approach Ruckesville? A. I remember only 
one sign. Q. What was that? A. 15 mile an hour speed 
limit sign. 'Q. ,What sp_eed were you making pirior to 
reaching that sign? A. I would say we were going about 
50, we knew we were coming into Ruckersville and slowed 
down." Do you deny that you made that statement in the 
Justice Court? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. It has been sometime I admit, which was 
page 104~right. You told us just now you didn't see any 
signs, which was right the statement you made 
in the Trial Justice Court, where you did see the sign or the 
one which you make now? 
A. I said I knew there was a sign there. 
Q. You further said you were going about 50 miles an 
hour when you .reached that sign? 
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A. I mean by that that we were going 50 miles an hour 
along the road before we approached Ruckersville. 
Q. Why did you say that I remember only one sign, then? 
Then you were asked, "What was that? A. 15 mile an hour 
speed limit sign. Q. What speed were you making prior 
to reaching that sign? A. I would say we were going 
about 50, we knew we were coming into Ruckersville and 
slowed down." Did you ever see the 15 mile an hour sign 
or not on that occasion? 
A. I might have seen it, I don't. think I paid any atten-
tion to that part of it. 
Q. How could you say how fast you were going, if you 
didn't see the 15 mile an hour sign and didn't pay any 
attention? 
A. I don't mean that I was paying attention to the speed 
we were travelling in relation to the sign. I knew we were 
travelling 50 miles an hour before we got to the .intersec-
tion. 
Q. You said evidently what you didn't mean, Mr. Taylor. 
You also said this, question by Mr. Duke, "When you saw 
this other car, how far was it away? A. About 
page 105 rten yards. Q. What happened next? A. Mr. 
Greenleaf started to turn the car to the right to 
avoid the collision, the brakes were on very hard, and we 
swerved around to the right." Do you remember making that 
statement? 
A. I don't remember it, I imagine I did. 
Q. You don't deny that you made any of these statements, 
I am reading to you here, do you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And you further said in reply to a question by Mr. 
Duke, "Q. What speed were you making at the time you 
reached the intersection. Did you slow dk>wn, if so 'to 
what speed? A. It is hard to say. Q. In the intersection 
about what speed were you making? A. About 15 miles 
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an hour. Q. What speed do you estimate you were making 
when you struck the other car? A. 10 miles an hour or· less. 
Q. What speed would you estimate the other car was making? 
A. It is hard to say, I would say about five or ten miles an 
hour." You don't deny making that statement do you? 
A. No, sir. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. DUKE: 
Q. You were a passenger in that car? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. It had come a little over a half an hour, it had taken 
a little over a half an hour from Charlottesville 
page 106 rto Ruckersville, do you know what the distance 
is? 
A. I believe it is 21 miles, from what I understand. 
Q. If you don't know, don't say? You have no par-
ticular reason to know that distance, do you? 
A. No, only I happened to ask the State Traffic Officer 
outside a moment ago, and he told me 21 miles. 
Q. There was nothing about Mr. Greenleaf' s driving that 
made it necessary for you to watch the road in front of 
you was there? 
A. No. 
Q~ In what manner had he been driving with reference 
to care? 
A. Very carefully, because I was not paying any atten-
tion. 
Q. In the open country he could drive 55 miles an hour, 
could he not? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. He was driving under 55 miles an hour? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You crossed several intersections between Charlottes-
ville and Ruckersville, did you not? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Any car at any of them that made you think you 
ought to kep a look out? 
A. No. 
Q. As you approached Ruckersville, what did you say 
you noticed in connection with the speed of the car? 
A. As we approached the intersection? 
Q. Yes? 
page · 107 ~ A. I noticed we were slowing down.· 
Q. And how? 
A. Very slowly, gradually. 
Q. Slowly at first and then suddenly? 
A. That is right. 
Q. And not until you felt a sudden application of the brakes 
did you feel it necessary to look? 
A. That is true. 
Q. Will you show us on this map about where you were 
when you first saw that car? 
A. I would say about here. 
Mr. Duke: That is the center of the eastern half of U. 
s. 29. 
Mr. Norris: I object to that statement.· 
Mr. Duke: I was merely stating that for the benefit of 
the Stenographer. I would be glad to have these gentlemen 
correct me, it is directly across-
The Court: The objection is sustained. 
Mr. Richey: We will ask the Court to dictate to the 
Stenographer the point indicated. 
The Court: I will place two pin holes at the point marked 
by an X. · 
Q. Will you please point again to where the Richards' 
car was at that time? 
A. Just about here, that red cross is above the sign-
Mr. Duke: We will put a dot on it. 
page 108 ~ Q. Will you describe the location of that point 
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for the benefit of the Stenographer with reference to the 
prolongation of these lines here? 
Mr. Norris : Why not let his honor do that. 
The Court : Where the record shows this witness has 
testified definitely as to where he was, I see no necessity 
for marking up that plat. If that plat went up you would 
have Exhibit No. 1, changed by so many things no Court 
in the world could possibly understand what they were. 
Do you gentlemen have any objection to it? 
Mr. Norris: We would prefer to have the witness dictate 
the location of the mark or let the mark speak for itself. 
The witness stood aside. 
Mr. John C. Greenleaf, Jr., the Defendant, being first 
duly sworn, testified in his own behalf, as follows: 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF BY MR. DUKE: 
Q. Pl~ase state your full name, Mr. Greenleaf? 
A. John Cameron Greenleaf, Jr. 
Q. Your residence? 
A. Hewlett, N. Y. 
Q. Your age? 
A. 20. 
Q. You are a student I believe, at the University 
page 109 rof Virginia, and Defendant in this case? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On the 20th of December, 1939, what time did you 
leave the University of Virginia, to go to your home? 
A. Two or a little after. 
Q. Are you familar with U. S. 29 and Route 33? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know what cautionary signs exist on U. S .. 
29? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. There are two cautionary signs, I believe, would you 
describe them? 
A. On 29 before all the cross roads, there are the cross 
sign and speed sign. 
Q. Do you know what sign there is, if any, on route 33? 
A. Yes, I knew there was a stop sign on all roads going 
into 29. 
Q. About what speed were you making before you reached 
the cautionary sign on 29? 
A. Forty five or fifty. 
Q. What happended as you reached the cautionary sign on 
29, near Ruckersville? 
A. I slowed down. 
Q. Did you observe anything to your left shortly there-
after and if so what? 
A. As I came up the slight inclination, yoµ are talking 
about, I saw in 33 a car moving ba!k at a place 
page llOrwhere I thought the stop sign was. I slowed down 
all the time getting at what we call the intersec-
tion. There has been some trouble as to what is the inter-
section, as I got into the main part of the road, the other 
car was moving, and I thought naturally would stop or 
let me by, as it had not came into the main part of the road, 
it was in the curved part, and it did not stop, but kept on 
coming and seemed to be gathering speed all the time, after 
going quite slowly. I did put on the brakes hard and swerve 
to the right to avoid the accident as best I could. 
Q. What speed were you making when you first saw the: 
Richards car approaching .from your left? 
A. Hard to say, probably 25 or 30. 
Q. About how far away was your car from his car, when 
you came to the conclusion he was not going to stop? 
A. Then we were both,-let me see, more or less equal 
distance, the same distance from the absolute center of the 
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road, and he might have been a little closer, he didn't let me 
by, I suppose I was 20 yards from it and he was 15 yards 
from it. 
Q. What did you do then? 
A. I then put on my brakes as hard as possible and swerved 
way to the right, swerved to the right all the time, it came 
right up in front of us. 
Q. Had you observed that car when you first 
page 111 ~saw it in the vicinity of the stop sign on 33, until 
it did come in front of you on your left? 
A. I would say almost all the time, with the possible ex-
ception of the fraction of a second. It did not reduce its 
. ~peed, but came right across, I thought it was going to stay 
on. the other road and let me go by, because I thought it 
should have seen me. 
Q. What did ·you expect Mr. Richards to do, when you 
first saw tie car, you saw it was about opposite the stop 
sigri on route 33, what did you expect him to do? 
A. I didn't know whether he had stopped or not, and 
since he was moving all the time I did see him I expected 
him to stop. 
Q. Where did you expect him to stop? 
A. Coming out of a road like that you expect him to stop 
before the real main portion of the road is reached. 
Q. In other words you expect him to stop at or before 
he reached the north and south travelled lines-
Mr. Chapman: I object. 
Mr. Duke: I will withdraw the question. 
Q. At what point on 33, did you expect him to stop, Mr. 
Greenleaf? 
A. I hadn't seen him stop before, he was out in the main 
portion of the traffic, 'in a place he could see, maybe not 
where the stop sign was, maybe a little beyond that, but 
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page 112 r Q. If he had looked at any time when you were 
watching him, he could not have failed to see 
you, if you could see him, could he? 
A. I don't see how he could, no, if he looked. 
Q. At the stop sign you could see him clearly from where· 
your car was? 
A. Mr. Richards car, I guess he was very near the stop 
sign, when I first saw him. 
Q. You could see him clearly from then on? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. From the stop sign as it came on into 29? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If Mr. Richards had looked he would have been bound 
to see you? . 
Mr. Chapman: I object. 
The Court: The objection is sustained. 
Mr. Duke : I think it is apparent. 
The Court: We don't need any comment, when I rule 
just go ahead. 
Q. Mr. Greenleaf what was the fair ·market value of your 
car before the accident? 
A. It was worth $300.00 or over for a trade in. 
Q. What have you been able to do with the car, what 
advise did you receive about the car after the accident? 
A. It was beyond repair, it was not the wise thing to 
do to get it fixed, it would cost much more than 
page 113 rit was worth. 
Q. Did you make efforts to sell it? 
A. It was only good for junk. 
Q. You could only sell it for junk? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What were you offered for it as junk? 
A. $45.00 
Q. Have you ever received any of that $45.00? 
A. Not yet, most of it went for towing and things like 
that] 
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Q. And storage? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You have not received any money from that? 
A. Not yet. 
·' 
.II 
Q. Before the acident the car was worth $300.00, if you 
traded it in? 
A. That is right. 
Q. And after the accident worth $45.00 for junk, none 
of which has been received, is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. CHAPMAN: 
Q. Mr. Greenleaf you were going home, I believe to 
enjoy the Christmas at your home? 
A. We were going back home, yes. 
Q. How far do you live from New York City? 
A. About 20 miles. 
Q. You were going pretty fast in order to get 
page 114 ~there sometime during the night, were you not? 
A. There was no reason to go fast. 
By the Court: From Charlottesville to your home is 
what distance? ' 
A. I don't know, I know it by hours, I know it takes 
10 hours to make the trip. 
By the Court : It is 360 or 70 miles isn't it? 
A. I know we figure 10 hours to New York City. 
Mr. Chapman: I think it is 351 miles to New York 
a~ . 
Q. How many miles an hour did you have to make an 
hour in order to get there by mid night? 
A. I don't know anything about that, I just drive until 
I get there. · 
~fr.· Richey: You say you figure it at 351 miles to New 
York City. 
r 
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Mr. Chapman: It is 238 miles from Washington, and 
113 miles from Charlottesville to Washington, 
By the Court: Which way do you go from Washing-
ton, from Washington to Balitmore, and Baltimore to Phil-
adelphia, and Philadelphia to New York? 
A. We avoid Philadelphia, by taking -the ferry. 
Q. That cuts off a good deal of distance? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And also takes you around Philadelphia? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You had to travel at a pretty nice clip, 
page 115 rthough to get there my mid-night, did you not? 
A. There was absolutely no time set for me to 
get there. 
Q. You wanted to get your friend there sometime during 
the night, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Your friend was asleep before you passed Ruckers-
ville, I reckon, at the time of the collision wasn't he asleep? 
A. He was not ·asleep. 
Q. Did you see the signs when you passed them? 
A. You do things out of habit, I don't actually remember 
seeing signs, there is a sign there, and I knew I ought to do 
something to bring my car down to cross the cross roads. 
Q. When you drive a car, don't you think it is your duty 
to see what the signs say? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you see those signs? 
A. I did. 
Q. Did you know what your duty was? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was your duty? 
A. It was to slow up from the speed you were doing and 
go through the intersection, the intersection we are talking 
about, probably at 15 miles an hour. 
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Q. You don't mean to say you were going 15 miles an 
hour after you ascended that hill from the bottom, 
page 116 ~that you cut your. speed down to 15 miles an hour? 
A. I would like to. I would have tried to 
absolutely. 
Q. You don't krtow whether you succeeded or not? 
A. I did. I didn't go through the intersection all the 
way, I had cut my speed down. 
Q. Did you look at your speedometer? 
A. Just one or two times you do. 
Q. Did you look at your speedometer on this occasion? 
A. I don't think I did. 
Q. You were gue&sing at it? 
A. I guess all speeds are guessed at. 
Q. It has been testified that your skid mark was about 
51 feet long, if you were going 15 miles an hour, how do 
you account for that? 
A. The car was swerving, I bore it to the right. 
Q. What made it swerve? 
A. I turned it a way from the other. car. 
Q. Were you afraid of turning over? 
A. No. 
Q. · What made that skid mark? 
A. My tire. 
Q. You were dragging _your tires for 51 feet? 
A. I don't know. I don't know whether that 50 feet 
is all skid or not. · 
Q. Do you believe your car would have made that skid 
mark, if you were going only 15 miles an hour? 
page 117~ A. I don't know, I am not familar with that 
stuff. 1 
Q. You said you saw this car, you don't know where the 
stop sign is, but you saw the car on that side of the road, 
somewhere near the stop sign, and it was moving? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Which way was it going? 
A. It was going. 
Q. East or west? 
A. It was going east from Harrisonburg, I guess. 
Q. How far were you from the car when you first saw it? 
A. That is hard to say. 
Q. Give me the distance approximately? 
A. Approximations have gotten a lot of people into trouble. 
Q. You know about how far you were from it, were you 
20 feet? 
A. When I first saw the car? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Probably. been about 25 or 30 yards. 
Q. How much? . 
A. Probably 25 to 30 yards. 
Q. You say the car was moving when you first saw it? 
A. Yes, I think so. 
Q. That is right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it was going east, why didn't you stop your car? 
A. Well I didn't know it was the thing to do, no law 
about me stopping. 
page 118 r Q. I am not talking about the law .at all, you 
think something of your property, don't you? 
A. Yes, but that car was going from way back there, 
it was moving out, I thought it should have seen me, and 
I was up to the cross roads. 
Q. You had plenty of time to stop your -car? 
A. I might have possibly. 
Q. Wasn't the Richards car closer to the intersection 
when you first saw it, than your car? 
A. That is hard to say. 
Q. Why is it hard to say? 
A. Because when you are looking you don't make a mark 
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on the ground. I may have been just as far back as he 
was, I thought there was a stop sign there. 
Q. -Where you thought you were? 
A. No, on the other road. 
Q. Evidently the Richards car, when you first saw it 
was near the eastern edge of 29, wasn't it? 
A. No it was back near the stop sign. 
Q. You had a plain view of the Richards car, and you 
know it was coming straight across 29, and yet your car 
was going fast the skid marks were 51 feet, and you are try-
ing to tell us you were going only 15 miles an hour, how do 
you explain that? 
A. I don't know whether they are all skid marks or not, 
I don't know where the skid marks were. 15 
page 119 rmiles an hour in the intersection is not 15 miles 
an hour all the way. 
Q. What about 15 miles an hour? 
A. We never have come to the conclusion where the 15 
miles an hour start, where a car would be going 15 miles an 
hour. 
Q. You mean we have never said what the skid marks 
would be for a car going 15 miles an hour? · 
A. No, where a car should start going 15 miles an hour. 
Q. How fast were you going when you put on your 
brakes? 
A. I would have to estimate that, I put on the brakes 
all the way up to the intersection. 
Q. All the way up the hill? 
A. No not up the hill, there is a stretch before you come 
to the top. 
Q. Give me your estimate? 
A. Of what speed? 
Q. Speed after you put on the brakes? 
A. Well if I was going 45 back there, I put them on when 
I started up that rise. 
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Q. You didn't put them on until you got some distance 
beyond the 15 mile an hour sign then? 
A. I don't know about that, I know it was way back on 
the road. 
Q. The 15 mile sign doesn't reach the summit of the hill, 
it is on the side of the hill, isn't it? 
page 120 r A. I don~t know about that. 
Q. You didn't put on your brakes until you 
got over the hill ? 
A. When I started to slow down is when I put on my 
brakes. 
Q. Whereabouts did you hit this car, where was the 
car when you hit it? 
A. The cars came together, I don't say I hit the car, we 
struck each other. 
Q. What part of 29 was the Richards car on when you hit 
it? 
A. It was coming into what you call the eastern part. 
If you draw imaginary lines across the road, it might be 
coming into that, I was swerving all the time the other way. 
Q. It was beyond the center line of 29? 
A. Yes, that is where the mark was. 
By the Court: You saw where Officer Parker testified 
the cars came together, is he accurate about that? 
A. Yes, sir, that was very accurate, my car was turning 
eastward. 
By the Court: Is his locc1tion accurate of the point of 
the accident? 
A. Yes. 
By the Court : Did you see the Richards car stop, was 
the Richards car standing at any time you saw it or all 
the time was it in motion? 
A. All the time I saw it, it was in motion. 
By the Court : All together in motion? 
page 121 r A. Yes. 
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By the Court: Could you see it or did you see it far enough 
back to see that stop sign? 
A. No, I just knew there was one there. 
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. CHAPMAN,. 
Continued: 
Q. Do you still say that Mr. Richards' car was closer to 
the intersection, when you saw it, than you were? 
A. I didn't say it this time, I might have before, un-
doubtedly I did, if it was written down, and probably he 
was. 
Q. You say here, he must have been closer to the inter-
section than I was. I 
A. Yes, sir, I thought he was going to stop. 
Q. Let's don't get our mind on so many subjects-
Mr. Richey: I suggest that he be permitted to make his 
own answers. 
The Court : The witnesses just make their answers re-
sponsive to the questions, they can make their explanations 
after they have answered the· question. 
Q. You said this, "I am not talking about the stop sign 
now, but I asked you how far you were from the intersec-
tion when you saw the other car, and you put it at 25 
yards, I want you to tell me where the other car _was when 
you saw it, and you answered beyond the stop sign. Q. 
You mean it had passed the stop sign? A. The front of 
the car had pa~sed the front of the stop sign. Q. 
page 122 r You think that is correct? A. It must have been. 
Q. So that the other car was very close to the 
· intersection at that time? A. Closer that I was." Do you 
still say the Richards car was closer to the intersection than 
you were? 
A. It probably was, yes, sir. 
Q. You hadn't put on your brakes then? 
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A. Yes, sir, they were on. 
Q. You didn't put on the brakes until you saw you were 
going to hit the car, did you? 
A. I did, I had to slow down. 
Q. At what rate of speed were you running when you 
put your brakes on? 
A. You asked me that question before. 
Q. And I have never gotten any answer. 
Mr. Richey: Please the Court, I will have to object to 
that, he has answered that several times. 
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR. DUKE: 
Q. Mr. Greenleaf, I wish you would look at this plat and. 
tell us abut where the Richards car was when you first saw 
it? Will you look at this plat please, there is 33, the Green-
leaf car was coming that way, about where was the ichards 
c~r when you first saw it? 
A. It was just about in here. 
Q. Will you make a straight mark across the place? 
Mr. Chapman: There is a mark there now. 
page 123~ Mr. Duke: We want him to make a mark. 
· A. (The witness indicates the point by a mark 
with a circle drawn around it). 
Q. Make a circle about where you think you were? 
A. I suppose about in here. ( Indicated by circle). 
(The two marks referred to above are identified further 
hy the initials R & G respectively). 
Q. Mr. Richards had ample time to stop for some little 
distance before he reached the intersection did he not? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. How many years have you driven cars? 
A. About three. · 
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Q. When you first drove them you used to watched the 
speedometer and check the speeds? 
A. I suppose I did, yes. 
Q. Can you tell without looking at your speedometer, at 
this time your speed? 
A. I suppose you can at times, and at other times you 
cannot. 
Q. Are you usually way out on your estimates? 
A. You can usually come pretty close to it. 
Q. You can say how well? 
A. I suppose it is easier to judge someone elses speed 
than it is your own, I cannot say how near. 
Q. Approximately how near? · 
Mr. Chapman: He has been over that before. 
. page 124 r The Court: Yes, I think that has been covered. 
The witness stood aside. 
Mr. Max Oliver, another witness called by the defendant, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF BY MR. DUKE: 
Q. You are Mr. Max Oliver? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Norris: If your Honor please, Mr. Ashby, the 
mechanic is here and can testify. 
The Court : Unless you insist on it, I see no reason for 
it. Gentlemen of the Jury, the man he refers to is the 
garage man, who made up the estimate. 
Mr. Duke: We would like to have an opportunity to cross 
examine him. 
Q. You are 37 years of age, Mr. Oliver, and you drive a 
s~hool bus is that true? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Where were you at the time of the collision of the 
Greenleaf Plymouth car and Mr. Richards Chevrolet car? 
A. I was over at John Elliot's Service Station. 
Q. Will you point out where you were standing on this 
map? 
By the Court: It is on the south east corner of these 
two roads? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 125 r Q. Wher.e were you standing? 
A. Standing in the door over there. 
Q. What if anything, unusual attracted your attention 
at the time? 
A. I heard crying of car brakes, and I just looked there 
just about then and the two cars struck just about the time 
I looked over there. 
Q. When you first looked over there, didn't you see the 
Greenleaf car about opposite the Seminole Trail sign? 
Mr. Norris: I object. 
The Court: The objection is sustained. 
Q. You made a statement in this case, did you not and 
talked it over with me? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I will ask you to look at this and refresh your re-
collection? 
Mr. Norris: I object, if your Honor please. 
The Court: Who made up the statement, did you make 
it Mr. Oliver? 
A. No, sir, I testified up here in the Trial Justice Court. 
Q. And after you went back out there and looked over 
the situation and looked over this statement, you had me 
make some corrections in it and signed it, did you not? 
The Court: The witneis is now on the witness stand and 
no matter what he has said heretofore, we are governed 
strictly by what he says in this Court room. 
page 126 t Mr. Duke : We will go back to his testimony, 
then. 
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Q. You testified in the Trial Justice Court early in Feb-
ruary, I believe? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you asked at that time, and didn't you say in 
reply to the question- . 
Mr. Norris: I object, if the Court please. 
The Court: The objection is sustained. Mr. Duke, the 
Court has held you put this witness on the stand and you must 
ask him questions, you must not confront him with state-
ments, he must testify. 
Mr. Duke: If the witness proves adverse, as this wit-
ness has I can contradict him. 
The Court: In what respect has he proved adverse? 
Mr. Richey: Let's waive that and examine the man as 
our witness. 
Q. Mr. Oliver did you notice the Chevrolet car as it 
came into the intersection of route 29? 
A. Just as I looked over there, it was entering into 29. 
Q. The Chevrolet car? 
A. Yes. 
Q.· At what speed? 
A. I would say around 15. 
Q. Where was the Plymouth at that time? 
A. Coming out 29. 
Q. Coming out 29 into the intersection? 
A. Just going into the intersection, both cars 
page 127 },coming in together, when I lookeq. over there. 
Q. About how did the cars come together? 
A. The Plymouth, when they hit, hit the other side like 
this, and the Plymouth turned in the road and the Chevrolet 
went over in the direction of Charlie Jenning's Service Sta-
tion. 0 
Q. About how fast was the Chevrolet going after the 
impact? 
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A. I don't know it went over there pretty fast, I thought 
it was going to hit the gas tank over there. 
Q. It came into the intersection at a fairly good rate 
of speed, did it not? 
A. Well I would say about 15 miles an hour, as near as 
I can get at it. 
Mr. Norris : Would you mind getting the speed of 
the Plymouth as it entered the intersection? 
Q. At what speed did the Plymouth enter this intersec-
tion? · 
A. It came in pretty fast,. I reckon around 35 as near 
as I can get to it. 
Q. After it got into the intersection didn't it slow down.? 
A. That is about the time it got my attention, when the 
brakes got to crying and I looked over there and it all 
happened so quick. 
Q. W~sn't the Plymouth slowing down from the time you 
saw it until the time they came together? 
Mr. Norris : I object. 
The Court: The objection is sustained. 
page 128 ~ Q. State whether or not your noticed any change 
in the rate of the speed of the Plyrnouth? 
A. I think it was slowing down some, he applied his brakes. 
Q. Would you mind marking for us on these maps about 
where the Plymout car was when you first saw it, putting 
a circle with a dot in the center. 
The Court: Let me ask you gentlemen, aren't there 
enough marks on this plat for the witnesses to locate the 
points without putting more on there. Look at it Mr. Oliver 
and see if you can locate it? 
A. I don't know as I can. 
Q. Does this Seminole Trial sign mean anything to you? 
A. No. 
Q. Does this grass plot mean anything to you? 
A. There is one on each side. 
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Q. Does either one mean anything to you, as you were 
standing in the driveway and looking at it? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You couldn't place it exactly? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Will you tell us if looking from this driveway were 
you looking out in this direction across the grass plot or were 
you looking down across the grass plot on the other side, 
or could you state? 
A. When I first looked out I heard the cry of the brakes, 
and I saw the cars just before they struck. The car, the 
Chevrolet was coming into 29, and the other car 
page 129 rwas coming up 29, and they struck, it happened 
so quick I couldn't tell. 
CROSS EXAMINATION BY SENATOR NORRIS: 
Q. Mr. Oliver you say the thing that attracted your atten-
tion was the crying of brakes of the car, was that coming 
from the car coming from Charlottesville, to the best of 
your knowledge? 
A. I think it was coming from the Plymouth. 
Q. Did you observe the brake marks on the highway 
after the accident? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. I believe you stated that when you saw the Chevrolet 
entering the intersection it was going about 15 miles an 
hour? 
A. Something like that. 
Q. When you first saw the Plymouth it was going around 
35 miles an hour? 
A. Something like that as near as I can get at it. 
Q. The Plymouth was not at the intersection when you 
first saw it, was it? 
A. It was near about the intersection. 
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Q. And going at 35 miles an hour approximately? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How far would you say the Plymouth was from the 
intersection when you saw it? 
A. It was right at the intersection where it comes in 
near 33. 
page 130~ The c;ourt: Ask him what he means by inter-
section. 
Q. When you speak of intersection do you mean all that 
is within the curved lines representing each highway or 
do you mean this little part here formed by extending the 
lateral lines of each highway? 
A. Near about . long in here. They struck near about 
the intersection right here. I saw it just before they struck. 
Q. At that time the Plymouth was going at 35 miles an 
hour? · 
A. Just before it struck, I think it was. 
Q. Can you tell us, if you know, which car was nearest 
the intersection, when you first saw them? 
A. I don't know, they were both drawing right up in there. 
Q. You couldn't say? 
A. No. 
Q. But you can say when the Plymouth entered the inter-
section it was going about 35 miles and hour, and when the 
Chevrolet entered the intersection it was going 1 S ? 
A. Yes, sir, somewhere close there. 
Mr. Richey: I think it is fair to identify what he says 
is the beginning of the intersection. . 
The Court: When you say the intersection, I want to 
know what you mean by intersection? Do you mean this 
area in here. This is the outside line here, and 
page 131 ~this dotted line here shows the projection of this 
highway here, the travelled portion, that middle 
line is the center line, that represents the travelled portion 
on that side, and this other one represents the same thing. 
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Now what do you consider the intersection. Do you under-
stand this would be the intersection? You have been talking 
about the intersection, and I am not in a position to know 
whether you mean the projection of the lines across or what 
is generally sometimes called the Y or the entire area. 
A. That is what I mean, I didn't mean after they got 
in the intersection here, I saw it just before, I saw the car 
just as they entered the intersection. 
The Court: You are ref erring to the point south of 
the actual south margain of 33 continued across 29 ? 
A. Yes. 
The Court : Generally speaking you understand all this 
area in here as intersection? (Referring to the whole area 
embraced in the Y). 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Duke: Will you take a pencil-
The Court : Did you gentlemen of the Jury see and under-
5tand what he was pointing to. 
(The Jury indicates that they did). 
Q. Could you take a pencil there and mark 
page 132 rapproximately where the Plymouth was when you 
first saw it? 
A. I don't know whether I could or not. 
By the Court: Here is the center, the absolute center of 
29 and 33? 
A. Yes, right in here is about where I saw the car. 
( This point is marked with pencil). 
Q. At that time where was the Chevrolet, mark it with 
a pencil? 
A. The Chevrolet was right along here. (This point 
is marked with cross and initials of witness). 
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The witness stood aside. 
The Defendant rests. 
Mr. Norris : As long as we are taking evidence we 
• I 
will put the garage man on. 
The Court : The witness that comes on now is the one 
that is referred to, who has made the estimate of damages 
to the Chevrolet car. · 
Mr. Zack Ashburn, another witness for the Plaintiff, 
being first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
EXAMINATION IN CHIEF BY MR. NORRIS: 
Q. Did you examine Mr. G. E. Richards car shortly 
after December 20, 1939? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you make a list of the repairs that had to be 
meade on that car? 
A. Yes, sir, all my work we put on a repair list-
page 133 ~ Insert p. 133. 
T. D. McGINNIS, I.NCORPORATED 
Kilmarnock, Virginia 
REPAIRS TO G. E. RICHARDS' CAR-Dec. 30, 1939 
Front wheel R. Str ............... . 
Floor Pan, Str. at Rt. Frt. 
Cowl Assy., Str., Lower Panel R. 
Weld & Str. dash at Lower R. 
1 Rear Qtr. Panel R. . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 
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Turret top panel, str. r. side 
1 Roof Bow No. 3 ................. . 
1 Rear Qtr. Glass, R. Safety Plate ... . 
1 Headlining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1 Rear Qtr. Glass Run Channel R. . .... 
Door assembly r, str., panel str., & fill 
upper panel, str. lower panel 
1 door gar, mldg r. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1 rear hub cap ................... . 
rear wheel r. str .................. . 
1 front hub inner cap .............. . 
1 front brake drum r ............... . 
6 front hub bolts, r. . ............. . 
1 king pin support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
l steering arm, r. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
steering tie rod str. 
1 frame assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1 drive shaft . . . . . . . . . ............ . 
1 drive shaft housing .............. . 
hood side panel, r. str. & refinish 
1 front fender, r. & refinish (gray) ... 
front fender skirt R. str. 
1 runing board assembly r. & Ref. Gray 
1 rear fender R. & Refinish (Gray) .. 
radiator shell str. r. side & ref. 
radiator core repair .............. . 
1 radiator hose upper .............. . 
2 radiator hose lower .............. . 
1 fan blade ....................... . 
1 gallon Prestone ...... ~ ~ .......... . 
1 gas tank top . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1 gas tap extension pipe ............. . 
1 gas tank hose ................... . 
1 exhaust manifold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
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2 side motor cushions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.70 
2 front motor mountings . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.00 
$ 181.95 
Duco material .................. . 
Total labor $183.80 and Towing 
charges $25.00 ................ . 





.page 134}-with a carbon copy and my time and all is shown 
right on that. 
Q. Where do you live? 
A. I live in Kilmarnock. 
Q. Who do you work for? 
A. T. E. McGinnis, Inc. 
Q. I hand you a list and ask you if that is a correct list 
of the replacements that had to be made on Mr. Richards' 
car? 
A. I happened to be in the office, at the time, and when 
I got my repair order, I had the book-keeper make this 
list ap from my repair order. 
Q. Is it correct? 
A. Yes. 
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. DUKE: 
Q. I notice the radiator shell is damaged, and also the 
radiator core and fan blade. I understood Mr. Richards to 
say the radiator had been knocked back into the fan? 
A. Yes, sir, on the right hand side. 
Q. What was the fair market value of this car before 
the accident? 
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A. The sale price of that car would run at that time 
$550.00 to $575.00, it was a particularly good type '38 model. 
Q. Are you acquainted with the value of 1936 Plymouth 
Coupe? 
page 135 r A. I cannot say; but there are not very many 
Plymouths we take in, I make estimates on all 
cars we take in. 
Q. What was the fair market value of Mr. Richards' 
car after the accident? 
A. I don't quite get your meaning. 
Q. I am asking you what was the fair market value of his 
car after the accident? 
Mr. Norris: And before any replacements had been made. 
A. That particular car, might have been salvaged for 
$100.00 or $125.00. 
Q. The difference would be between $550.00 and $575.00 
and $100.00 to $125.00? 
A. Yes, sir, $550.00 to $575.00 sale price. 
Q. What would you have paid for it? 
A. We ususally allow that much. 
Q. If a man came to you and wanted to sell it to you 
how much would you have been willing to give for it? 
A. That would be hard for me to say. 
Q. A man that wanted to sell a car? 
A. I don't know about that, that is according to how bad 
the other fellow wants to buy the car, and the one that 
owns it wants to sell. 
Q. Take the average buyer there? 
A. The average buyer in that country, would be willing 
to pay $550.00 to $575.00 for that car, and of course financing 
charges would run it over $600.00. 
page 136rRE-EXAMINATI0N BY MR. NORRIS: 
Q. What did you say was the sale price of the wreck? 
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A. $100.00 to $125.00. 
By the Court: Was this car repaired or .disposed of? 
A. It was repaired and the man who owns it now is Mr. 
Christmas. 
Mr. Richey: What did he pay for it. 
A. I don't know. 
Mr. Duke: You don't know what the repairs amounted 
to do you? 
A. Yes, sir, that is the amount right there of the re-
].Jairs. ( Referring to statement). 
Witness stood aside. 
Mr. Richey: We have a similar statement, which if 
we cannot locate by tomorrow morning we will waive. 
The Court: With that exception the evidence is all 
in, is that right, gentlemen, both sides rest? 
To which counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant reply in the 
affirmative. 
Court is at this point adjourned until 9 A. M. May 25, 
1940. 
page 137 ~May 25, 1940. (In Chambers). 
Mr. Norris: If the Court please, I am· not going to 
agree to that statement on that plat, and I am going to ask 
that the Jury be allowed to go down there and test it out 
themselves. ( Counsel is referring to the statement on the 
plat, to the effect that the road ahead is clearly visible to 
a man seated in an automobile for 1000 feet from the inter-
section). 
The Court : I want the record to show that, because 
I see there is an apparent error there. If you gentlemen 
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remember I looked at it yesterday when that plat was in-
troduced and yesterday evening I looked at the scene, and 
there is no doubt there is an error there. It is impossible 
to see a car. coming up the hill and keep your eye on it, it 
disappears for some span of time, · it could not be very 
much, I don't know, probably about a few seconds, be-
cause a car going 30 miles an hour will travel 44 feet in 
a second. In measured automobile time if you say second 
you are apt to be wrong. . 
Mr. Norris : · I was out there this morning and I notice 
it disappears and disappears well, and we want the Jury to 
know the facts about the car. And the safe thing for us 
to do is to put ourselves right on the record. This map 
has gone in by agreement, and at the time I had 
page 138 }not even observed the statement as to the visi-
bility being 1000 feet, I want to get in this re-
cord we do not agree with that part of the map. 
Mr. Duke: We have no desire in the world to have 
anything in- there appearing to be a fact, which is not a 
fact. 
The Court: Have you tried it Mr. Early? 
. Mr. Early: Yes, sir, there is no doubt about it, I noticed 
it yesterday afternoon. 
The Court: There is no question about it at all, I tried 
it sliding up from all points, and it didn't matter where I 
got in that Y and looked south, cars disappeared, isn't that 
right Mr. Early? 
Mr. Early : Yes, sir, that is correct. 
Mr. Duke: I deem it very material to both sides to 
have the facts shown as to be true visibility at the various 
points along that road, and if your Honor will permit us 
to send for a Surveyor, then .we would like to go down there 
and place a car at various points from the stop sign on and 
see precisely where they go out of sight on the road.° 
John C. Greenleaf, Jr .. v .. G. E. Richards 127 
Mr. Norris: We have a wrong record, that I want to 
have corrected. 
The Court: Wait a minute, Mr. Duke, we cannot use 
tests unless it is by agreement. The sole thing wrong 
. with the record as it stands, is as counsel 
page 139 ragree on both sides, that at any point you may 
take in the Y or the intersection or what you 
,·all it, cars to the south do disappear within the 1000 yards 
disclosed in the plat, they disappear and disappear for some 
moments, how long will depend on the speed of the car. ~s 
there any conflict on that? 
Mr. Duke: None. According to Mr. Greenleaf's evi-
dence, and it is undisputed, he was past the cautionary sign, 
,vhen he first saw the defendant's car at the stop sign or 
approximately at the stop sign, therefore, I see no need to 
have the tests include beyond that point. 
Mr. Norris: We have not agreed to any tests. 
The Court: The only thing is we want to clear the · 
record, the record says that looking from the intersection 
southward, you can at all times see an automobile· for 1000 
yards. That is not true, and counsel agree it is not true, 
and that cars do disappear, your plat shows the lowest point. 
Mr. Norris : I was going to ask that the Jury be allowed 
to go down· and see it we will make no tests, but if the 
Jury want to make a test that would be all right. 
Mr. Duke : We think it is important to show the visi-
bility along there be shown. 
The Court : I can state for the purpose of the 
page 140 rrecord that this plat was admitted by both sides 
under a mistake of fact in regard to visibilty 
toward the south, and it has been suggested there was an 
error in the plat, and agreed there was an error, and for 
that purpose the plat was amended by agreement, and it 
was then asked that the Jury view the scene for the purpose, 
and for the purpose alone. For the purpose of our view 
also, counsel agree that the Sheriff of this county and his 
deputies may take their car and drive from towai:c;ls .Char-
128 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virgina 
lottesville towards the intersection coming northward and 
stop at all of the signs appearing on the side of 29. Is that 
satisfactory? 
Mr. Duke: Not, quite, I don't think he need go back 
as far as the stop sign, so that our test will show that if the 
Plaintiff stopped at the stop sign as he says, and Greenleaf 
was where he says he was at the time, whether or not they 
would have been in sight of one another at those points. 
The Court : I don't want to get in violation of the rules. 
The Jury must go there and have a view, they don't go there 
to take evidence. I asked if you wanted the Sheriff to do 
that? 
Mr. Norris: We do, sir. 
The Court: All the evidence is in. Y ot1 gentlemen, can 
make the motion and I will over-rule it. 
At this point the Jury is called to the Jury box. 
page 141 ~ The Court : Gentlemen of the Jury a plat was 
put in evidence here yesterday describing the 
location of this accident, counsel agreed on the plat, but 
it subsequently developed that the plat has an erroneous state-
ment in it, as respect to visibility to the south. The evi-
dence shown on the plat is that cars do not disappear, coun-
sel agree that is not accurate, so as to be fully and completely 
clear to you, we will take a view for the· purpose of looking 
south. As you have heard in the evidence the intersection 
has been changed since the accident, we are not looking at 
it for that purpose, but solely to observe the visibility to the 
south. If is further agreed that the Sheriff shall take his 
car and come from towards Charlottesville on up to the 
intersection stopping at the road markings along the road. 
You will go with me, you are not to- discuss this matter at 
all, you are not to talk to any one concerning it, if you want 
to know anything you ask me and I will try to find out for 
you. 
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Mr. Richey: I don't think it is correct to say it is agreed 
we are going down to see. 
The Court: It is agreed, it was agreed in chambers 
by Mr. Duke and Mr. Early. 
Mr. Duke : . I further understand the tests will be made 
at several points. 
page 142 (a) ~ After returning from the view : 
Mr. Richey: There is one other point that occurs to 
me, you made a statement in the record of what was wrong 
with the plat. We went out there and looked at it, and you 
will remember a car came into view 419 feet from the inter-
section, there should be something in the record to show 
that. 
The Court: In the event there is anything on that point 
that is not clear, I can make it clear. 
The Court: The car disappears. between the sign, which 
is. I think, marked caution, and the sign marked, the second 
s1gn. 
page 142(b)} CERTIFICATE OF EX-
CEPTION NO. 4 
The following objections were made and exceptions taken 
to the granting and refusing of instructions by plaintiff and 
defendant as below set out : 
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTIONS: 
The Court: All right, is there any objection to number 
l? 
Mr. Duke: No objection to No. 1. 
The Court: Is there any objection to No. 2? 
Mr. Duke: Our objection is first, ··that it is not a complete 
statement and is apt to confuse and mislead the Jury, because 
it overlooks the fact that Greenleaf had the right to assume 
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the other car would stop before it entered the intersection. 
This is a finding instruction, if the two vehicles got there 
at approximately the same time, Greenleaf had the right 
to assume it would stop, for two reasons, first, the car was 
to his le£ t; second, there was a stop sign, and in addition the 
law requires any oncoming vehicle entering a main high-
way from a secondary highway to stop; not only that 
he had a right to assume the other man would use due care. 
Mr. Norris : There is not evidence that shows that Mr. 
Greenleaf entered the intersection at the same time. 
page 142(c) ~ Objections and exceptions taken to the grant-
~nd refusing of instructions. 
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTIONS: 
The Court: All right, is there any objection to Number 
1. 
Mr. Duke: No objection to No. 1. 
The Court: Is there any objection to No. 2? 
Mr. Duke: Our objection, is first, that it is not a 
complete statement and is apt to confuse and mislead the 
Jury, because it overlooks the fact that Greenleaf had the 
right to assume the other car would stop before it entered 
the intersection. This is a finding instruction,. if the two 
vehicles got there at approximately the same time, Greenleaf 
had the right to assume it would stop, for two reasons·, 
first the car was to his left ; second, there was a stop sign, 
and in addition the law requires any oncoming vehicle enter-
ing a main highway from a secondary highway to stop; not 
only that he had a right to assume the other man would 
Ltse due care. 
Mr. Norris : There is no evidence that shows that Mr. 
Greenleaf entered the intersection at the same time 
page 143 ~as Mr. Richards, in fact; Mr. Greenleaf himself 
testified that when he saw Mr. Richards car it 
. was closer to the intersection that he was. As to the right 
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of way, if Greenleaf had any right of way it was lost the 
minute that ·Richards entered the intersection, first, be-
cause, the person who enters the intersection first had the 
right of way, and with reference to assumptions, after Rich-
ards entered that right of way, having entered first, he had 
the right to assume that Greenleaf would not enter it. This 
instruction is based upon the theory and upon the condition 
that Mr. Richards entered the intersection, ahead of Green-
leaf, and, therefore, had the right of way, and that if 
Greenleaf had been travelling at the rate of speed the law 
required of him 15 miles an hour, he could have stopped 
his car ~ithin less than 53 feet. 
Mr. Duke : Mr. Richards testified that he never looked 
after he stopped back at the stop sign. 
Mr. Norris: I don't think he testified to that. 
The Court : Aren't you dealing with a partial view of 
the evidence, doesn't the total evidence show that he stopped 
somewhere back there, and that he stopped at a place where 
he could see up and down. 29. We must take it all, and it 
is very apparent that if anyone stopped where the stop sign 
originally was that he could not have seen. 
page 144 r Mr. Richey: At the same. time it is in evidence,. 
from Mrs. Van Fossen's transcript, that every-
one who testified at the Trial Justice Court said that Mr .. 
Richards stopped at the stop sign, Richards testified that he 
might have been three or four feet past it. 
The Court : Do you gentlemen take that as aff rmative 
evidence or impeaching evidence? 
Mr. Richey: I am taking it as his evidence. 
The Court: What is it in law? 
Mr. Norris : We also proved that he said he stopped 
where he could see by Mrs. Van Fossen. 
The Court: All right what is the objection to No. 3? 
Mr. Duke: You are refusing No. 2? 
The Court: Mr. Duke, I have never in my life reached 
the stage of talking to a man when he didn't want to listen 
to what I had to say. 
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The Court: All right No. 3, what is wrong with that? 
Mr. Duke: May it please the Court, may I dictate my 
exceptions into the record. · 
The Court: If you want to dictate anything into the 
record you can do so, but the Court has not ruled on any-
thing for you to except to yet. 
Mr. Richey: I don't think it fits this case. Here is 
a superior highway, regardless of who had the right of way, 
the man who has the right of way has no right 
page 145 rto ignore the fact that he was crossing a superior 
highway. Mr. Greenleaf said he was far enough 
away to have stopped, and should have stopped, and that he 
expected him to stop. 
The Court : What is wrong with the last part of that. 
Is there any question about that? 
Mr. Duke: Yes, sir. Where the evidence shows as it 
does in this case that they arrived simultaneously or practi-
cally so, then the car on the superior highway had the right 
of way. Also it disregards the assurpption Greenleaf is 
entitled to that the man would stop before entering the 'inter-
section and would not proceed across in front of him. 
The Court : What is wrong with this instruction in 
this case? (Here reads last paragraph instruction 3). 
Mr. Richey: There is no evidence in the world that this 
man entered the intersection, before the Greenleaf car. 
Mr. Norris : It is his own evidence, and it is the reason-
able inference from all the evidence. 
The Court: I will give No. 3, the second part, I think 
the Jury should be told that when he got into the intersection, 
then it was the business of the other man to respect his 
being in there. 
Mr. Duke : It overlooks the fact that if he came too 
late for the other man to stop, there would be no last clear 
chance to avoid the accident, it would be too late for the 
Greenleaf car to stop. 
page 146 r The Court: If he couldn't stop within that 
distance running 15 miles an hour, then the rule 
applies against him. 
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The Court: What objection is there to No. 4? 
Mr. Duke: First· it is an abstract statement of law, and 
in particular taking paragraph two, the only requirement was 
that he should slow down, that is all that he had to do, I 
think it is confusing to say stop, slow down or regulate his 
speed. 
The Court : I think to stop ought to be cut out. 
Mr. Duke: Furthermore it is confusing because it does 
not show where he should slow down. I think your Honor 
that it is general knowledge that road signs at the present 
time, instead of having one broad sign have two or more 
separate signs, and that the purpose of a primary highway 
is to speed up traffic, and that the two signs mean that 
when reaching the cross roads one should slow down to 15 
miles an hour and not 500 feet back. 
The Court: I agree with everything you say, and still 
don't see where you should object to this. (Here the in-
struction is read). What objection is there to that in-
struction? 
Mr. Duke: It ignores the defence of contributory neg-
ligence, and is not a complete statement, being a finding 
instruction. 
page 147 r The Court: Mr. Duke I can write everyone of 
these instructions in ten minutes. I have had 
so much trouble recently about instructions, I tried a $10,-
000.00 damage suit this week, contested bitterly, and I didn't 
have ten minutes trying to reach a decision on the instruc-
tions. I try to give counsel a chance to express their views, 
but I am coming to the conclusion that it is not worth the 
time and trouble. What I am trying to find out, is if there 
is anything wrong with this instrution. If there is, point 
it out to me. If you want me to I will throw everyone of 
these instructions out and instruct this Jury myself, but I 
am not going to sit here and listen to objections such as you 
have been making. Gentlemen, to my mind there couldn't 
he any possible exception to this instruction, if I am wrong; 
where is there anything in the instruction that is wrong? 
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It lays down the duty and says if he breaches it he is respon-
sible, I cannot see any objection to it, this business of shoot-
ing at all of them don't help me one bit. 
Mr. Richey: If your Honor please, that is not my idea 
at all, the only thing I. see it ignores the question of con-
tributory negligence. 
The Court: I agree with you. 
Mr. Norris: We have another instruction on that. 
The Court : That brings up the idea of whether that 
is proper or not, they are all to be read together 
page 1 :48 ~and this business of winding up each instruction, 
"unless you should further believe from the evi-
dence that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence," seems to me to be useless, I prefer telling the Jury 
that if they. believe that he is guilty of contributory neg-
ligence he cannot recover. 
Mr. Norris: It is generally conceded that the instructions 
are all considered together. 
The Court: All right, coming back to No. 2, I will tell 
you the tendency of both sides in this case is to undertake 
to have the Court say where a man should begin coming 
down to 15 miles an hour, or exactly where he should stop. 
I can find nothing in the law that warrants my doing so. 
He must stop, where he can see both ways, I cannot say he 
must stop here or there or any other place, that is covered 
wholly and strictly by the entire traffic regulations, and I 
cannot say, and no Court has a right to say he must stop 
behind the stop sign or· immediately at the stop sign, the 
stop sign is a warning and where he should stop I don't 
know. I think that is the trouble in this case, and it has 
been coming from both sides. You gentlemen, say he 
should have gotten to within 15 miles an hour at the speed 
sign and not beyond it, I don't think that is ·the law. 
Mr. Norris : I think the real intersection is the pro-
longation of the parallel side lines of the two 
page 149 }-roads, I think we all agree on that. 
Mr. Richey: I think as to where he should get 
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down to 15 miles or begin to get down to 15 miles an hour 
v1ould depend a lot on his speed, if he is going 20 miles an 
hour he can begin later, than if he were going faster. He 
has got to get down to 15 miles an hour when he comes 
to the crossing of the two side lines. If Greenleaf, when 
he got to this point here was down to 15, it doesn't matter 
where he started or how fast he was coming back here some-
where. 
The Court: Here is where the trouble comes on both 
sides, it is the theory that you give all the force to one side 
and do not give any to the other. There are usually two or 
three signs, first a caution sign and so on, which you must 
pay attention to, the same is true as to the 15 miles an hour 
· si~, then the next one the intersection sign, that further 
calls your atention to the traffic law, then third you must not 
cross that middle line no matter what is happening at a 
high rate of speed. In view of my feeling, and the fact 
that I have never been able to find a case in conflict with it, 
• I cannot instruct the Jury here· as to where he ought to 
have come down to 15 miles an hour, or where he should 
have stopped, his business is to stop where he can see up 
. and down, and it is the duty of the other one to use caution, 
and the 15 miles an hour sign is for the pur.pose 
page 150 }-of preventing him from going through that in-
tersection and injuring someone else. 
Mr. Duke: Every man has a right to assume the other 
man will obey the law. 
The Court : I am going to give you that instruction if 
· you want it, if a man is within the law, he has a right to 
assume the other man will also obey the law. I am going 
to give No. 1, No. 3, as modified and No. 4. 
Mr. Duke : Thc1it is a finding instruction and ignores this 
theory that Greenleaf entered the intersection .at 15 miles 
an hour, and he had a per£ ect right to assume that other 
cars would observe the law and stop, and this is especially 
true when the other car was coming from his left over 
an inferior highway, and, therefore, Greenleaf had the.right 
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to assume that he would stop, and until the contrary came to 
his attention there was no duty resting 11,p him at all, and 
it appears that that did come to his attention too late for 
him to <lo anything further. 
The Court : ( Re-reading the first paragraph of Instruc-
tion No. 2) . There cannot be anything wrong or any 
o_uestion on that part of it. ( Reading the last part of In-
struction No. 2). I must have been reading the wrong in-
struction, of course, that is right, no question about that 
at all. In view of that I don't see that there is any need 
of giving No. 3 at all. I don't think it is necessary to give it 
in view of this other one. 
page 151 ~ Mr. Norris: I would want the Jury told that 
the man who got in the intersection first had the 
right of way. 
The Court: All right I will give No. 1, No. 2, No. 4, 
and No. 3 as modified. 
Mr. Duke: We except to the iiving of the instructions 
for the reasons assigned. 
The Court: All right Instruction No. 5, any objection to 
that. 
Mr. Richey: I think there should be added to that, but 
if on the other hand the Jury believe that Richards was 
guilty of negligence, _which in any efficient degree con-
tributed to the collision then he cannot recover, and the 
Jury must find for the Defendant. 
Mr. Duke: An additional objection to that is instead 
of proximate cause, should be inserted the word sole prox-
imate cause. 
The Court: Any question about the insertion of the 
word 'sole'. 
Mr. Norris : I think it has been fuUy covered. 
The Court : Put it in there. 
Mr. Duke: In addition, I think it would be less con-
fusing, if the word efficiently could come out. 
Mr. Richey: I think it would be proper to explain to 
the Jury that there must be more that a scintilla; that a 
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mere scintilla on either side is not sufficient. 
page 152 ~ Mr. Duke: If Richards negligence was the sole 
cause of the accident then, of course, Greenleaf 
can recover, second, if the negligence of both concurred 
then neither one could recover,· and lastly, if Greenleaf was 
negligent then Richards can recover. 
The Court: All right No. 6, what is the objection to that? 
Mr. Duke : We object to that, because it is not borne 
out by the evidence. The evidence shows that Richards 
never looked for the car, therefore, he could not assume a 
car was not there, or that it would yield him the right of 
way. 
Mr. Richey: The error in that is that there should be 
added, at the same time, if the Jury believe that Greenleaf 
saw this car and expected it to stop, he had a right to assume 
that it would stop, and if it cut in front of him under these 
drcumstances Richards cannot recover. There should be 
added to that that the burden is upon them to prove the facts 
stated. 
The Court : All matters contained in No. 8 are properly 
in the instructions I indicated I would give. I think it 
is repition, and in addition it is stated better in the other 
instructions. The thought is covered in No. 2, it is covered 
again in No. 4, or enough of it is covered. Refuse No. 
8, as covered. 
Mr. Norris : Counsel for the Plaintiff except 
page 153 ~for the reason that no other instruction in this 
case covers the proposition that the Plaintiff hav-
ing entered the intersection first would have the right to pre-
sume that the right of way would be yielded to him by a 
car not having entered said intersection. 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTIONS. 
The Court: I have ·before me Instructions A, ·B, C, 
U, E, F, G, H, and I. Is there any objection to K? 
Mr. Norris : We wiU agree to A. 
' 
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The Court : All right B ? 
Mr. Norris: I object to that. 
The Court: What is the trouble with that. 
... 
' 
Mr. Norris : In the first place . it is a mere repetition 
of Instruction A. · In the second place, it is apparently 
an excrept from the Court's opinion. I object to that in-
struction every bit of it, I don't think it is in the form of 
an instruction which has been approved by the Court of 
Appeals. I think it is a dissertation by the Court. 
The Court : I think your statement is true generally. 
I see no objection if the argument the Court was using 
on the tail end of it is cut out, that one when he looks must· 
see, and that when one looks fails to take heed is 
page 154 ~as guilty as one who fails to look at all. I will 
strike out everything after "look out". 
Mr. Norris: I think that is a good rule of law. 
Mr. Chapman: It is the same proposition as A. 
The Court : It is a little broader. He must not only 
look, but he must see, and having seen what he ought to 
have seen he must act. 
The Court: All right No. C .. 
Mr. Norris : I don't think that is any more true than for 
cars coming from the right. 
Mr. Duke : It is taken from the Otey v. Blessing case. 
Mr. Norris: And particularly for cars coming from the 
right. 
The Court: I don't want to point out any details, I 
don't want to emphasize any one item. 
Mr. Norris : I don't like the last part of this instruction, 
I object to that. 
Mr. Duke: The Court says in the Otey v. Blessing 
case that the duty to stop is the duty to give the right of 
way. 
The Court: There is .no doubt about A, coming to a com-
plete stop, no doubt about B, to keep a proper look out, and 
C in starting on said highway without seeing that such 
movements could be .made with safety, we are going off on 
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another thought, then, to yield the right of way to cars 
approaching. 
Mr. Norris: If he saw them. 
The Court: I am striking out the written in 
page 155 ~portion and giving it, I will give you an instruc-
tion on the question of right of way, but I think 
it is out of place here, because I am telling what his dutie.l» 
are. 
Mr. Duke: vVe object and except on that on the grouna 
that since the Blessing case says the duty to stop meant 
the duty to yield the right of way, .we submit that is, undet 
the circumstances of this case a proper instruction for the 
Defendant and ought to be given in its original form. 
The Court : The Court's view is that subsection one, 
two and three of "C" covers every thing that is properly pre-
5ented in Instruction C, while the added four, which has 
been striken out confuses the other three. 
Mr. Norris : The balance of that, it has got to be 
negligence, that was the sole proximate cause. 
Mr. Duke : Or if it contributed to it. 
Mr. Norris: It must be negligence that efficiently con-
tributed to the accident. 
Mr. Duke: We have ;no objection to your putting thal 
in. 
The Court : All right. 
Mr. Duke : We think the instruction is proper and ex-.. 
cept to the amendment. 
The Court : Then I will refuse it. 
Mr. Duke: I say we will except to the refusal of it 
in its original form, and tender it again as amended by 
your Honor. 
page 156 ~ The Court: What is the objection to D? 
Mr. Norris: We seriously object to a part ot 
that. He says here according to his instruction that Richards 
had to keep his eyes glued up and down 29. 
The Court: Let me ask you Gentlemen, do· you contend 
that after he got in the intersection and clearly had a right 
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to be there, that he then had to look to· his right and to his 
le£ t. That is not the Ia w of Virginia. 
Mr. Richey : Let's see about this one that I wrote this 
morning. What I am getting at is up to where he got to 
where he could put his foot on the laterial line, he must 
look both ways. 
Mr. Norris : After he looked and considered it was clear 
he had a right to cross, he had to cross with ordinary 
care under the circumstances. 
The Court: That is all. To plft it another way, when 
he reached 29, where 29 was a part of 33, when he got 
there he didn't have to look right and left, he ought to 
get out of the way then as quickly as possible. Yoi.t gen-
tlemen agree on that, 29 is the superior highway and 33 
is resting .on 29 at that intersection, therefore the law says 
cars coming on 29, although it appears to be a part of 
33, they must not come on until they have looked, but once 
having looked and gotten on 29, he must get 
page 157}out of the way. No. D of course, could not be 
given it is erroneous. 
The Court: Any objection to No. E. 
Mr. Norris: It is a good proposition of law, it is not 
as clearly stated as it should be, ·I think that is good law. 
The Court: Any objection to F. If he stopped at 
the sign and couldn't see down the highway then he must 
stop when he arrives at a point where he can see down the 
highway, if he didn't do that then he cannot recover. In-
sert after stop, 'to have avoided the accident by again stop-
ping at some point before reaching the intersection.' I 
think No. F is all right. 
The Court : Is there any question about G? 
Mr. Norris: That is correct law under certain con-
ditions, it is not necesary true, that if Greenleaf was driving 
north on 29, Richards would have to yield the right of way 
it is only true where he was closer to the intersection. 
Mr. Duke: In the Otey v. Blessing case the man was 
in the intersection; when a car enters upon a in.a.in high-
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way it shall before reaching the intersection stop, and second 
when two cars reach the intersection at the same time the 
car on the left shall yield the right of way, and it is said in 
the Otey v. Blessing case, the duty to· stop means 
page 158 rthe duty to yield the right of way. 
Mr. Norris: It says that John C. Greenleaf 
driving north on 29 had the right to assume that Richards 
driving east on 33, would yield the right of way, 
he would have a right to assume that if they both arrived 
at the intersection at the same time, but he would not have 
necessarily the right to assume that he would yield hiin 
the right of way, because Richards might have been very 
dose to the intersection and Greenleaf might have been 
200 yards away. 
The Court : Your point is well taken, merely because 
I am riding on 29 would not give me the right to assume 
that the other man will stop and yield the right of way. If 
I am on top of the hill at the 1000 yard line and had seen 
this man about to enter 29 I haven't any right at that 
point to say he would yield the right of way. 
Mr. Richey: The facts of this case do not show a case 
where a car was 1000 yards away. 
The Court: That is squarly the case, if the Jury believe 
that Richards failed to stop in a place where he could see 
along U. S. 29, and such failure was the proximate cause 
of the accident or approximately contributed thereto, then 
the Jury must find for the Defendant. 
Mr. Duke: We would like to put in stop and 
look. 
page 159 r The Court: All right H any object to H. 
Mr. Duke: We want to make a formal ex-
ception to the amendment of the last instruction ("G") and 
will re-off er it as amended. 
The Court: You gentlemen cannot get any bill of ex-
ceptions from me on that. 
Mr. Richey: Do you mean if we amend them and offer 
them and off er them again, we waive our exception? 
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The Court : Yes. 
Mr. Norris : H I think carries a correct principle of 
law. 
The Court: That is right. All right I any objection. 
You are just piling them up. 
Mr. Norris: I object to I, it is a duplication. 
The Court: Yes, that is right. 
Mr. Richey: I have some others here. 
The Court: Gentlemen, I have 7 lengthly instructions here. 
Mr. Richey: I think you gave the Jury one that if he 
approached that highway at an unlawful rate of speed he 
forfeited his right of way. 
The Court: Not in that language, I don't think so. 
Mr. Richey : If you did I want this one to match it. 
The Court : I struck it out. 
Mr. Duke: One further one, I want. I wanted Sen. 
Norris to put that on his No. 5. 
Mr. Norris : It is all covered by his instructions. 
Mr. Duke: You have nothing. on concurrent negli-
gence. 
page 160 ~ Mr. Norris : That would be concurrent neg-
legince-
The Court : H is the broadest thing under the sun on 
that subject. 
Mr. Duke : I will only ask for one part of that No. 2. 
They had an instruction in there, if this was added to it, 
they said if the sole proximate cause was Greenleaf's neg-
ligence, then they could find for the Plaintiff. 
Mr. Norris : It is all included. 
The Court : Insruction L that will be given. 
Mr. Norris: You have got that in there once already. 
The Court: All right, I think I have given enough. 
Mr. Duke : We except. 
Mr. Duke: We want to renew the Motion to strike. 
The Court : All right, I over-rule it. 
Mr. Duke: We except, can we put in our grounds of 
exceptions later. 
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The Court : You can put in all the grounds and exceptions 
you want. 
At the conclusion of the reading of the instructions by 
the Court. to the Jury, the following proceedings were had. 
Mr. Duke: May it please the Court there are two ad-
ditional ones, you said you would give, first, the one as to 
burden of proo_f, and second as to defining the intersec-
tion. 
page 161 ~ The Court: Gentlemen of the Jury, the man 
that brings his suit the burden of proving his 
claim is upon that man; the man who claims contributory 
negligence, the burden is upon him to prove. Gentlemen 
of the Jury throughout the testimony witnesses have from 
time to time · referred to the intersection, I am not under-
taking to give you the interpretation-
Mr. Norris: I have never entered into any agreement 
that the Court could instruct the Jury on that point. 
Mr. Richey : I request the Court to give that instruction. 
The Court: I am not going to define it unless counsel 
agree. 
Mr. Duke: I ask your Honor to adjourn to chambers. 
(Which was done). 
The Court: All I can say is that. Gentlemen, when I 
refer in the instructions to intersection, what I am mean-
ing there is the prolongation of the lines of the respective 
highways. It is very apparent as witnesses came on the 
wiJness stand that they did not use the term in the same way 
the Court is using it, when I am speaking of Intersections, 
I tnean the continuation of the lin~s across. What the wit-
nesses meant, is a question for jury to determine. Some 
meant the whole Y, some meant the same thing I mean. Is 
there any question on that subject? (To counsel) .. 
Mr. Norris: That is entirely all right. 
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At this point the Jury retires to its room to consider of 
its verdict. 
page ~162 ~ After deliberating at some length the Jury 
returns to the Court room, when the following pro-
ceedings were had : · 
The Court: Gentlemen, have you reached a verdict m 
this case. 
The Foreman: Yes, but we are not certain how it 
5hould be worded. 
The Court: You are not certain how you should write 
the verdict? If you find for the Plaintiff on the main claim 
you will say, we, the Jury, find for the Plaintiff and fix his 
damages at so many dollars, signed by your Foreman. If 
you find for the Defendant on the cross claim, you will say, 
we the Jury find for the defendant on his cross claim and 
fix his damages af so many dollars. Do you think I should 
go any further gentlemen? 
The Court: At present say, we the Jury find for the 
Plaintiffs and fix their damages at so many dollars, or we, 
the Jury find for the Defendant on his cross claim and fix 
his damages at ~o many dollars. 
Mr. Duke: And if they simply find for the Defendant say 
we the Jury find for the Defendant. 
The Court : That is right, if you do not find for either 
one say, we, the Jury find for the Defendant. Go ahead and 
fix your verdict and I will correct it. 
The Jury again retire to their room. 
page 163 r After a short time the Jury returns to the 
Court Room, when the following proceedings were 
had: 
The Court: Gentlemen of the Jury have you arrived at a 
verdict. 
The Foreman : Yes, (handing verdict to the Court). 
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The Court: We, the Jury find for the Plaintiff $450.00, 
damages to the car. Is that your verdict gentlemen? 
A. Yes. 
The Court: Does the form suit you? (To counsel). 
Mr. Norris: Yes. 
Mr. Chapman: That ought to be plural number. 
The Court: That is right. 
Mr. Duke: May it please the Court we would like to 
move to set aside the verdict on the ground that it is con-
trary to the law and evidence, and for errors in giving and 
refusing instructions, and we would like to assign other 
grounds after we have had a chance to examine the record; 
and further that the physical facts show conclusively that 
the Plaintiff was guilty of contributary negligence, and 
some other grounds which we would like to assign later. 
The Court: I want to hear all of it now. 
Mr. Duke: Because the Plaintiff's own evidence shows· 
that he was guilty of contributory neglignce 
page 164 rwhich certainly contributed to his own injury, 
~nd because the physical facts show conclusively 
that the. Plaintiff was guilty of Cqntributory negligence, 
which contributed in an efficient manner to his injury and 
should bar his recovery, and we would like to reserve leave 
to assign other grounds after we have had a chance to ex-
amine the record. 
The Court: I think the motion covers everything, it 
possibly could cover, if it does not the Court will consider 
it as made. The Court is ready to act on the motion. On 
the subject of the law, the Court has given too many in-
structions in this case, that is proved in the argument of 
counsel forty minutes to the side, notwithstanding the large 
number of instructions, which were given, there was not a 
single reference, except a general reference to the Def en-
<lant' s instructions, and the only reference to the Plaintiff's 
instructions was during the last four minutes of the argu-
ment; that leads the Cot.li11 to the conclusion that the in-
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structions were given uselessly, certainly the Court has spent 
hours listening to all the complaints to the original instruc-
tions, and has modified every instruction that was offered, 
where there was any serious objection made to it. The con-
clusion the Court comes to, is that there is no matter of 
law, to which there is any objection or exception. As to 
the facts, this case is one that presents wholly 
page 165 }-an issue for the Jury's determination. The issue 
has been clearly presented by the instructions, and 
more clearly by the argument of counsel, no question about 
that. The Court being of opinion that the issue has been 
squarely presented for the Jury's determination, there is 
(,nly one question for the Court to determine, and that is 
whether the evidence warrants the verdict the Jury has 
teturned. If the evidence warranted that verdict, then the 
Trial Court has no right to set aside the verdict. There is 
evidence in the record sufficiently to support that verdict, as 
a matter of fact the evidence is sufficient to clearly show 
the damage was caused as a result of the negligence on the 
part of the defendant, and the Jury having found that 
there was no contributory negligence on the part of the 
Plaintiff, that in any wise contributed to the injury, the 
Court will have to over-rule the motion and enter up judg-
ment for the sum of $450.00, as provided for in the Jury's 
verdict, which is accordingly done. 
Mr. Richey : There is one other point that occurs to me, 
you made a statement in the record of what was wrong with 
the plat. We went out there and looked at it, and you will 
remember a car came into view 419 feet from the intersection, 
there should be something in the record to show that. 
page 166 ~ The Court: In the event there is anything 
on that point that is not clear, I can make it clear. 
Mr. Duke : We desire to note an appeal and want to 
know the amount of suspending bond. 
The Court: You may note exceptions, and the order 
will provide for suspension bond of $250.00, and the sus-
pension bond shall run for 60 days, and you will have 30 
days to give the bond. 
John C. Greenleaf, Jr. v. G. E. Richards 147 
The Court: The car disappears between the sign, which 
is, I think, marked caution, and the sign marked, the second 
s1gn. 
Presented to me July 23, 1940. 
Given under my hand this 2nd day of Aug., 1940. 
(Signed) LEMUEL F. SMITH 
Judge. 
NOTE: Instruction D refused in MS, but marked out with 
pencil. If necessary see MS-Clerk. 
page 167~ CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION 
NO. 2 
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, defendant 
moved the Court to strike the plaintiff's evidence and for 
grounds of said motion stated the following: 
Upon the evidence of the plaintiff himself that he cannot 
ask for any more than what he had testified to himself; that 
he testified that he came up to the place and stopped; that 
he stopped where he could see and looked up and down that 
road (highway No. 29) and did not see anything; that he 
started across; that highway No. 29 is a superior highway 
as compared to No. 33 and has no stop sign; but No. 33, at 
the time of the accident, had a stop sign 80 feet from the 
intersection; that according to the engineer and the elevations 
shown upon the plat introduced in the evidence, the plaintiff, 
when he got his front wheels up to the intersection ( meaning 
where the sidelines of the paved portions of the highway 
intersect) he could see a distance of over 1,000 feet south 
( afterwards admitted to be over 400 feet south) ; that when 
he got his front wheels up to the intersection as thus defined. 
he was in a place of danger; that it was his duty then to look 
North and South for oncoming cars ; that according to his 
own statement, he did not see defendant's oncoming car, 
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, visible at this point for a distance of over 400 feet, and which 
he could have seen had he looked, but drove directly in front 
of it; 
page 168 ~ And on the further ground that the plaintiff's 
own evidence showed contributory negligence on 
his part that efficiently contributed to his own injury; 
That this motion was overruled by the Court and to this 
ruling the defendant excepted on the grounds stated in the 
motion itself. 
And thereafter, to-wit, on the 25th day of May, 1940, 
at the conclusion of all of the evidence herein the defendant 
by counsel, renewed his motion to strike plaintiff's evidence 
upon the grounds : 
(a) Plaintiff's own evidence shows conclusively plaintiff 
Richards' negligence is the sole cause of the accident; 
(b) Plaintiff's own evidence shows conclusively that plain-
tiff Richards is guilty of contributory negligence which effic-
iently and proximately caused the accident and should bar 
his recovery herein ; 
( c) The evidence shows conclusively, and plaintiff's evi-
dence shows conclusively, that if plaintiff Richards' negli-
gence was not the sole cause of the accident, as defendant 
avers that it is, and if plaintiff's evidence does not show plain-
tiff is barred from recovery, and if there be any evidence to 
show defendant was guilty of any negligence, which def en-
dant denies, then plaintiff's evidence and the whole 
page 169 ~vidence shows plaintiff Richards was guilty of 
concurring negligence which bars any recovery 
herein; 
( d) The physical facts show· conclusively that plaintiff 
Richards was guilty of negligence which solely caused the 
accident, and if not, that plaintiff Richards was guilty of 
contributory negligence sufficient to bar his recovery herein; 
( e) That the evidence of the plaintiff Richards shows con-
clusively that he was guilty of negligence contributing prox-
imately to his own injury in that he kept no proper lookout, 
did not avail himself of what a proper lookout would have re-
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vealed and that he negligently undertook to enter the inter-
section across the line of travel of defendant Greenleaf's on-
coming car which, as shown by the record, was clearly visible 
on his right for a distance of more than four hundred ( 400) 
feet, and that he failed to stop, failed to stop at the proper 
place, failed to yield to defendant the right of way which 
defendant was entitled, and failed to stop in time to avert 
the accident as he could have done had he maintained a proper 
lookout; 
. But the Court overruled said motion, to which action of 
the Court in overruling said motion, the defendant, by coun-
sel, excepted upon the grounds stated. 
Presented me July 23, 1940. 
Teste: This 2nd day of Aug., 1940. 
(Sgd) LEMUEL F. SMITH 
Judge. 
page 170~ CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION 
NO. 3 
The Court is satisfied that the following instructions are 
the instructions and all the instructions given by the Court 
for either plaintiff or the defendant upon the trial of this 
case; those given for the plaintiff being numbered A, B, C, 
etc.; and that preceding the actual reading of the individual 
instructions, the Court made the following statement to the 
Jury: 
"Gentlemen of the Jury, please pay attention . to the in-
structions of the Court, which constitute the law governing 
the trial of the case you have just heard. At this time, I 
will read you a number of paragraphs, which we call instruc-
tions and are numbered one, two and so on, they are all the 
instructions of the Court and constitute the law of the case. 
No one of them is to be given any greater weight than the 
other. Gentlemen, I might say this to you--whenever any 
cpntroversy comes into the Court-room. that is what law 
suits are, that indicates that there is a difference of opinion 
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between the parties and they have to submit these matters of 
law to the Court, and the Court has to give you the rules or 
the law of the case. In order for the Court to do this, it is 
necessary for the Judge to sit first in the position of the plain-
tiff and look at the evidence of the plaintiff and give you the 
law of the case from his view points, then it is necessary for 
the Judge to sit in the position of the defendant and look at 
the evidence of the defendant and give you the law of the 
case from his view point. Notwithstanding, that this is 
the method, they are all one instruction, there 
page 171 ~are no conflicts in the instructions, and whenever 
the Jury reaches the Jury room, if they have any 
argument about what the law is, you ought not to take much 
time on that. It is difficult in a case of this type to be 
as definite as I would like to be, but if there is any ques-
tion about what the instructions mean, or what. the law is, 
come back and I will try to clarify it for you. 
Gentlemen, I want to call your attention to the fact that 
in this case there are really two suits going on at one time. 
The plaintiff is suing the defendant for what we describe 
as personal injuries, that is injuries to himself and injuries 
to his automobile, that is one direct suit. The defendant is 
likewise suing the plaintiff for the injuries to his car. You 
are really trying two cases at one and the same time. 
page 172 r No. 1 
1. The Court instucts the jury that if they find for the 
plaintiff, they may, in estimating damages, take into consider-
ation the bodily injury, disability and disfigurements sustained 
by him, if any, and the permanent or temporary character 
thereof and the pain and mental anguish caused by said 
injuries, if any, and fix the amount of damages at such 
sum as will be a just reasonable, and proper compensation 
therefor; provided, however, such damages shall not ex-
ceed the amount sued for, to-wit, Five Hundred ($500.00) 
Dollars. 
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And the Court further instructs the jury that if they 
believe from the evidence that the plaintiff's automobile was 
partially destroyed by the defendant's negiigence, if any, 
then, the measure of damages, with reference to said auto-
mobile, is the reasonable cost of the necessary repairs and 
labor in restoring said automobile to its condition before. 
the collision, provided it does not exceed the difference be-
tween the fair market value before the accidnt less its value 
thereafter. 
2. The. Court instructs the jury that if they believe from 
the evidence that the defendant, John C. Greenleaf, Jr., en-
tt'red the intersection at the time of the collision involved in 
this case at a speed materially exceeding fifteen miles an 
hour in violation of the lawful speed limit fixed by signs erect-
ed on U.S. Highway No. 29 then the said defendant was guil-
ty of negligence; and if the jury further believe that such 
negligence was the proximate couse of the collision and 
the plaintiff's damages, they should find for the plain-
tiff. 
page 173 rNOTE: Instruction 3, in MS. but marked out 
with pencil. If necessary see MS.-Clerk. 
4. The Court instructs the jury that it was the duty of the 
defendant John C. Greenleaf, Jr., while driving his auto-
mobile along U. S. Highway No. 29 on the day of the alleged 
accident occurring near Ruckersville, Virginia, to use ordin-
ary care to operate his vehicle at a speed and in such manner 
as to avoid endangering or be likely to endanger life, limb, 
or property of any person using said highway; and 
( 2) Slow down, or regulate the speed of his auto-
mobile to accord with the requirements of the road signs 
erected upon said highway by authority of the State High-
way Commission; and, 
( 3) To approach an intersection at a lawful rate of speed·; 
And if the jury believe from the evidence that the saicl 
<lefendant, John C. Greenleaf, Jr., failed to use ordinary 
-care to perform any one or all of the foregoing duties, an"d 
that by reason thereof his automobile struck the automobile 
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of the plaintiff and inflicted serious bodily injuries upon said 
plaintiff and demolished and damaged his automobile, then 
the defendant was guilty of negligence; and if the jury fur-
ther believe from all the evidence in the case that 
page 17 4 ~such negligence was the proximate cause of the 
injury to the plaintiff and damage to his automobile 
they must find for the plaintiff. 
5. The Court instructs the jury that in this case Richards 
is asking for judgment against Greenleaf in the amount of 
$500~00 for damage to Richards' car and in the amount of 
$500.00 additional for personal injury suffered by Richards, 
all of which he alleges was caused by a collision between the 
automobile driven by Greenleaf with the automobile driven 
by Richards at Ruckersville on December 20th, 1939, on the 
ground that the sole proximate cause of said collision was 
the negligent and careless operation by Greenleaf of his 
said car. 
Greenleaf has filed a counter claim against Richards, in 
which he denies that he operated his said car on the occasion 
mentioned, carelessly or negligently, and alleges that the 
sole proximate cause of said collision was the careless and 
negligent operation by Richards of his said car, and Green-
leaf therefore claims he was under no liability to Richards 
and is asking for judgment against Richards in the a-
mount of $300.00 which he alleges to be the damage to his 
automobile by reason of said collision. 
If the Jury believe from the evidence, that upon the occasion 
mentioned the sole proximate cause of the collision was 
the negligent operation by Greenleaf of his said automobile, 
and that Richards was guilty of no negligence in the oper-
ation of his said automobile, that efficiently contributed to 
the collision, then they shall find a verdict against Greenleaf 
on his cross claim, and in favor of Richards on his claim 
in such amount for damage to his car, as the evidence shows, 
not to exceed the amount claimed, and also in stich amount 
for personal injury as the evidence shows, not to exceed the 
amount claimed. 
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page 175 }- But if on the other hand the Jury believe that 
Richards was guilty of negligence which in any 
efficient degree contributed to the collision then he cannot 
recover and the Jury must find for the defendant. 
8. The Jury are instructed · that in this case the burden 
is upon the defendant Greenleaf to prove contributory neg-
ligence on the part of the plaintiff Richards; and unless 
this is shown by a preponderance of the evidence, the Jury 
cannot find Ric;h~rds guilty of contributory negligence. 
page 176~ V _(A) 
The Court instructs the Jury that the driver 
of a car may be guilty of negligence even though he is 
proceeding at a slow rate of speed, the caution in the 
]Jlatter of speed will not absolve or relieve him from the duty 
of keeping a proper lookout for oncoming vehicles when he 
is about to enter an intersection. The driver of an auto-
mobile will not be permitted to drive into the path of an-
other automobile approaching dangerously near and in plain 
view; or to fail or refuse to look for another automobile, 
which is using the intersecting road, when such other auto-
mobile is in plain view and is dangerously near, and to enter 
it in such circumstances is negligence. And if you believe 
from the evidence that in this case Richards did enter U. S. 
)J' o. 29 without looking and that the defendant, Greenleaf' s · 
car was in plain view and dangerously near, then Richards 
was guilty of negligence. And the jury must find for the 
defendant. 
(B) 
The Court instructs the Jury that the law requires the 
driver of a car to keep a proper lookout, in order that he 
may avail himslef of what the lookout discloses to provent 
injury to himself as well as to others. Keeping a lookout 
is without avail unless one uses the information thereby 
secured. One who keeps a lookout, and fails to take ad-
vantage of what it discloses, is as guilty of negligence as one 
who fails to keep his lookout. 
154 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
page 177 r (C) 
The Court instructs the jury that under the 
law it was the duty of plaintiff Richards, at and before 
emerging from Route No. 33 into U. S. No. 29; 
( 1) To come to a complete stop,' 
( 2) To keep a proper lookout fro traffic flowing along 
U. S. No. 29, 
( 3) Not to start into said highway without first seeing 
that such movement could be made in safety. 
And if you believe from the weight of the evidence that 
he failed to perform one or more of these duties, he is 
guilty of negligence. 
(E) . 
The Court instructs the Jury that negligence on the part 
of defendant Greenleaf cannot be assumed merely because a 
collision with Defendant's automobile the plaintiff's auto-
mobile was damaged and plaintiff was injured; but the burden 
rests upon the plaintiff to establish negligence on 
page 178 rthe part of the defendant by a preponderance of 
evidence and if the plaintiff fails to do this, the 
Jury must find for the defendant. 
(F) 
The Court instructs the Jury that even though they may 
believe that the Richards' car stopped at or near the stop 
sign on Route 33, yet if the jury further believe that a 
proper lookout would have revealed the approaching car 
from his right in time for him to have avoided the accident 
by again stopping before reaching U. S. 29, it was his duty 
to do so, and if he failed to do so, such failure was negligence, 
and if such negligence proximately contributed to the acci-
cent, the jury must find for the defendant. 
(G) 
The Court instructs the jury that the defendant, John 
C. Greenleaf, Jr., driving north on U. S. No. 29 had the 
right of way over the Richards' car coming over Route 
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33; that it was the duty of the driver of the Richards' 
car to stop before attempting to cross highway U. S. No. 
29, and the defendant Greenleaf had the right to assume 
that we would stop, and if the jury believe that the Richards 
failed to stop in a place where he could see along U. S. 
29, and that such failure was the proximate cause of the 
accident, or proximately contributed thereto, then the Jury 
must find for the defendant. 
(H) 
The Court instructs the jury that the law will not under-. 
take to balance the negligence of respective par-
page 179 rties for the purpose of determining which was 
most at fault. The law recognizes no graduation 
·of faults in such case, and where both parties were guilty 
Qf negligence which proximately causes ·or efficiently con-
tributes to the injuries complained of, there can be no re-
covery. 
(L) 
The Court instructs the jury that if they find for the 
defendant, Greenleaf, on his cross claim they shall award 
his damages the fair market value of his car before the 
· accident less the salvage value thereof. 
(R) 
The Court instructs the Jury that negligence is failure 
to exercise ordinary care; the care which a man of reason-
able or ordinary prudence would have exercised under the 
circumstances ; that it is a relative term, and must be com-
mensurate with the risk or danger faced; that the greater 
the risk or danger, the greater the care required; that what 
would be ordinary care where the risk or danger is slight, 
would not be or~inary care where the risk or danger is 
great." 
page 180~ CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION 
No. 4 
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To the giving of Instruction No. 1 offered by the Plain-
tiff, there was no exception. 
To the giving of Instruction No. 2 offered by the Plain.:. 
tiff, the defeIJ.dant excepted and for grounds of exception 
assigned these. shown (transcript) the· heading of insts. 
I 
page 182 ~ To the giving of Instruction No. 3 offered by 
the Plain ti~, the defendant duly excepted and for 
grounds of exception assigned ii:i the heading of instructions. 
page 183 ~ To the giving of Instruction No. 4 offered by 
· the Plaintiff, the defendant duly excepted and for 
grounds of exception assigned those shown tr. hearing of 
instructions. 
page 184~ To the giving on Instruction No. 5 offered by 
the Plaintiff, the defendant duly excepted and for 
grounds of exception assigned those shown in hearing of 
insts. 
Given under my hand- this 2nd day of Aug., 1940. 
( Sgn) LEMUEL F. SMITH. 
Judge 
Presented to me July 23rd, 1940. 
page 185 ~ CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION 
No. 5 
The defendant offered instructions lettered reading as · 
follows, which said instructions were refused by the Court. 
Defendant's Original Instruction "D" 
The Court instructs the jury that it was the duty of the 
driver of the Richards' car not only to stop and look, as re-
quired by the stop sign on Route No. 33, but to continue to 
John C. Greenleaf, Jr. v. G. E. Ric.hards 157 
look until his car was safely across the traveled portion of 
U. S. No. 29; and that if he failed to do so, such failure 
was negligence; and if the jury believe that the said Richards 
by keeping a. proper lookout could have avoided the accident 
at any time up to the actual collision, and failed to do so, and 
that such f ~ilure proximately caused or contributed to the 
accident, they must find for the defendant Greenleaf. 
page 186 ~ The failure of the Court to give instruction "D", 
defendant by counsel excepted on the ground that 
it properly sets out the law. · 
Presented to me July 23rd, 1940. 
Given under my hand the 2nd day of Aug., 1940. 
LEMUEL F. SMITH 
Judge 
page ·187~ CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION 
NO. 6 
And on the same day, to-wit, the 25th day of May, 1940, 
the J uty having heard the evidence in full, received the in-
structions from the Court, and having heard the argument 
of counsel, retired to their room to consider of their verdict ; 
and after some time returned to the Court, having found 
a verdict as follows : 
"We, the jury, find for the plaintiffs $450.00 Four Hun-
dred and Fifty Dollars damages to car. 
J.' A. DUNN, Foreman" 
Whereupon the defendant, by counsel, moved the Court 
to set aside the verdict of the Jury for errors of law com-' 
mitted during the trial as contrary to the law and the evi-
dence because : 
(a) Plaintiff's own evidence shows conclusively plaintiff 
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Richards' negligence is the sole cause of the accident; 
(b) Plaintiff's own evidence shows conclusively that plain-
tiff Richards is guilty of contributory negligence which 
efficiently and proximately caused the accident and should 
bar his recovery herein; 
( c) The evidence shows conclusively, and t~e plaintiff's 
evidence shows conclusively, that if plaintiff Richards' neg-
ligence was not the sole cause of the accident, as defendant 
avers that it is, and if plaintiff's evidence does 
page 188 rnot show plaintiff is barred from recovery, and 
if there be any evidence to show defendant was 
guilty of any negligence, which defendant denies, then plain-
tiff's evidence and the whole evidence shows plaintiff Richards 
was guilty of concurring negligence which bars any recovery 
herein; 
( d) The physical facts show conclusively th~t plaintiff 
Richards was guilty of negligence which solely caused the 
accident, and if not, that plaintiff Richards was guilty of 
contributory negligence sufficient to bar his recovery herein; 
( e) That the evidence of the plaintiff Richards shows 
conclusively that he was guilty of negligence contributing 
proximately to his own injury in that he kept no proper look-
out, did not avail himself of what a proper lookout would 
have revealed and that he negligently undertook to enter the 
intersection across the line of travel of defendant Greenleaf's 
oncoming car which, as shown by the record, was clearly 
visible on his right for a distance of more than four hun-
dred ( 400) feet, and that he failed to stop, failed to stop 
at the proper place, failed to yield to defendant the right of 
way which defendant was entitled, and failed to stop in time 
to avert the accident as he could have done had he maintained 
a proper lookout; 
page 189 r But the Court overruled said motion, to which 
action of the Court in overruling said motion, 
the defendant, by counsel, excepted upon the grounds stated. 
Presented to me July 23rd, 1940. 
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Teste: This 2nd day of Aug., 1940. 
(sgn) LEMUEL F. SMITijI 
Jud 
page 190 ~ CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION 
No. 7 
The plat purported to have been made by O. Rob ins 
Randolph, certified engineer,• is the · plat and survey~-n-
troduced in evidence as exhibit No. 1 by consent of co n-
sel, the engineer having been retained by counsel for pl in-
tiff and defendant. Attention is called, however, to he 
fact that agreed by counsel the notation on said plat ttat 
"Visibility 1,000 feet or more" is incorrect inasmuch as 
there is a dip in U. S. No. 29 South of its intersect on 
with Route No. ·33 approximately 500 feet South of srid 
intersection in which a car was not visible. See record. F. or 
more complete identification, I have put my initials "LF " 
on the back of the plat. 
Presented to me July 23rd, 1940. 
Teste: This 2nd day of Aug., 1940. 
Sgn. LEMUEL.F. SMIT 
Judge 
egal and timely service accepte 
1940. 
ugust, 
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JOHN S. CHAPM.A.j\r & R. 0. NORRIS,°- JR. 
Per: (sgd) R. 0. NORRIS, JR. 
I agree that this is all of the record required. 
page .192rVIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 
GREENE COUNTY 
G. E. RICHARDS ............. ·. . . . . . . . . . . . Plaintiff 
v. CERTIFICATE OF THE JUDGE 
JO.RN C. GREENLEAF, JR ..... · ......... ,. Defendant 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Certificate of Ex-
ception No. 1 . to 7 inclusive, af t~r clue notice in writing 
to counsel for plaintiff, were presented to me at my office in 
the City of Charlottesvile, Virginia, by attorneys for the 
defendant and that John S. Chapman, Esq., of counsel for 
plaintiff (defendant in error) was present, this being done 
on the 23rd day of July, 1940, and l further certify that at 
my said office in said City on the 2nd day of August, 1940, 
the foregoing Certificates of Exception were duly signed 
by me. 
Given u11det my hand this 2nd day of August, 1940. 
(sgd) LEMUEL F. SMITH, Judge 
I, B. I." Bickers, certify that these bills of exception No. 
1 to 7 were delivered to me Aug. 2nd, 1940, at 2 :30 P. M. 
page 193 r 
(sgd) B. I. BICKERS, Clerk 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, B. I. Bickers, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Greene 
County, Virginia, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a 
true transcript of of the excerpts of the record requested 
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in the above entitled case wherein G. E. Richards is plain-
tiff and John C. Greenleaf, Jr,; is defendant, and that the 
t)laintiff had due notice in writing of their intention of the 
defendant to apply for such transcript of the record. 
Witness my hand this 25th day of September, 1940. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
B. I. BICKERS 
Clerk 
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